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Abstract 
 
This thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of change 
in product market competition on board composition and evaluate its consequences on firm 
performance. Using industry-specific exogenous changes in product market competition, I 
test whether firms respond to changes in the demand for board independence. I find that 
firms decrease their level of board independence by 5.52 percentage points in response to 
an increase in product market competition. Moreover, by exploiting the 2003 NYSE and 
NASDAQ rulings in a triple-difference design, I show that constraint on firm’s ability to 
adjust its board structure in response to changes in competition has negative consequences 
on its performance; firms which are constrained by the regulation to reduce their board 
independence experience a 10.5 percentage points lower return on assets (ROA) compared 
to unconstrained firms. This suggests that the decrease in board independence is in the 
interest of shareholders. By showing that regulation may actually harm some firms, the 
analysis sheds light on the costs of “one size fits all” governance regulations. 
 
In the second chapter, I shed light on the political ideology of the CEO as an important 
determinant of firm performance. Using individual campaign contribution data, I measure 
the political ideology of U.S. CEOs over the period 1994 to 2014 and analyze the relation 
between CEO ideology and firm performance. To identify the causal effect of CEO ideology, 
I use a combination of time-varying effects and novel instruments based on the ideology of 
the pool of potential CEO hires. Across all specifications, I find that firms with Republican 
CEOs, on average, 6 percentage point higher ROA compared to firms with Democrat CEOs. 
Several alternate explanations such as time varying differences at state-industry level, 
political connections and firm fixed effects do not explain away the  results. 
 
In the third chapter, joint work with Antonio Vazquez Lopez (UC3M), we test whether focal 
firms whose CEOs sit on multiple boards can suffer decreases in performance due to 
transient attention-grabbing events in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors. We 
exploit extreme returns (positive and negative), extreme earnings and extreme volatility  in 
firms where CEOs sit as independent directors and find that such distraction leads        to 
an average decrease of approximately 1% of focal firm’s ROA, Q, market returns and 
ROE. This effect is stronger for focal firms that are geographically more distant to firms 
where CEOs sit as independent directors, which suggests that distraction is costlier in  such 
situations. Additionally, we show that distraction is greater for CEOs that sit on the audit 
committee or chair a major sub-committee. Finally, we show that these distraction events 
also lead to lower CEO compensation and higher probability of forced   turnover. 
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Using industry-specific exogenous changes  in  product  market  competition,  I  test whether  
firms  respond  to  changes  in  the  demand  for  board  independence.   I  find    that firms 
decrease their  level  of  board  independence  by  5.52  percentage  points  in response  to  an  
increase  in  product  market  competition.  Moreover,  by  exploiting  the 2003 NYSE and 
NASDAQ rulings in a triple-difference design, I show that constraint on firm’s ability to adjust 
its board structure in response to changes in competition has negative consequences on its 
performance;  firms  which  are  constrained  by  the regulation  to  reduce  their  board  
independence  experience  a  10.5  percentage  points lower  return  on  assets  (ROA)  compared  
to  unconstrained  firms.   This  suggests  that   the  decrease  in  board  independence  is  in  
the  interest  of  shareholders.   By  showing that  regulation  may  actually  harm  some  firms,  
the  analysis  sheds  light  on  the  costs  of “one size fits all” governance regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
Board of directors is one of the most salient internal governance mechanisms employed by 
firms. However, answers to some of the first order questions on board of directors in the 
corporate governance literature remain contested, even after decades of research on them. 
Does board independence matter for firm performance?2 Are board structures reflective of 
shareholder interests3 or are they a result of CEO entrenchment?4 Is regulating board 
composition value enhancing?5 Even in the absence of consensus on the answers to these 
questions, since the early 2000s, activist institutional investors and regulators have pressed 
for greater board independence, under the assumption that independent directors are 
better monitors of managers. If firms choose their board structures to maximize firm value 
or if greater board independence is not always beneficial, such “one size fits all” regulations 
may have negative consequences. 
In this paper, I contribute to these open debates by addressing two novel research questions. 
Do firms adjust their board independence in response to a change in product market 
competition? If so, is this adjustment in the interest of shareholders? 
Product market competition arguably serves as a significant governance mechanism in 
disciplining managers.6 Several empirical studies highlight this substitution between 
product market competition and corporate governance.7 If competition serves as a 
monitoring mechanism, then an increase in competition would reduce the benefits of 
monitoring accrued to a firm using internal governance structures. Hence, firms may 
reduce their board independence in response to an increase in competition. By making 
use of an exogenous change in product market competition which alters the competitive 
landscape of the firm, I find that when firms are allowed to adjust their board structure, 
firms reduce their board independence in response to an increase in competition. 
However, is this reduction in board independence in the interest of shareholders? If the 
governance structures are captured by managers, this decrease in board independence 
might not be reflective of reduced monitoring needs, but rather the result of managers 
opting for lower monitoring to indulge in unethical behavior or to enjoy quiet life.8  To 
2There seems to be a lack of consistency in the empirical findings for the effect of board independence on firm value.
Some studies have found positive associations (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Krivogorsky, 2006; Hossain et al., 2001; Black 
et al., 2006) while some found negative or non significant effect (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Klein, 1998; Dalton et al., 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2001; Adjaoud et al., 2007; Pham et al., 2011; Wintoki et al.,   2012). 
3See, for instance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998); Raheja (2005); Harris and Raviv   (2008).
4See, for instance, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk et al.  (2008).
5While some studies find an overall positive effect of governance regulations on firm value (Chhaochharia and Grinstein,
2007), others debate their efficacy (Romano, 2004; Coles et al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010; Ahern and Dittmar,  2012). 
6See, for instance,Alchian (1950); Stigler (1958); Fama (1980); Hart (1983).
7See, for instance, Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011); Chhaochharia et al.  (2016).
8Shleifer (2004) highlights the dark side of competition where due to increased competition, managers may feel the 
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test whether this decrease in board independence is indeed in the interest of shareholders, 
I analyze a setting in which some firms are constrained in their ability to reduce their 
board independence in response to a change in competition. If this reduction in board 
independence is due to decreased monitoring needs by the firm, then a restriction in the 
ability of the firms to determine the level of monitoring given their environmental setting 
may reflect negatively in firm profitability. I find that constrained firms fare worse in 
terms of firms performance than unconstrained firms when faced with an adverse shock to 
competition. 
 
To analyze the effect of product market competition on board independence, I exploit a 
quasi-natural experiment in the form of large tariff reductions as an exogenous increase 
in the product market competition. I utilize import tariff reduction from 1980-2015 in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector. To estimate the effect of increased competition on board 
independence, I use a difference-in-difference approach with the firm, year and 2-digit 
SIC-year fixed effects. Thus, for identification, I compare changes in board independence 
of firms belonging to the industry that received tariff reduction (treated firms) to the 
changes in board independence of the firms that did not receive tariff reduction (control 
firms) in the same 2-digit SIC. I find that firms react to competition by decreasing board 
independence. In particular, a large tariff reduction event leads to a 2.9 percentage points 
decrease in the board independence in firms affected by the event relative to unaffected 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC. 
 
This effect is much stronger when I limit the analysis to the years prior to 2002. In 
response to corporate scandals and other corporate governance failures, various regulations 
were passed in the early 2000s which were aimed at increasing board independence. Hence, 
they effectively set up a lower bound that may limit the reduction in board independence 
of the firms in response to increased competition. To abstract from these confounding 
effects, I carry out the analysis for the relevant sample i.e. for the years prior to 2002 and 
obtain a stronger negative effect of 5.52 percentage points decrease in board independence 
for this sample period. This effect reflects a 12% decrease in board independence for a 
firm with average board independence. 
 
A decrease in the proportion of board independence could be due to simply firing (not 
re-electing) the independent directors or hiring of non-independent directors or due to 
replacing the independent directors with non-independent directors. I analyze the change 
in board composition to show that the decrease in board independence is partly due to 
a decrease in the number of independent directors and partly due to an increase in the 
pressure to enhance short term performance. For instance, they may manipulate the earnings to influence the stock prices 
Datta et al. (2013) or indulge in tax evasion (Cai and Liu, 2009). 
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non-independent i.e. employee and linked directors. These results are consistent with the 
notion that in light of a significant increase in product market competition, complex and 
strategic decisions need to be made on how to respond to the new competitive environment. 
Hence, increase in competition may not only render the monitoring role of the directors 
less relevant but may also enhance the need of an insider in the board for their superior 
advising capabilities.9 These results support the view that firms trade off the strengths 
and weaknesses of inside and outside directors in advising and monitoring to maximize 
shareholder value. 
Furthermore, I show that firms’ reaction to competition depends on the level of exposure 
to competition. Stand-alone firms which operate in a single product market (focused firms) 
may be exposed to intensified pressure from foreign competitors much more than highly 
diversified firms which operate in numerous product markets. Similarly, firms that sell 
a significant fraction of their production abroad (exporting firms) may be less affected 
by the increased pressure from foreign rivals. I find that the effect is mainly driven by 
focused and non-exporting firms. 
To explicitly test whether this reduction in board independence is in the interest of 
shareholders or not, I utilize the listing requirements by the NYSE and NASDAQ approved 
by the SEC in November 2003, which required the majority of the board to be composed 
of independent directors. In conjunction with the exogenous shock to competition, these 
requirements pose constraints on some firms, but not all, in reducing board independence.10 
If firms were structuring the boards in the interest of shareholders, constrained firms would 
end up with a suboptimal board and hence lower firm performance. 
I analyze how a change in competition affects constrained firms differently from uncon- 
strained firms. I define my group of “constrained” firms as firms with lower than 55% board 
independence at the time they received a tariff reduction.11 Since firms were constrained 
only after the law was passed (i.e., 2003), I carry out the diff-in-diff analysis for years 
2003 onwards. I find that ROA of constrained firms decreases by 0.065 pp (statistically 
significant at 1%) compared to unconstrained firms after the passage of the law. This effect 
is economically significant as it corresponds to more than one-third standard deviations 
9See, for instance, Baysinger et al. (1991); Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Bhagat and Black (2001); Coles et al. (2008);
Faleye et al. (2011). 
10 For example, consider two firms listed in NYSE; one with 55% of its board as independent while another having board
independence of 85%. Both firms are in compliance with the regulations imposed by the exchange. Now suppose there is a 
significant tariff reduction increasing the product market competition for both firms. Results from the first part show that 
firms would want to decrease board independence in response to this change. However, one of the firms (with 55% board 
independence) is constrained compared to the other (with 85%) in its ability to reduce independence due to the listing 
requirements by NYSE and NASDAQ. 
11The results are robust to alternative definitions of constrained, i.e., using both stricter (50%) as well as lenient (60%)
thresholds of board independence. 
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decrease in ROA. 
 
However, being “constrained” is dependent on firm’s board independence level at a specific 
point in time. While I show that the two groups (constrained and unconstrained) do not 
differ systematically in observables, it can be argued that board independence is being 
endogenously determined by the firms. Therefore, we may be concerned that the very 
fact that these groups have different levels of board independence indicates that these 
two groups are systematically different from each other. However, what is pertinent for 
identification is that the two groups do not differ in their response to competition, i.e. 
the change in competition affects constrained and unconstrained12 firms in the same way 
even in the absence of law. Triple differences (DiDiD) analysis allows me to address this 
potential concern. 
 
DiDiD not only allows me to capture the effect of this inability to freely reduce board 
independence on firm performance but also allows for the effect of competition on the 
profitability of these two distinct groups in the absence of being constrained to be different.13 
The results show that change in competition affects firm profitability of constrained firms 
significantly negatively compared to unconstrained firms post law. In particular, being 
constrained results in 10.5 percentage points lower return on assets (ROA) compared to 
unconstrained firms which correspond to a quarter of a standard deviations decrease in 
ROA for a firm with average ROA. 
 
I provide numerous tests in support of the validity of results. Specifically for the first 
analysis, I assess the evolution of board independence before and after the tariff reduction 
event to show evidence in favor of parallel trends assumption underlying the difference- 
in-differences approach. In addition, I show that the treatment and control firms do not 
systematically differ along any important dimension, I show that the firms that got tariff 
reduction were very similar in levels as well as trends in firm characteristics, including 
board independence, prior to the tariff reduction. I further show that the average board 
independence of the industry does not predict tariff reduction events. I also provide 
evidence that other average firm or board characteristics at industry level do not predict 
tariff reductions either. I also provide numerous tests in support of the validity of the DiDiD. 
First, I show that the constrained and unconstrained firms do not systematically differ 
along important observables. Second, I show that the evolution of board independence for 
constrained and unconstrained firms was similar prior to the law. Lastly, I provide evidence 
12note that firms were not really constrained before the law. The terms constrained and unconstrained here are being 
used to refer to firms with a certain level of board independence at the time they receive tariff reduction, i.e. below and 
above 55% respectively. 
13 The three dimensions of treatment are; pre- and post-tariff reduction, pre- and post-law and constrained versus 
unconstrained. 
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in favor of parallel trends assumption by showing that the constrained and unconstrained 
firm did not differ in their firm performance prior to the law. 
 
Results are robust to alternative thresholds to define tariff reduction and exclusion of any 
specific industry or year. To ensure that tariff reduction events are not systematically 
correlated with some unobserved firm characteristics, I carry out placebo regressions where 
I randomly assign significant tariff reduction (treatment) to the industries. I find no effect 
of competition, reassuring that the results do not reflect systematic differences among the 
firms in the sample. Results are also robust to alternate thresholds to define “constrained”, 
using varying sample periods and using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance. 
 
Through these set of analyses, I contribute to the ever growing literature on the importance 
of board independence for firm outcomes. The findings suggest that board independence 
matters. Not only do firms alter their board structure in response to an exogenous shock, 
the constraint on the ability to do so has negative implication for firm performance. 
 
This paper also contributes to the research that purports that product market competition 
is a substitute for corporate governance. Earlier studies that have examined the relation 
between product market competition and corporate governance have either used endoge- 
nously determined measures of governance or competition14 or have analyzed the effect of 
governance on firm performance, moderated by a given level of competition15 to imply the 
substitution between competition and governance. By directly analyzing the effect of an 
exogenous increase in competition in decreasing board independence, the paper provides 
causal evidence that competition and board monitoring are substitutes. 
 
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the stream that analyzes organizational responses 
to a change in product market competition. For instance, technology upgrade (Bustos, 
2011),  structure  of  compensation  and  incentives  of  executives  Cun˜at  and  Guadalupe 
(2009), organizational design (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010), cost of debt (Valta, 2012), 
investment (Fre´sard and Valta, 2015), corporate social responsibility (Flammer, 2015)and 
CEO turnover and performance sensitivity (Dasgupta et al., 2017). In this paper, I 
examine a previously unexplored organizational response to a change in the competitive 
environment of a firm, namely change in board  independence. 
 
Moreover, I contribute to the debate on the optimal versus entrenched boards. While 
some researchers argue that board structure arises as an optimal outcome to the given 
14See, for instance, Cremers et al. (2008); Chou et al. (2011).  These studies analyze the relation between competition and 
external governance structures, specifically, market for corporate control, using Herfindahl Index (HHI) for industry 
competition as a measure of industry  competition. 
15See, for instance, Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011); Chhaochharia et al.  (2016). 
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environment of a firm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005), another strand of 
literature supports the entrenchment view according to which the boards may be captured 
by the managers who seek to indulge in rent seeking behavior (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). I present evidence in favor of the former view by 
showing that changes in board composition caused by an exogenous increase in competition 
increase shareholder value, in the sense that profits fall less for firms that lower board 
independence than for those who cannot do so. 
 
Finally, I contribute to the research on the costs of corporate governance regulation (Coles 
et al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010)16 by explicitly showing that constrained firms fare worse 
than unconstrained firms when faced with an adverse shock to the competition. I utilize 
a triple diff design to alleviate the potential endogeneity concerns not addressed in this 
literature earlier. By highlighting that greater board independence may actually harm 
some firms, I emphasize the negative consequences of regulations with one-size-fits-all 
approach. 
 
 
 
2 Product Market Competition and Board Indepen- 
dence 
Board of directors is one of the most critical apparatus for corporate governance. Their 
essential duty is to ensure that the shareholders best interests are met. Having independent 
directors in the boards is considered a corporate governance “best practice”, at least since 
the widespread corporate scandals in the early 2000s. Institutional investors such as TIAA- 
CREF only invest in firms with majority independent boards, and CalPERS advocate 
that the only insider on the board should be the CEO Bhagat and Black (2001); Coles et 
al. (2008). Moreover, the priority of reformers to increase board independence is also 
reflected in regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and rules implemented by 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) which have called for majority of the 
board to be composed of independent agents. 
 
These regulations stem from the assumption that independent directors are better moni- 
tors.17 
16Coles et al. (2008), for instance, document that ‘complex’ firms with greater advising requirement benefit more from 
larger boards with outsider directors. However, firms in need of greater firm-specific knowledge of the directors would benefit 
more from insider directors. Duchin et al. (2010) assert that the cost of information is an important factor determining whether 
increased board independence as a result of these regulations would be beneficial for the firm or not.  When the cost of 
acquiring information is low, the addition of outsiders to the board increased firm performance while when the cost is high, 
the addition of outsiders to the board worsens the   performance. 
17This notion that independent boards are more effective is mainly grounded in agency theory where the   separation 
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However, this increased independence is by no means a costless panacea. While independent 
directors may lead to improvements in oversight, these improvements may come at a 
cost to the advising function of the board.18 Boards require firm specific knowledge 
along with sufficient experience and expertise to fulfill this advisory role. Several studies 
have recognized that insider directors are more aware of the functioning of the firm and 
have more inside knowledge lending them the superiority of the amount and quality of 
information over an outsider.19 Hence, these two roles are subject to a tradeoff. Faleye 
et al. (2011), for instance, highlight how the improvement in monitoring quality comes 
at the significant cost of weaker strategic advising and greater managerial myopia. For 
firms with intense board monitoring, they document significant negative effects on firms’ 
acquisition performance and corporate innovation. They further emphasize that the costs of 
intense monitoring through lower quality advising outweigh the benefits of better quality 
monitoring with respect to overall firm value. Other studies have also highlighted how 
increased board independence might have costs for certain subsample of firms (Coles et al., 
2008; Duchin et al., 2010). 
 
In light of these costs of increased independence, firms with lower monitoring needs or 
higher advising requirements may be better off with boards with a smaller proportion 
of independent directors. I analyze a setting in which the monitoring needs of the firms 
receive an exogenous shock. In response to decreased monitoring needs, firms would then 
adjust their board, reducing their independence  level. 
 
Product market competition is viewed as a significant governance mechanism in disciplining 
managers (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Fama, 1980; Hart, 1983). A common argument 
supporting this view is that of ‘natural selection’ proposed by Alchian (1950) as inefficient 
firms would not be able to survive in the face of increased competition. If managers 
continue to engage in wasteful behavior, the firm would be incapable to compete and would 
have to declare bankruptcy eventually. Hence, the threat of liquidation and bankruptcy 
induces managers to exert greater effort (Allen et al., 1999). Moreover, greater competition 
results in increased information availability for monitoring the managers (Hart, 1983). 
 
Several empirical studies also highlight the substitution between product market com- 
petition and corporate governance of firm by analyzing the effect of governance on firm 
performance, moderated by a given level of competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; 
Chhaochharia et al., 2016). These studies show how good governance is beneficial for firm 
 
of management and ownership leads managers to take actions not completely aligned with the goals of the shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Board of directors, as a monitoring mechanism, would then fail to serve its purpose if it is 
comprised of the members of the management that it is supposed to control (inside director). 
18Board of directors have two main functions; monitoring and advising the senior management. See, for instance, (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010; Lu et al.,  2017) 
19see, for instance, (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black,  2001). 
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performance, but only for firms in non-competitive  industries. 
 
Not many studies have analyzed the direct effect of competition on governance structures. 
Few exceptions include Cremers et al. (2008)20 and Chou et al. (2011)21 who analyze the 
relation between competition and external governance structures, specifically, market for 
corporate control. 
 
I contribute to this literature by analyzing the effect of competition on one of the most 
important internal governance mechanism, board independence. If indeed competition 
serves as a monitoring mechanism, then an increase in competition would reduce the 
benefits of monitoring accrued to a firm using internal governance structures. Hence, 
we would expect firms to reduce their internal monitoring through decreased board 
independence in response to an increase in competition. 
 
 
2.1 Data and Sample 
 
To understand how competition affects board independence, the main challenge is to find 
a measure of competition at the industry level that is exogenous to corporate policies. To 
account for potential endogeneity of product market competition, I use a quasi-natural 
experimental setting that produces exogenous increases in competition in some industries 
but not in others. Specifically, I exploit reductions in import tariffs to identify the effect 
of variations in competition on the firm’s board independence.22 
 
Import tariffs represent a significant amount of trade costs. Hence, over the past few 
decades, U.S. trade authorities have gradually removed this important barrier to trade. 
In the U.S. manufacturing sector, the average tariff has seen a reduction of about 75% 
in  thirty  years  (Fre´sard  and  Valta,  2015).   This  reduction  in  import  tariffs  facilitates 
the entry of foreign rivals to domestic U.S. markets, thus increasing the product market 
competition.23 
 
I gather industry-level imports data compiled by Feenstra (1996); Feenstra et al. (2002); 
Schott (2010). This data is available for manufacturing firms for the years 1972-2005. To 
20The authors highlight that competition is associated with higher takeover defenses suggesting that competition and 
market for corporate controls can be   substitutes. 
21Using Herfindahl Index (HHI) for industry competition and G-Index for governance, they document that firms in 
competitive industries have poor corporate  governance. 
22Recently, several studies have used tariff reduction as an exogenous change in product market competition(Trefler, 
2004;  Fresard,  2010;  Guadalupe  and  Wulf,  2010;  Valta,  2012;  Flammer,  2015;  Fre´sard  and  Valta,  2015;  Dasgupta  et  al., 
2017). 
23Reduction of trade barriers gives rise to a significant increase in competition from foreign rivals (Balassa, 1966; Edwards, 
1993). 
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be able to extend the analysis to most recent years, I extend tariff reduction data until 
2015 using the data on imports provided by Peter Schott on his website.24 
 
Any product imported into the U.S. is categorized through a 10-digit HS (Harmonized 
System) code. Feenstra (1996) and Schott (2009) have developed concordance tables that 
allow the mapping of each HS product code onto four-digit SIC codes. Using this, for 
each industry-year, I compute the ad valorem tariff rate as the duties collected at U.S. 
Customs divided by the Free-On-Board custom value of imports. To ensure that I capture 
significant events, I only consider large tariff reductions. Specifically, following Valta (2012) 
and Fre´sard and Valta (2015), I compute the average tariff change for each industry and 
characterize tariff reductions in a given industry as the deviations in the yearly change 
in tariff rates from the same industry’s average (absolute) change. Tariffs fluctuate very 
often and a usual tariff change from one year to another can be very small. To ensure 
that I capture significant events which would actually affect the competitive landscape of 
the firms in that industry, I consider tariff reductions only when the tariff reduction in an 
industry year is three times larger than the average (absolute) change in the same industry 
across years and only when the tariff rate is at least 1% or higher. The results remain 
robust even after employing thresholds of two and four times larger than the industry 
average tariff change.  Moreover, similar to Fre´sard and Valta (2015), I exclude tariff cuts 
when they are followed by equivalently large increases in tariff rates over three subsequent 
years. This is to ensure that we are not capturing transitory changes. 
 
The variable of interest is board independence calculated as the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. Therefore, I merge tariff data with the data on boards from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly Risk Metrics) for the years 1980-201525. For 
industries with multiple events,26 I use the first large event as the shock to the competition. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of tariff reduction events from 1980-2015. The figure shows 
that tariff reductions occur throughout the sample period. This alleviates the concern that 
the identification may be driven by a time-specific event concentrated in a given year. We 
observe a large peak in 1995. This corresponds to the adoption of North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 which resulted in a trilateral trade block between the 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 
 
After merging, I have a total of 120 unique 4-digit SIC with 1475 firms in the sample. 
There are 76 events corresponding to 55 distinct four-digit industries in 346 firms during 
24http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub   international.htm 
25In ISS, the data on board composition is only available for years 1996 onwards.  To  avoid losing more than half of    the 
events, I collect information on board independence using the individual profile of the directors from Boardex from 1980-
1996. 
26I have 15 industries with multiple events over these 35 years; 10 industries with 2 events, 4 industries with 3 events and 
1 industry with 4  events. 
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the time period 1981-2015. 
 
Table I shows the descriptive statistics of the tariff, firm and board variables. Panel A shows 
the descriptive statistics for the 4-digit SIC level tariffs from 1981 to 2015. The average 
tariff in the manufacturing industries during the period is 2.13%. There is significant 
variation in the tariff rates among industries, ranging from 0% to 27.6%. The change in 
tariff during this period is negative and corresponds to an average decrease of 0.11 
percentage points per year. 2.2% of 4-digit SICs witnessed a significant tariff reduction. 
Panel B shows the firm characteristics. The average firm in the sample has a ROA of 2.2%. 
Panel C shows the board and governance variables. The average board independence 
during the sample period is 63.6%, and the average board has around 7 members. Variable 
definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical  Methodology 
 
I exploit the difference in timing of the events across industries by using a difference-in- 
difference strategy to estimate the effect of significant tariff reduction on board indepen- 
dence. In particular, I estimate the following: 
board independencejikt = βtariff reductionikt + αj + αt + αit + Xjtikt−1Γ + ujikt, (1) 
where board independencejikt is the proportion of independent directors in the board of 
firm j which belongs to 2-digit SIC i and 4-digit SIC k in the year t. tariff reductionikt 
is a binary variable equal to one for all years after t for a 4-digit SIC, k, that got a 
significant tariff reduction in year t. Xjikt−1 are one year lagged firm-specific factors such 
as firm performance, firm size, leverage, cash, investment and R&D that may impact board 
independence. It also includes one-year lagged board controls such as board size, gender, 
and ethnic composition and the average age of the board. 
 
αj controls for firm fixed effects. This term accounts for all time-invariant factors such as 
the firm location, industry, firm mission statement or long-term vision and policy. Hence, 
I rely only on within firm variation for my estimation. I include year fixed effects, αt, to 
controls for factors which impact all firms similarly in a year. The macroeconomic and 
business cycle fluctuations which are common to all firms, as well as aggregate governance 
trends, are accounted for by this term. 
 
Moreover, the trends in board independence in different industries might be evolving at 
a different rate. In order to account for this, I include 2-digit SIC specific time-varying 
fixed effects, αit. Hence, the term αit non-parametrically allows for a differential trend 
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in board independence among firms belonging to different 2-digit SIC. To understand 
this better, consider two 2-digit industries “20: Food and Kindred Products” and “21: 
Tobacco Products”. While both of these are within the manufacturing sector, these two 
groups of industries are very different from each other and hence might have very different 
board structures. For instance, average board independence for “21: Tobacco Products” is 
75.3% while it is only 51.5% for “20: Food and Kindred Products”. Now, for instance,  in 
our sample, a 4-digit industry “2024: Ice Cream and Frozen Deserts” receives a tariff 
reduction in 2000 hence making it “treated” while “2121: Cigars” doesn’t which makes it 
“control”. Therefore, when we compare this “treated” firms with “control” firms, we may 
be comparing two groups which differ not only in their treatment but also various other 
aspects. By including 2-digit SIC specific time-varying fixed effects, I am able to compare 
firms which at least belong to the same major group and hence are much alike except for 
their treatment status. 
 
Together, the estimation relies only on within firm variation in board independence within 
a 2-digit SIC to estimate β. That is, I compare changes in the board independence in a 
firm in a 4-digit SIC which was affected by a tariff reduction with changes in another firm 
within the same 2-digit SIC which was not affected by a tariff reduction in that year. The 
identification assumption for β to estimate the causal impact of tariff reduction on board 
independence is given by:  E(ujikt|αj, αt, αit) = 0.  That is, the unobserved factors  that 
affect board independence are uncorrelated with the tariff reduction conditional on firm 
fixed effects, year fixed effects and 2-digit time-varying fixed effects. 
 
 
2.3 Results 
 
Table II presents the estimation of Equation 1. The standard errors are clustered at the 
2-digit SIC level to allow for arbitrary correlation among firms within the same 2-digit 
SIC across years. We see a clear negative and significant impact of tariff reduction event 
on board independence. Board independence decreases by 3.37 percentage points after 
the tariff reduction compared to firms that did not face a significant tariff reduction 
(Column 1). The magnitude is economically significant. The effect corresponds to a 0.14 
standard deviations decrease in board independence. In other words, the effect reflects a 
5.5% decrease in board independence for a firm with average board independence. The 
magnitude of the coefficient slightly reduces to 3.1 percentage points once I include firm and 
board controls, but the effect of the increase in competition remains negatively significant 
(Column 3). 
 
My sample spans over 1981 to 2015. Hence the result shows the average effect of competition 
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on board independence over three decades. However, in response to corporate scandals 
and other corporate governance failures, various regulations were passed in the early 2000s 
targeted towards the composition of the boards such as SOX in 2002 and rules implemented 
by exchanges such as NASDAQ and NYSE in 2003. These regulations aimed at increasing 
board independence and hence may confound the effect I obtain. However, the coefficient, 
if anything, would be underestimated as these regulations would result in an opposite 
effect on board independence to the one I hypothesize. In order to abstract from these 
confounding effects, I carry out the analysis for the relevant sample, i.e. for the years 
prior to 2002. Results are presented in Table III. I obtain a stronger negative effect of 
competition on board independence for this sample period. In particular, after controlling 
for firm and year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC industry specific trends, firm characteristics 
along with governance factors, I find that firms reduce their board independence by 5.53 
percentage points or 0.21 standard deviations in response to an increase in competition.27 
This effect reflects a 12% decrease in board independence for a firm with average board 
independence. 
 
 
2.3.1 Board Composition 
 
The results in the previous section show a sugnificant decrease in the proportion of 
independent directors on the board as a response to increased competition. In this section, 
I test whether the decrease in the proportion of board independence is due to merely firing 
the independent directors, or hiring of insider and linked directors or due to replacing the 
independent directors with the employee or linked  directors.28 
 
If a firm fires independent directors without replacing them with other directors such 
as insider or linked directors, we should see a decrease in board size due to the firing of 
independent directors and no change in the number of insiders and linked directors. 
Instead, if a firm hires new non-independent directors to the board, we should see an 
increase in the number of non-independent board members and subsequently the board 
size. On the other hand, if a firm replaces independent directors with insiders or linked 
directors, we should see an increase in the number of directors belonging to these two 
categories. The board size, however, can increase, decrease or remain unchanged depending 
on the replacement rate between the independent directors.29 I have this information on 
the type of director only after 1996.  Therefore, this analysis is restricted to the   years 
27Results are robust to clustering the standard errors at firm level, 3-digit and 4-digit SIC level. 
28IRRC considers any director to be linked who is a “former employee; is a service provider, supplier, customer; is a 
recipient of charitable funds; is considered an interlocking or designated director; or is a family member of a director or 
executive”. 
29For instance, a firm can fire two independent directors and hire two insider directors, thus keeping board size unchanged. 
On the other hand, the firm can also replace the two fired independent directors with one (hence, decreasing board size) or 
three (increasing board size)). 
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1997-2002. 
 
Table IV shows the results. Column 1 shows that the number of independent directors 
decreases after the tariff reduction. Tariff reduction event decreases the number of 
independent directors on the board by 13.87%. This corresponds to a decrease of 0.65 
(-0.1387*.6137*7.664239= -.652) independent directors for an average board. Column 2 
and 3 show whether the decrease in the number of independent directors is met by an 
increase in the other directors. We see that there is a significant increase in the number of 
both employee and linked directors after the event. Tariff reduction event increases the 
number of employee directors in the board by 11% and linked directors in the board by 
20%. This implies an increase of around 0.20 (0.11*.228*7.66) and 0.25 (0.2027*.157*7.66) 
for employee and linked directors for an average board, respectively. There is no significant 
change in overall board size (column 4). These results are consistent with the notion that 
in light of a significant increase in product market competition, complex and strategic 
decisions need to be made on how to respond to the new competitive environment. Hence, 
as argued above, increase in competition may not only render the monitoring role of the 
directors less relevant but may also enhance the need of an insider on the board for their 
advising capabilities. 
 
 
2.3.2 Exposure to Competition 
 
Firms face varying level of exposure to competition depending on various factors. For 
instance, a stand-alone firm which operates in a single product market may be exposed 
to intensified pressure from foreign competitors much more than a highly diversified firm 
which operates in numerous product markets, only one of which belongs to the affected 
industry.  Following Fre´sard and Valta (2015), using Compustat’s Business Segment files, I 
define a firm as “diversified” (“focused”) if it reports operations in more than one (only 
one) industry (4-digit SIC code) in a given year. 
 
I also distinguish exporting firms from non-exporting ones. Firms that sell a large fraction 
of their production abroad may be less affected by the increased pressure from foreign 
rivals or may even be positively affected if the importing country experiences reduction in 
tariff. Using Compustat’s Geographic Segment files, I classify a firm as “exporting” if it 
realizes positive sales abroad in a given year (Denis et al., 2002). 
 
At the industry level, I use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to distinguish firms 
already operating in a competitive environment from those operating in a less competitive 
environment. Higher HHI indicates a high industry concentration (i.e., less competitive 
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industry). 
 
Table V reports the difference-in-difference estimates. Column 1 shows that board inde- 
pendence decreases after the tariff reduction, but this effect is not statistically significant 
for diversified firms. Focused firms, on the other hand, reduce their board independence by 
0.055 in response to an increase in competition, as shown in column 2. Hence, the effect 
of competition on board independence is driven by these focused firms. Similarly, we see 
no significant effect on board independence of exporting firms. However, non-exporting 
firms decrease their board independence by 0.066 after the event. We also find a strong 
significant reaction to competition by firms operating in industries with high HHI, i.e. in 
less competitive industries. Column 5 shows that firms in industries with high HHI reduce 
their board independence by 0.059 in response to an increase in competition while we see 
no statistically significant effect of competition for firms operating in industries with low 
HHI (column 6). The results highlight that exposure to competition determines how firms 
adjust their board independence. 
 
 
3 Competition, Regulation  and Firm  Performance 
 
Board independence has been in the spotlight for the past few years with regulators and 
institutional investors pushing for more independent directors on the boards. Independent 
directors are assumed to be more effective monitors and therefore considered synonymous 
to good governance. 
 
In 2002, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) pressured the exchanges to improve 
their governance listing standards (Chhaochharia et al., 2016). Therefore, in August 
2002, NYSE proposed that the majority of the board has to be composed of independent 
directors followed by a similar proposal by NASDAQ in October 2002. SEC approved 
these proposals in November 2003 and firms had until 2004 to comply with the regulation. 
Specifically, they had to comply by either the first annual shareholder meeting of the listed 
issuer or 31st October 2004, whichever came earlier. . 
 
This law sets a minimum threshold of independence for all firms irrespective of the 
environment they operate in. However, as analyzed above, firms may find it beneficial 
to reduce their board independence in response to an increase in external governance via 
increased competition. 
 
However, is this reduction in board independence indeed reflecting the needs of the firm? 
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Could the counter-factual have been more beneficial for them, i.e. would they have been 
better off by not reducing the monitoring in response to competition? One may argue that 
the managers are the ones who choose the board and hence this decrease in independence 
is reflective of their preferences to empire build, shirk or enjoy quiet life rather than in the 
interest of shareholders. 
 
To corroborate that this reduction in board independence is indeed in the interest of share- 
holders, I analyze a setting in which firms are unable to reduce their board independence 
in response to a change in competition due to regulatory restrictions. If this reduction is 
indeed a response to decreased monitoring (and potentially increased advising) needs by the 
firm, then a restriction in the ability of the firms to determine a level of monitoring given 
their environmental setting may reflect in firm profitability. In this section. to identify 
the effect of regulatory restrictions, I use 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements 
which required the majority of the board to be composed of independent directors. 
 
 
3.1 Identification  and Results 
 
For the analysis, I exploit the regulation in conjunction with the quasi-natural experiment 
of tariff reductions. I am interested in firms which were constrained at the time they 
received tariff reduction. Firms which had board independence slightly higher than 50% 
after the law are unable to remove an independent director as a result of the tariff reduction 
shock because they will fall below the 50% board independence mark once they do so. I 
define the group of “constrained” firms as firms with lower than 55% board independence 
at the time they received a tariff reduction. Similarly, “unconstrained” are defined as 
firms with greater than 55% board independence at the time of tariff reduction. I choose 
55% board independence because the results from obtained earlier reveal that, on average, 
a significant tariff reduction decreases board independence by 12% for an average firm. 
Hence, firms with 55% board independence just before the tariff reduction shock would 
fall below the minimum allowed board independence mark if they react optimally to the 
tariff reduction. I consider other definitions of constrained and unconstrained firms, both 
stricter (50%) as well as more lenient (60%), and show that the results remain robust.30 
 
To  identify the effect of the ruling passed by NASDAQ and NYSE (hereafter referred  to 
as “law”) in conjunction with the change in competition, I compare changes in firm 
profitability for firms that are constrained by the law at the time of tariff reduction once 
the law is implemented with firms which are unconstrained by the law. As none of the 
firms were constrained before the law, I carry out the analysis for years 2003 and onwards. 
30Depending on the definition of constrained, the number of observations change. Number of firms with significant tariff 
reduction and board independence lower than 50%, 55%, 60%, and 65% are 41, 41, 46 and 61 (out of 102 firms) respectively. 
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I use a difference-in-difference strategy and estimate the following: 
 
 
ROAjikt  = β1post  tariffikt + β2constrainedj  ∗ post  tariffikt + Xjtikt−1Γ + αj  + αt + αit + ujikt, 
(2) 
 
 
Where ROAjikt represents ROA for firm j in the year t operating in 2-digit SIC i and 4-
digit SIC k. In the baseline case, I define constrained equal to one if the firm at the time 
of tariff reduction has board independence equal to 55%. post tariffikt is a binary 
variable equal to one for all years after t for a 4-digit SIC, k, that got a significant tariff 
reduction in year t. As before, I include the firm fixed effects and 2-digit SIC specific 
time-varying fixed effects. 
 
Table VI presents the results. Column1 shows that tariff reduction affects the ROA of 
constrained firms significantly negatively compared to unconstrained firms. Once firm and 
board controls are included in the estimation (column3), the magnitude of this effect of 
being constrained increases to 10.12 percentage points. This effect is economically large 
as it corresponds to more than one-third (0.36) standard deviations decrease in ROA in 
response to tariff reduction of constrained firms compared to unconstrained  firms. 
 
However, being constrained is dependent on a firm’s board independence level at a specific 
point in time. While I show that the two groups (constrained and unconstrained) do not 
differ systematically in observables, board independence is still being endogenously 
determined by the firms. Hence, one may be concerned that the very fact that these 
groups have different levels of board independence indicates that these two groups are 
systematically different from each other. In such a case, we cannot rely on a simple diff-
in-diff analysis. However, what is pertinent for the identification is that the two groups 
do not differ in their response to competition, i.e. the change in competition affects 
constrained and unconstrained31 firms in the same way even in the absence of law. Then, 
the difference observed could be attributable to the effect of being constrained imposed 
by the passing of the law. Triple difference analysis allows me to address this potential 
concern. 
 
For example, suppose there are two firms. Firm1 has board independence of 55% while 
firm 2 has board independence of 80%. If both receive tariff reduction in year 1999, both 
would be able to reduce their board independence freely in response to the change  in 
31note that firms were not really constrained before the law. The terms constrained and unconstrained here are being 
used to refer to firms with a certain level of board independence, i.e. below and above 55% respectively. 
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competition as the law has not been passed yet. Change in competition then should not 
affect their profitability differentially. However, if they receive tariff reduction, say, in 
2005, firm 1 doesn’t have as much leeway as firm 2 to reduce the board independence. 
Triple-diff not only allows me to capture the effect of this inability to freely reduce board 
independence on firm performance, but also allows me to estimate the effect of competition 
on the profitability of these two distinct groups in the absence of being constrained. Hence, 
I compare the changes in performance of constrained firms to the changes in performance 
of the unconstrained firms in response to tariff reduction pre and post the law using the 
following estimation. 
ROAjikt = αj + αt + αit + β1post tariffikt + β2constrainedj ∗ post  lawt+ 
β3constrainedj ∗ post tariffikt + β4post lawt ∗ post tariffikt+ 
β5constrainedj ∗ post lawt ∗ posttariffikt + Xjtikt−1Γ + ujikt, 
(3) 
 
Where ROAjikt represents ROA for firm j in the year t operating in 2-digit SIC i and 4-
digit SIC k. As before, in the baseline case, I define constrained equal to one if the firm at 
the time of tariff reduction has board independence equal to 55%. post tariffikt is a 
binary variable equal to one for all years after t for a 4-digit SIC, k, that got a significant 
tariff reduction in year t. post lawt is dummy equal to one for all years since 2003. As 
before, I include the firm fixed effects and 2-digit SIC specific time-varying fixed effects. 
In the baseline analysis, I use a total of 17 years as the sample period with 8 years before 
and 8 years after 2003 i.e. when the law was passed. The results are robust to varying 
sample periods. 
 
The parameter β3 reports the differential effect of tariff reduction on constrained firms 
before the law was passed. However, pre-law, firms were technically not constrained in 
reducing their board independence. Hence, we should expect β3 to be statistically 
insignificant. The main parameter of interest is β5, which gives us the differential effect of 
tariff reduction on ROA for constrained firms over unconstrained post-law in comparison 
to pre-law. If reducing board independence in response to an increase in competition 
is an optimal decision for firms, then firms which are unable to do so would suffer as a 
consequence. Hence, we expect β5 to be negative. 
 
Table VII presents the results. Column1 shows that there is no difference in the ROA of 
constrained and unconstrained firms once they receive tariff reduction pre law (i.e., β3 
is statistically insignificant), however, the triple diff coefficient is significantly negative. 
Change in competition affects ROA of constrained firms significantly negatively compared 
to unconstrained firms post law. Once firm and board controls are included in the 
estimation (column3), the magnitude of this effect is 10.45 percentage points, which is 
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economically significant as it corresponds to approximately 0.4 standard deviations decrease 
in ROA in response to tariff reduction of constrained firms compared to unconstrained 
firms. 
 
 
4 Validity and Robustness 
4.1 Validity  of DiD 
 
4.1.1 Do Industry Factors Predict Tariff Reductions? 
 
To estimate the causal effect of tariff reductions on board independence, tariff reduction 
events should not be systematically aimed at industries with specific characteristics. It 
is most important to rule out the possibility that industry-level tariff cuts are targeted 
towards industries with specific board independence levels. While this is implausible, I 
provide evidence that average board independence of the industry does not predict tariff 
reduction events. I collapse all the firms variables at the industry level and estimate the 
following equation. 
 
tariff reductionikt = αi + αt + βboard independenceikt−1 + Xitkt−1Γ + uikt, (4) 
 
Table VIII presents the results. Column 1 shows that even without controlling for any 
other factors, lagged average industry board independence doesn’t predict tariff reduction 
in that industry. After controlling for industry fixed effects (Column2), industry controls 
(Column3) and other board characteristics at the industry level (Column4), there is still 
no relation between industry board independence and tariff reduction  events. 
 
An additional concern could be that rather than the board independence of industry, it 
might be some other industry characteristics that predict tariff reduction events. For 
instance, if tariff reductions are targeted towards industries with low profitability (industry 
ROA) or high leverage. F-Test results show that the industries which receive tariff 
reductions are not systematically different across either industry characteristics or industry 
board characteristics even at 10% significance level. 
 
 
4.1.2 Testing  Parallel Trends 
 
I use a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the causal impact of tariff reduction on 
board independence. DiD strategy relies on the crucial parallel trends assumption. That 
is, in the absence of the tariff reduction event, board independence in the treated firms 
2
 
 
should have changed in the same way as board independence in the control firms. This 
assumption, by definition, is not directly testable as we do not observe the counter-factual. 
However, we can study the pre-trends in the board independence in the treated firms 
relative to the control firms to provide evidence in favor of the parallel trends assumption. 
If we observe that the board independence was changing at the same rate in the treated 
firms and the control firms prior to the tariff reduction event, it is reasonable to believe 
that they would have been similar had the event not taken place. 
 
To asses the validity of this identification strategy, I first assess the evolution of board 
independence before and after the tariff reduction event. I set the year before the tariff 
reduction event as the base year. I run the following regression: 
board independencejikt = β1T −5+β2T −4+......+β9T +4+β10T +5+αj +αt+αit+Xjtikt−1Γ+ujikt, 
ikt ikt ikt ikt 
(5) 
 
Figure 2 shows that board independence was evolving at the same rate in the treated 
firms and control firms before the tariff reduction. There is no statistically or economically 
significant difference in changes in board independence in treated and control firms in the 
five periods prior to the event. The tariff reduction results in a sudden large decrease in 
board independence. The difference in the board independence of treated and control 
firms persists even 3 periods after the event. 
 
 
4.1.3 Balancing Test 
 
To show that the treatment and control firms do not systematically differ along any 
important dimension, I show that the firms that got tariff reduction were very similar in 
levels as well as trends in firm characteristics, including board independence, prior to the 
tariff reduction. 
 
Table IX shows the differences in firm characteristics between firms affected by the tariff 
reduction (treated firms) relative to firms that are not affected by the tariff reduction 
(control firms). Panel A shows the differences in treated and control firms in levels. The 
treated firms have higher levels of cash, investment and R&D and lower levels of dividends. 
Since, I include firm fixed effects, these differences in levels are absorbed by the firm fixed 
effects and hence do not affect the estimates. Moreover, treated and control firms have 
similar levels of board independence, board size and board composition as shown in Panel 
C. 
 
Panel B and D of Table IX shows the differences in trends among treated and control firms. 
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Treated and control firms have similar trends in firm profitability and other corporate 
policies. We see a significant difference in the size of the firms, with treated firms being 
slightly bigger by 0.0193,32 however, I always control for firm size in all the estimations 
along with other firm controls. These results show that the firms affected by the tariff 
reduction are not systematically different from firms not affected by the reduction. These 
results strengthen our confidence that the differences in treated and control firms after the 
tariff reduction can be associated to the event rather than pre-existing differences among 
firms.33 
 
 
4.2 Validity  of DiDiD 
4.2.1 Balancing Test 
 
To ensure the validity of the identification strategy, it is essential that the two groups of 
firms, constrained and unconstrained, do not systematically differ along any important 
dimension. Table X shows the differences in firm characteristics between constrained and 
unconstrained firms in the first two years of the sample. We can see some differences 
between constrained and unconstrained firms when we look at levels. Constrained firms 
tend to be larger, more profitable with lower levels of investment and cash holdings as 
can be seen in Panel A. However, these differences in levels are absorbed by the firm 
fixed effects and hence do not affect the estimates. More importantly, the two groups of 
firms should be similar in their trends across various characteristics. Constrained and 
unconstrained firms have similar trend in firm profitability, and other corporate policies as 
shown in Panel C and D of Table X. This alleviates the concern that the estimates may 
be driven by pre-existing differences among firms. 
 
 
4.2.2 Testing  Parallel Trends 
 
As I am analyzing the effect of law in conjunction with an exogenous change in competition 
on firm performance, it is pertinent to show that the firm performance (ROA) was changing 
at the same rate in the constrained and unconstrained firms pre-law. Figure 3 plots the 
results. We see that the constrained and the unconstrained firms had similar ROA prior to 
the law. These two groups of firms diverge after the law. There is a slight decrease in ROA 
of constrained firms one year after the law, however, it is statistically not significant. The 
difference in ROA for the two groups becomes statistically significant two years after the 
law is passed with the constrained firms having lower ROA relative to the unconstrained 
32Although this number is statistically significant, it is economically irrelevant in magnitude. 0.0193 corresponds to a 
difference of 0.009 standard deviations of log(assets) or only 0.36% of the mean. 
33As a robustness check, I repeat the main analysis using a matching procedure based on Mahalanobis distance to ensure 
that the two groups of firms are similar across various important dimensions.     The results remain robust. 
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firms. 
 
Moreover, as we are focusing on board changes as a result of tariff reduction and the 
constraints of the ability to alter the board composition, it is important to establish that the 
constrained firms do not have different board dynamics relative to unconstrained firms. In 
order to see whether the constrained and unconstrained firms have a similar trend in board 
independence prior to the law, I carry out analysis akin to parallel trends, where I allow for 
a different trend in board independence between constrained and unconstrained firms every 
year. If constrained and unconstrained firms have similar dynamics in board independence, 
and the regulation prevents constrained firms from decreasing board independence in 
response to a tariff reduction, while unconstrained firms are unaffected, we should expect 
to see the constrained and unconstrained firms to have similar trend prior to the regulation 
and the have a different trend after the regulation. 
 
Figure 4 plots the results. We see that the constrained and the unconstrained firms had 
similar internal governance dynamics prior to the law. These two groups of firms diverge 
after the law, with the constrained firms having a higher trend in board independence 
relative to the unconstrained firms after the law. Since constrained firms are not able 
to decrease board independence freely in response to a tariff reduction, we see that the 
board independence in constrained firms increases with respect to unconstrained firms. 
The average board independence for constrained firms was around 40.9%, while average 
board independence for unconstrained firms was around 53.5% in 1997. The difference 
in average board independence between the set of constrained and unconstrained firms 
remained the same until 2001, i.e. prior to the law. By 2005, this difference decreased 
steadily to less than 5 percentage points. The difference in average board independence 
between the two groups of firms decreased to less than 1 percentage points by 2009. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
4.3.1 Alternative thresholds to define tariff reduction event 
 
In the first analysis, following previous literature, I consider a tariff reduction event only if 
the tariff reduction in an industry-year is three times larger than the average change in the 
same industry across years. I check the robustness of the effect of the increase in product 
market competition on board independence by changing the threshold used to define a 
tariff reduction event. Specifically, I use a threshold of 2x and 4x larger than the average 
change in the same industry as well as 2x, 3x, and 4x larger than the median change in 
the same industry. 
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Baseline results are obtained in the main analysis use a cutoff of 3x larger than the average 
in the industry. We see a negative and significant effect regardless of the threshold used. 
The effect is lower in magnitude with loser threshold (2x) and higher with a stricter 
threshold (4x). When using median instead of average industry change, we obtain stronger 
results than the baseline, and robust to the threshold used. The results highlight that 
the effect obtained is not driven by the arbitrary choice of the threshold used to define 
competition change. 
 
 
4.3.2 Placebo test 
 
In order to show that tariff reduction events are not systematically correlated with some 
unobserved firm characteristics, I carry out placebo regressions. I randomly assign 
significant tariff reduction (treatment) to the industries and estimate the Equation 1 
1,000 times. If there are some unobserved differences among firms driving the results, 
the distribution of estimates will reflect those differences. If the distribution of placebo 
estimates is centered around zero and much smaller than the results obtained above, 
this would reassure us that the results obtained in the main analysis do not reflect some 
systematic differences among firms in the sample. 
 
Figure 5 shows the results from the placebo regressions. Panel A shows that the distribution 
is centered around zero. The mean placebo estimate is −0.00015, with a standard deviation 
of 0.0153. The minimum and maximum placebo estimates are −0.047 and 0.055 respectively. 
These extreme values are lower than the coefficient obtained earlier (-0.0552). This means 
that randomly assigning tariff reduction to some firms relative to the others can not result 
in such a large and precise estimate as obtained in the above analysis. 
 
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the CDF of t-values of the coefficients from the placebo 
regressions. If there are no systematic differences among the firms in the sample, we should 
get the absolute value of t-value to be greater than 1.96 only 5% of the times. This is what 
we find. Also, the t-value obtained in the main analysis lies far away from the distribution 
of the placebo t-values. These results from placebo estimates reassure that the results I 
find do not reflect systematic differences among the firms in the sample. 
 
 
4.3.3 Alternative thresholds to define  “Constrained” 
 
I use other definitions to define the group of constrained and unconstrained firms. In the 
main analysis, a firm is categorized as constrained if it has board independence of 55% 
or lower at the time of tariff reduction.  I provide estimates using both, stricter   (50%) 
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and lenient (60%), thresholds to define the group of constrained firms. First 3 columns in 
Table XII report results with varying definitions of constrained while keeping the sample 
period constant. The result remains robust to the varying definition of constrained. 
 
 
4.3.4 Alternative sample period 
 
For the base analysis, I utilize eights years before and after the law was passed (i.e., 2003). 
However, I alter the sample period using 6, 10 and 12 years before and after the law to 
ensure that the findings are not sensitive to the sample period. Table XII, columns 3,4 
and 5 show that results are robust to varying sample periods. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Having independent directors in the boards is considered a corporate governance “best 
practice” with institutional investors, regulators, and exchanges such as NASD and NYSE 
vouching for greater board independence for all firms. This pressure for greater board 
independence stems from the assumption that independent directors are better monitors. 
However, boards have two main functions; monitoring and advising the senior management. 
Hence, firms’ monitoring needs as well as advising requirements determine the optimal 
level of board independence for a firm. 
 
An increase in product market competition reduces the monitoring needs of the firm and 
potentially increases the advisory requirements of the firm, hence leading firms to reduce 
their board independence. Using changes in import tariff rates to identify exogenous changes 
in product market competition, I provide evidence that firms substantially adjust their 
board independence in response to increased competition. In particular, after controlling 
for firm and year fixed effects, 2-digit SIC industry specific trends, firm characteristics 
along with governance factors, I find that firms reduce their board independence by 5.52 
percentage points, or 0.21 standard deviations in response to an increase in competition. 
This effect reflects a 12% decrease in board independence for a firm with average board 
independence. 
 
Using listing requirements by NYSE and NASDAQ, which required the majority of the 
board to be composed of independent directors, in conjunction with the exogenous shock 
to competition, I carry out a triple diff estimation. I show that firms that are constrained 
in their ability to reduce board independence at the time of tariff reduction fare worse in 
term of firm profitability compared to unconstrained firms. In particular, being constrained 
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results in 6.98 percentage points lower return on assets (ROA) compared to unconstrained 
firms which correspond to 23.5% standard deviations decrease in ROA for a firm with 
average ROA. 
 
This paper provides evidence of substitution between the internal and external governance 
of firms by showing that firms adjust their monitoring intensity accordingly when their 
competitive environment changes. Moreover, the results highlight that a forced increase in 
monitoring level, for instance by mandating a certain level of board independence, may 
actually harm some firms. These results shed light on the cost of regulations that do not 
take into account heterogeneity in firms’ environments and apply one size fits all criteria. 
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Figure1: Distribution of Tariff Reduction Events 
This figure shows the distribution of tariff reduction events from 1980-2015. Ad-valorem tariff rate is 
computed as the duties collected at U.S. Customs divided by the Free-On-Board custom value of imports. 
Tariff  reduction is considered an event  when the reduction in an industry year is three times larger than     the 
average tariff change in the same industry.  The criterion used to define an event is explained in detail    in the 
text in section   2.1. 
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Figure2:  Parallel Trends 
This figure plots the evolution of the impact of tariff reduction on board independence. Board independence 
is measured as the proportion of independent directors in the board.  Tariff  reduction is equal to one for     all 
firms which ever receive tariff reduction.  I set the year before tariff reduction event  as the base year   and 
run the following  regression: 
brd indjikt = β1T −5 + β2T −4 + ...... + β9T +4 + β10T +5 + αj + αt + αit + Xjf ikt−1Γ + ujikt, 
where brd indjikt is the proportion of independent directors in the board of firm j which belongs to 2-digit 
SIC i and 4-digit SIC k in the year t. T +n equals one for firms nth year after they receive tariff reduction 
and zero otherwise and T −n equals one for firms nth year before they receive tariff reduction and zero 
otherwise.  αj , αt, αit  are firm, year and SIC2-year fixed effects and Xjf ikt−1Γ are one year lagged firm and 
board controls. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure3: Difference in trends in Firm Performance Pre 
and Post-regulation 
This figure plots the evolution of differences in firm performance of constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Constrained is defined as equal to one if firm had board independence of 60% or less at the time of tariff 
reduction. 
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Figure4: Difference in trends in Board Independence 
Pre  and Post-regulation 
This figure plots the evolution of differences in board independence level of constrained and unconstrained 
firms. Constrained is defined as equal to one if firm had board independence of 60% or less at the time of 
tariff  reduction. 
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Figure5: Placebo Estimates 
This figure plots the estimates from the placebo regressions. These estimates are obtained from randomly 
assigning significant tariff reduction (treatment) to the industries and estimating the impact of product 
market competition on board independence 1,000 times. Panel A plots the coefficients. The bold red line 
represents the coefficient obtained earlier (with the actual tariff reduction events rather than randomly 
assigned events). Panel B shows the Cumulative density function of t-values of the coefficients from 
placebo regressions. The bold red line indicates the t-value of the coefficient obtained earlier. 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used. Number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, median, minimum and maximum values of the variables are provided. Panel A contains the 
descriptive statistics of tariff variables. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the main corporate variables. 
Lastly, Panel C reports descriptive statistics of the main board variables and governance controls used in the  
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividends 
 N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Tariff Variables       
 
Tariff 
 
3307 
 
2.133 
 
2.917 
 
1.150 
 
0.000 
 
27.612 
Change in Tariff 3212 -0.112 0.361 -0.010 -1.786 1.117 
Tariff Reduction 3446 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Firm  Controls       
 
ROA 
 
23803 
 
0.022 
 
0.282 
 
0.105 
 
-1.305 
 
0.394 
Log(Assets) 23824 5.403 2.133 5.218 1.068 10.605 
Cash 23819 0.259 0.258 0.171 0.000 0.956 
Leverage 23796 0.179 0.193 0.131 0.000 0.940 
Investment 23734 0.272 0.198 0.215 0.014 0.947 
R\&D 23827 
23803 
0.104 
0.010 
0.163 
0.024 
0.047 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.955 
0.179 
Panel C: Board & Governance  Controls       
 
Board Ind. 
 
23827 
 
0.636 
 
0.246 
 
0.667 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
Board Size 23827 6.804 2.708 7.000 1.000 21.000 
Proportion of females in the board 23827 0.062 0.097 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Mean board age 23824 58.087 5.868 58.625 29.000 80.600 
pct american 23826 0.565 0.334 0.600 0.000 1.000 
G Index 3905 8.942 2.663 9.000 1.000 17.000 
Inst. Ownership 21417 0.376 0.364 0.304 0.000 1.000 
Inst. Conc. 21417 0.353 0.391 0.125 0.000 1.000 
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Table II: Product Market Competition and Board in- 
dependence 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between board independence and increase in product market 
competition using OLS estimation. The sample contains firm-year observations from 1980-2015. The 
dependent variable, board independence, is measured as the proportion of independent directors in the 
board. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff reduction. Post equals one 
for all the years after tariff reduction takes place. Firm controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, 
investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic 
composition. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Board Ind. 
(2) 
Board Ind. 
(3) 
Board Ind. 
 
Tariff Reduction * Post 
 
-0.0337* 
(0.0162) 
 
-0.0331* 
(0.0165) 
 
-0.0311* 
(0.0153) 
Observations 23,783 23,783 23,783 
R-squared 0.6786 0.6789 0.6814 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No Yes 
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Table III: Product Market Competition and Board in- 
dependence - Prior to 2002 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between board independence and increase in product market 
competition using OLS estimation. The sample contains firm-year observations from 1980-2001. The 
dependent variable, board independence, is measured as the proportion of independent directors in the 
board. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff reduction. Post equals one 
for all the years after tariff reduction takes place. Firm controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, 
investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic 
composition. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Board Ind. 
(2) 
Board Ind. 
(3) 
Board Ind. 
 
Tariff Reduction * Post 
 
-0.0606*** 
(0.0096) 
 
-0.0601*** 
(0.0096) 
 
-0.0553*** 
(0.0091) 
Observations 10,036 10,036 10,036 
R-squared 0.6994 0.6996 0.7026 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No Yes 
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Table IV: Product Market Competition and Board 
Composition 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between an increase in product market competition and various 
measures of board composition using OLS estimation. Dependent variables in column1,2 and 3 are the 
number of independent, number of employee and number of linked directors in the board respectively. 
Dependent variable in column 4 is board size measured as log of total number of directors in the board. 
The sample contains firm-year observations from 1996-2001. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms 
which ever receive tariff reduction. Post equals one for all the years after tariff reduction takes place. Firm 
controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls 
include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic composition, and whether board is classified or has 
a poison pill provision. Presence of institutional investors and their concentration is also included in the 
controls. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked 
with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Log(Ind Dir) 
(2) 
Log(Emp Dir) 
(3) 
Log(Link Dir) 
(4) 
Log(Brd Size) 
 
Tariff Reduction * Post 
 
-0.1387** 
 
0.1100* 
 
0.2027** 
 
0.0105 
 (0.0662) (0.0620) (0.0961) (0.0333) 
Observations 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 
R-squared 0.9099 0.8021 0.7764 0.9253 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
Table V: Varying Exposure to Competition 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between board independence and increase in product market competition for different sub-samples of the data, depending 
on their exposure to competition. Column 1, 2, 3 and 4 contain subsamples of diversified, focused, exporting and non-exporting firms respectively. Column 5 
contains subsample of firms in low competitive industries (high HHI) and column 6 contain subsample of firms in high competitive industries (low HHI). The 
sample contains firm-year observations from 1980-2001. The dependent variable, board independence, is measured as the proportion of independent directors in 
the board. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff reduction. Post equals one for all the years after tariff reduction takes place. 
Diversified (Focused) is equal to one if it reports operations in more than one (only one) industry (4-digit SIC code) in a given year. Exporting is equal to one if a 
firm realizes positive sales abroad in a given year and non-exporting is equal to one if no sales abroad are realized in a given year. Firm controls include lagged 
ROA, log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic composition. Standard errors, 
clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable   Board Independence  
  
Diversified 
 
Non-Diversified 
 
Exporting Non-Exporting 
 
High HHI 
 
Low HHI 
 
Tariff Reduction *  Post 
 
-0.0208 
 
-0.0553*** 
 
-0.0174 -0.0656*** 
 
-0.0590*** 
 
-0.0460 
 (0.0365) (0.0157) (0.0231) (0.0121) (0.0158) (0.0706) 
Observations 2,189 7,574 2,368 7,479 2,119 1,988 
R-squared 0.8343 0.7308 0.7313 0.7439 0.6717 0.7398 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VI: Competition, Regulation and Firm Perfor- 
mance - DiD 
 
This table reports the DiD estimation. The dependent variable is firm performance measured by firm 
ROA. The sample contains firm-year observations from 2003-2015. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all 
firms which ever receive tariff reduction and zero otherwise. Post equals one for all the years after tariff 
reduction takes place and zero otherwise. Constrained is equal to one if the firm has board independence 
of 55% or lower at the time of tariff reduction. Firm controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, 
investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and 
ethnic composition. Presence of institutional investors and their concentration is also included in the 
controls. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked 
with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
ROA 
 
Post Tariff 
 
0.2100*** 
 
0.0291 
 
0.2018** 
 
Constrained * Post Tariff 
(0.0000) 
-0.0603*** 
(0.0000) 
(0.0789) 
-0.1230** 
(0.0335) 
(0.0607) 
-0.1012*** 
(0.0146) 
Observations 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.8803 0.8943 0.8960 
Sample 2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2015 
Constrained Definition 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VII: Competition, Regulation and Firm Perfor- 
mance - DiDiD 
 
This table reports the DiDiD estimation. The dependent variable is firm performance measured by firm 
ROA. The sample contains firm-year observations for eight years before and after the law was passed i.e. 
2003. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff reduction and zero otherwise. 
Post equals one for all the years after tariff reduction takes place and zero otherwise. Constrained is equal 
to one if the firm has board independence of 55% or lower at the time of tariff reduction. Post Law equals 
one for all years after the passage of law i.e. 2003 and onwards. Firm controls include lagged ROA, 
log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and 
gender and ethnic composition. Presence of institutional investors and their concentration is also included 
in the controls. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
ROA 
 
Post Tariff 
 
0.0062 
 
0.0173 
 
0.0188 
 (0.0527) (0.0452) (0.0449) 
Constrained * Post Law 0.0229 -0.0026 0.0125 
 (0.0192) (0.0297) (0.0334) 
Constrained * Post Tariff 0.0498 0.0262 0.0269 
 (0.0401) (0.0316) (0.0314) 
Post Nasdaq * Post  Tariff 0.0333 0.0407 0.0524 
 
Constrained * Post Law * Post  Tariff 
(0.0500) 
-0.1442*** 
(0.0515) 
(0.0384) 
-0.0877** 
(0.0337) 
(0.0416) 
-0.1045*** 
(0.0361) 
Observations 7,533 7,533 7,532 
R-squared 0.6270 0.6560 0.6561 
Sample +/- 8 +/- 8 +/- 8 
Constrained Definition 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes 
Board Controls No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
  
Table VIII: Do Industry Board Independence Predict Tariff Reduction Events 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between tariff reduction and lagged average industry board independence using OLS estimation. The sample contains industry-
year observations from 1980-2015.  The dependent variable, tariff reduction, is equal to one for the year in which an industry receives tariff reduction.      Board 
independence at the industry-level is measured as the average board independence of all the firms in that industry. Industry controls include lagged indutry level-ROA, 
log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D and dividends. Industry board controls include lagged industry-level board size, age and gender and ethnic composition.  
Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis.  Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%,      and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tariff Reduc Tariff Reduc Tariff Reduc Tariff Reduc Tariff Reduc Tariff Reduc 
 
Board Independence t-1 
 
0.0078 
 
0.0137 
 
0.0167 
 
0.0142 
 
-0.0044 
 
-0.0038 
 (0.0097) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0099) (0.0124) 
Observations 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299 865 865 
R-squared 0.0406 0.0613 0.0634 0.0614 0.1431 0.1536 
Industry Financial Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Governance Controls No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry Lobbying Controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
F-Test: Industry Lobbying Controls = 0 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.232 
Yes 
0.224 
F-Test: Industry Governance Controls = 0    0.194  0.724 
F-Test: Industry Financial Controls = 0   1.192   1.013 
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Table IX: Differences between Treated and Control 
Firms 
 
This table shows the differences in firm and board characteristics between firms affected by the tariff 
reduction (treated firms) relative to firms that are not affected by the tariff reduction (control firms). 
Panel A and B show the differences in treated and control firms in levels, while Panel C and D show the 
differences in trends for treated and control firms. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are 
reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Differences in Levels for Firm  Variables 
 ROA Log(Assets) Cash Leverage Investment R&D Dividends 
 
Tariff Reduction 
 
-0.0240 
 
0.1249 
 
0.0660** 
 
-0.0194 
 
0.0280 
 
0.0304** 
 
-0.0022** 
 (0.0251) (0.2077) (0.0287) (0.0119) (0.0171) (0.0135) (0.0009) 
Constant -0.0437* 5.0845*** 0.2848*** 0.1893*** 0.2885*** 0.1225*** 0.0104*** 
 (0.0252) (0.1445) (0.0275) (0.0106) (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0008) 
Observations 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 
R-squared 0.2715 0.1672 0.3811 0.1225 0.1574 0.3404 0.2011 
 
Panel B - Differences in Levels for Board Variables 
 Board Ind. Board Size Prop. Female Avg. Age Prop. American 
 
Tariff Reduction 
 
0.0128 
 
-0.0238 
 
0.0104** 
 
0.2304 
 
-0.0050 
 (0.0117) (0.1098) (0.0043) (0.3103) (0.0218) 
Constant 0.6631*** 7.0719*** 0.0571*** 57.6745*** 0.5088*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0813) (0.0035) (0.2424) (0.0167) 
Observations 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 
R-squared 0.0468 0.0894 0.0675 0.0218 0.0310 
 
Panel C - Differences in Trends for Firm Variables 
 ROA Log(Assets) Cash Leverage Investment R&D Dividends 
 
Tariff Reduction 
 
0.0052 
 
0.0193* 
 
-0.0009 
 
0.0029 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0009 
 
-0.0001 
 (0.0035) (0.0110) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0005) 
Constant - 0.0108*** 0.0563*** -0.0082*** 0.0081*** -0.0183*** 0.0048** 0.0003 
 (0.0033) (0.0089) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0003) 
Observations 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,471 1,472 1,472 1,472 
R-squared 0.0068 0.0123 0.0175 0.0253 0.0127 0.0036 0.0024 
 
Panel D - Differences in Trends for Board  Variables 
 Board Ind. Board Size Prop. Female Avg. Age Prop. American 
 
Tariff Reduction 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0098 
 
-0.0006 
 
0.0128 
 
-0.0022 
 (0.0023) (0.0209) (0.0007) (0.0449) (0.0015) 
Constant 0.0169*** -0.0471** 0.0039*** 0.6155*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0200) (0.0006) (0.0343) (0.0011) 
Observations 1,472 1,372 1,472 1,472 1,472 
R-squared 0.0135 0.0116 0.0121 0.0186 0.0079 
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Table X: Differences between Constrained and Uncon- 
strained Firms 
 
This table shows the differences in firm and board characteristics between constrained and unconstrained 
firms where constrained is defined as equal to one if firm had board independence of 60% at the time of 
tariff reduction. Panel A and B show the differences in treated and control firms in levels, while Panel C 
and D show the differences in trends for treated and control firms. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit 
SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Differences in Levels for Firm Variables 
 ROA Log(Assets) Cash Leverage Investment R&D Dividends 
 
(mean) constrained at tariffreduction 
 
0.1083*** 
 
0.3089** 
 
-0.0733*** 
 
0.0006 
 
-0.0659*** 
 
-0.0308* 
 
0.0024 
 (0.0315) (0.1364) (0.0199) (0.0223) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0019) 
Constant -0.1145*** 4.4326*** 0.3606*** 0.1744*** 0.3819*** 0.1690*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0836) (0.0227) (0.0159) (0.0120) (0.0162) (0.0007) 
Observations 587 588 588 588 586 588 588 
R-squared 0.1384 0.1254 0.2794 0.0251 0.1466 0.2203 0.0620 
 
Panel B - Differences in Levels for Board Variables 
    
Board Ind. Board Size Prop. Female Avg. Age Prop. American 
 
(mean) constrained at tariffreduction   -0.1513*** 
 
-0.0636 
 
0.0030 
 
0.6427 
 
0.0485** 
(0.0200) (0.1931) (0.0056) (0.4351) (0.0190) 
Constant 0.5501*** 5.7281*** 0.0429*** 54.4067*** 0.5784*** 
(0.0098) (0.1039) (0.0029) (0.2287) (0.0161) 
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.1510 0.0818 0.0509 0.0541 0.0196 
 
Panel C - Differences in Trends for Firm Variables 
 ROA Log(Assets) Cash Leverage Investment R&D Dividends 
 
(mean) constrained at tariffreduction 
 
0.0009 
 
-0.0287 
 
-0.0030 
 
-0.0045 
 
0.0107 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.0014* 
 (0.0047) (0.0226) (0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0089) (0.0033) (0.0008) 
Constant -0.0043 0.1605*** -0.0034 0.0082* -0.0221*** -0.0000 0.0014** 
 (0.0034) (0.0194) (0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0026) (0.0007) 
Observations 516 516 516 516 515 516 516 
R-squared 0.0099 0.0323 0.0248 0.0193 0.0382 0.0040 0.0076 
 
Panel D - Differences in Trends for Board  Variables 
 Board Ind. Board Size Prop. Female Avg. Age Prop. American 
 
(mean) constrained at tariffreduction 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.0109 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0523 
 
0.0051 
 (0.0039) (0.0453) (0.0017) (0.0629) (0.0036) 
Constant 0.0252*** 0.0094 0.0019 0.7791*** -0.0029 
 (0.0028) (0.0335) (0.0015) (0.0433) (0.0024) 
Observations 516 490 516 516 516 
R-squared 0.0543 0.0568 0.0170 0.0460 0.0204 
  
 
 
Table XI: Product Market Competition and Board independence - with alternate 
thresholds to define tariff reduction  events 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between board independence and increase in product market competition using OLS estimation.  Each column uses       a 
different cut-off to define tariff reduction event mentioned in the last row of each column. The sample contains firm-year observations from 1980-2001. The 
dependent variable, board independence, is measured as the proportion of independent directors in the board. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which 
ever receive tariff reduction. Post equals one for all the years after tariff reduction takes place. Firm controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, investment, 
leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic composition. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are 
reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Board Ind. Board Ind. Board Ind. Board Ind. Board Ind. Board Ind. 
 
Tariff Reduction * Post 
 
-0.0552*** 
 
-0.0322*** 
 
-0.0605*** 
 
-0.0625*** 
 
-0.0614*** 
 
-0.0841*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0149) (0.0201) (0.0190) 
Observations 10,063 10,063 10,063 10,063 10,063 10,063 
R-squared 0.7018 0.7011 0.7016 0.7021 0.7020 0.7033 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tariff Cut Baseline >2 >4 >3 Mdn >2 Mdn >4 Mdn 
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Table XII: Competition, Regulation and Firm Performance - with alternate defini- 
tions of constrained and alternate sample  periods 
 
This table reports the DiDiD estimation for the effect of competition and regulation on firm performance measured by firm ROA. First three columns use alternate 
definitions of constrained while keeping the sample period constant. Columns 4, 5 and 6 provide results obtained using different sample periods while keeping 
constant the definition of constrained. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff reduction and zero otherwise. Post equals one for all 
the years after tariff reduction takes place and zero otherwise. Post Law equals one for all years after the passage of law i.e. 2003 and onwards. Firm controls 
include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D, dividends. Board controls include lagged board size, age and gender and ethnic composition. 
Presence of institutional investors and their concentration is also included in the controls. Standard errors, clustered at 2-digit SIC level, are reported in parenthesis. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Alternate thresholds 
(1) (2) (3) 
ROA ROA ROA 
Alternate sample 
(4) (5) 
ROA ROA 
periods 
(6) 
ROA 
 
Post Tariff 
 
0.0188 0.0195 0.0208 
 
0.0229 
 
0.0441 
 
0.0119 
(0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0455) (0.0327) (0.0657) (0.0327) 
Constrained * Post Law 0.0125 0.0126 0.0183 -0.0231   
(0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0338) (0.0239)   
Constrained * Post Tariff 0.0269 0.0259 0.0286 -0.0097 -0.0264 -0.0041 
(0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0299) (0.0241) (0.0219) (0.0272) 
Post Nasdaq * Post Tariff 0.0524 0.0511 0.0461 0.0290 -0.0850** 0.0175 
(0.0416) (0.0419) (0.0411) (0.0436) (0.0308) (0.0544) 
Constrained * Post Law  *  Post Tariff -0.1045*** -0.1033*** -0.1025*** -0.0562** -0.0399** -0.0927* 
(0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0360) (0.0264) (0.0168) (0.0517) 
Observations 7,532 7,532 7,532 8,443 2,140 9,054 
R-squared 0.6561 0.6560 0.6559 0.6589 0.7724 0.6317 
Sample +/- 8 +/- 8 +/- 8 +/- 10 +/- 6 +/- 12 
Constrained Definition .55 .5 .6 .55 .55 .55 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table XIII: Competition, Regulation and Tobin’s Q 
 
This table reports the DiDiD estimation for the effect of competition and regulation on firm performance. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. First three columns  use 
alternate definition of constrained while keeping the sample period constant to eight years before and after the law is passed.  Columns 4, 5 and 6 provide      results 
obtained using different sample periods while keeping constant the definition of constrained. Tariff reduction is equal to one for all firms which ever receive tariff 
reduction and zero otherwise. Post equals one for all the years after tariff reduction takes place and zero otherwise. Post Law equals one for all years after the passage of 
law i.e. 2003 and onwards. Firm controls include lagged ROA, log(assets), cash, investment, leverage, R&D, dividends.  Board controls include lagged  board size, age 
and gender and ethnic composition. Presence of institutional investors and their concentration is also included in the controls.  Standard errors,  clustered at 2-digit SIC 
level, are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Tobin’s Q 
(2) 
Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
Tobin’s Q 
(4) 
Tobin’s Q 
(5) 
Tobin’s Q 
(6) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Post Tariff 
 
0.1685 
 
0.1685 
 
0.1321 
 
0.3911* 
 
-0.4697 
 
0.2409 
 (0.2614) (0.2614) (0.2622) (0.2075) (0.8577) (0.1612) 
Constrained * Post Law 0.9094*** 0.9094*** 0.9188*** 0.6209* 0.8035* 0.5029 
 (0.2978) (0.2978) (0.2976) (0.3564) (0.4588) (0.3131) 
Constrained * Post Tariff 0.1405 0.1405 0.1995 -0.4761 0.7683 -0.4645* 
 (0.2075) (0.2075) (0.1900) (0.3181) (0.6096) (0.2533) 
Post Nasdaq * Post  Tariff 0.5041** 0.5041** 0.5545** 0.2395 0.1846 0.1675 
 (0.1931) (0.1931) (0.2088) (0.2062) (0.4570) (0.1934) 
Constrained * Post Law *    Post Tariff -1.0901*** -1.0901*** -1.1542*** -0.7173** -1.1788** -0.5348* 
 (0.2443) (0.2443) (0.2528) (0.3527) (0.5027) (0.2695) 
Observations 7,079 7,079 7,079 7,931 1,962 8,540 
R-squared 0.5656 0.5656 0.5657 0.5670 0.6077 0.5679 
Sample +/- 8 +/- 8 +/- 8 +/- 10 +/- 6 +/- 12 
Constrained Definition .55 .5 .6 .55 .55 .55 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Panel A: Tariff Variables (from Peter Schott’s website) 
 
 
Tariff Duties collected at U.S. Custom divided by the Free-On-Board custom value of imports 
at the four-digit SIC industry 
Tariff Reduction Dummy variable equal to one if the reduction in the tariff rate is more than 3 times 
larger than the average tariff reduction in the industry, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Panel B: Firm Controls (from Compustat) 
 
 
ROA Ratio of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) to firm’s total  assets (AT). 
Log(Assets) Logarithm of total assets  (AT) 
Cash Ratio of Cash and short term investments (CHE) to firm’s  total assets(AT). 
Leverage Ratio of the book value of total debt (DLC+DLTT) to firm’s total assets (AT) 
Investment Ratio of capital expenditure (CAPX) to total net property, plant, and    equipment (PPENT). 
R  &D Ratio of research and development expense (XRD) to firm’s total assets  (AT). 
Dividends The ratio of cash dividends (DV + DVP) to firm’s total    assets. 
 
 
Panel C: Board & Governance Controls (from ISS and  13F) 
 
 
Board Ind. Proportion of independent directors in the board 
Board Size Number of directors in the board 
Log(Ind Dir) Logarithm of the number of Independent directors in the board 
Log(Emp Dir) Logarithm of the number of non-independent directors in the board which are employees of the firm 
Log(Link Dir) Logarithm of the number of non-independent directors in the board which are linked to the firm 
pct american Proportion of directors in the board with listed nationality as ”American” 
pct female Proportion of female directors in the board 
Inst. Ownership Proportion of total shares outstanding held by the institutional investors (From 13F) 
Inst. Conc. The concentration index (HHI) of institutional ownership (between 0 and 1) 
 
 
Panel D: Other Variables (from Compustat’s Geographic Segment files) 
 
 
Exporting Dummy variable equal to one if a firm realizes positive sales abroad, and zero otherwise 
Non-Exporting Dummy variable equal to one if a firm realizes zero sales abroad, and zero otherwise 
Focused Dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports only one business segment, and zero otherwise 
Diversified Dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports more than one business segment, and zero otherwise 
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6 Online  Appendix 
 
 
Extending the data till 2015 
 
 
The data on tariff reductions provided by Feenstra (1996); Feenstra et al. (2002); Schott 
(2010) is until the year 2005. However, for my second research question, I am using the 
regulation by NYSE and NASDAQ that limited the ability of the firms to reduce board 
independence. This regulation was passed in 2003, with a compliance period of one year. 
Hence, with a data till 2005, this yields very little time to see changes in the firm outcomes. 
Moreover, there are very few events in the year 2004 and 2005 which reduces the power 
to detect any firm level changes. Therefore, I extend the tariff reduction data until 2015 
using the data on imports provided by Peter Schott on his website34. 
 
As before, for each industry-year, I compute ad-valorem tariff rate as a ratio of duties to 
imports and compute tariff reductions in the same way. That is, I consider tariff reduction 
events as one in which the tariff reduction in a year in an industry is three times larger 
than the average (absolute) change in the same industry across years. 
 
Comparing the two data sets   
 
 
The tariff reductions using imports data (extended data) are very similar to the ones using 
the Feenstra et al. data (original data). I carry out the comparison for the period present 
in both datasets i.e. 1992 to 2005. The average industry tariff rate in the original data is 
1.395%. The extended data matches this average pretty well: the average industry tariff 
rate in the extended data is 1.435%. The average difference between the tariff rates in the 
two datasets is less than 0.025 percentage points or less than 2% for an average industry. 
 
Since, I am interested in the significant tariff reduction events, the absolute difference 
between the tariff reduction in the original and the extended data is not a major concern. 
What really matters for the analysis are the deviations from the average tariff rate for 
each industry. Specifically, it is of greater concern that the deviations from the mean 
(standard deviation) are similar across the two datasets so that, on average, we find similar 
number of significant tariff reductions in both datasets. The standard deviation of tariff 
rate in an average industry in the original data is 0.305%. The standard deviation of 
tariff rate in an average industry in the extended data is 0.332%. Hence, the difference in 
standard deviation of tariff rate in an average industry in the two datasets is less  than 
34http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/subinternational.htm 
50  
0.006 percentage points or less than 2% for an average industry. Table XIV provides the 
comparison of the categorization of treatment and control of an industry between the 
two datasets. During 1992-2005, out of 96 4-digit SIC industries, 41 are categorized as 
control and 38 as treated in both the datasets. This provides a match of over 80% with an 
even higher match when considering the firm year observations. The information has been 
summarized in Table XV. 
 
The timing of the significant tariff reduction event is crucial for the identification. Although 
the significant tariff reduction events match reasonably well across industries, one potential 
concern could be that the timing of the events do not match in both datasets. That is, 
say, industry X received a significant tariff reduction in one year according to original data 
and in a different year according to the extended data. In order to see whether there are 
any systematic differences in timing of tariff reduction events, I construct the distribution 
of significant tariff reduction events across years. Table XVI shows the yearly distribution 
of events in the extended and original data. The yearly distribution of the events in both 
datasets seems very similar. Both datasets have a peak in the significant tariff reduction 
in the year 1995. Overall, the extended data matches perfectly with the total number of 
events with 100 events in each dataset over the common period present in both datasets 
i.e. 1992 to 2005. 
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Table XIV: Categorization of treatment status across 
industries between “Original” and “Extended” data 
 
This table shows the categorization of an industry as either treated or control is each dataset from 1992        to 
2005. “Original” data is the data provided by Feenstra (1996); Feenstra et al. (2002); Schott (2010)  until 
the year 2005 and “Extended” data is the data on tariff reductions which I construct using the data on 
imports provided by  Peter Schott until the year 2015.  An industry is categorized as treated if the      tariff 
reduction in an industry year is three times larger than the average (absolute) change in the same industry 
across. Other filters are also applied following Valta  (2012) and are explained in the section on  data  and 
sample. 
SIC Comparison 
 
2011   Treated in Both 
2015 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
2024 Treated  in Both 
2033 Treated  in Extended Data but not  Original Data 
2082 Control in Both 
2084    Control in Both 
2086 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
2211 Control in Both 
2221 Control in Both 
2273 Control in Both 
2421 Control in Both 
2451    Control in Both 
2522 Treated  in Extended Data but not  Original Data 
2611 Treated  in Both 
2621 Control in Both 
2711 Treated in Both 
2721 Treated  in Extended Data but not  Original Data 
2731 Control in Both 
2741 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
2761 Control in Both 
2821 Control in Both 
2833 Control in Both 
2834 Control in Both 
2835 Control in Both 
2836    Control in Both 
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SIC Comparison 
 
2842 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
2844 Treated  in Both 
2851   Treated in Both 
2891 Treated  in Extended Data but not  Original Data 
2911 Treated  in Both 
3011    Control in Both 
3021 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
3081 Control in Both 
3089 Treated in Both 
3221 Treated in Both 
3231 Treated in Both 
3241 Treated in Both 
3312   Treated in Both 
3341 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
3357 Control in Both 
3411 Treated in Both 
3442 Control in Both 
3523 Treated  in Original Data but not  Extended Data 
3531 Treated  in Both 
3533 Treated in Both 
3559 Control in Both 
3561 Treated in Both 
3562 Treated in Both 
3564 Treated in Both 
3569 Control in Both 
3571 Treated in Both 
3572 Control in Both 
3577 Control in Both 
3578   Treated in Both 
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SIC Comparison 
 
3579 Treated in Extended Data but not Original Data 
3585    Control in Both 
3613 Control in Both 
3621 Control in Both 
3634 Treated in Original Data but not Extended Data 
3651    Control in Both 
3661    Control in Both 
3663 Treated in Original Data but not Extended Data 
3669 Treated in Extended Data but not Original Data 
3672 Treated in Original Data but not Extended Data 
3674   Control in Both 
3677    Control in Both 
3678 Treated in Extended Data but not Original Data 
3679    Control in Both 
3695 Treated in Both 
3711 Treated in Both 
3713 Treated in Both 
3714 Treated in Both 
3715 Control in Both 
3721 Treated in Both 
3724 Treated in Both 
3728 Treated in Both 
3743 Control in Both 
3812 Treated in Both 
3822 Control in Both 
3823 Treated in Both 
3824 Control in Both 
3825 Treated in Both 
3826   Treated in Both 
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SIC Comparison 
 
 
3827 Treated in Both 
3829 Treated in Both 
3841 Control in Both 
3842 Treated in Both 
3843 Treated in Both 
3844 Treated in Both 
3845 Treated in Both 
3851 Control in Both 
3861 Treated in Both 
3873 Control in Both 
3942 Control in Both 
3944 Control in Both 
3949 Control in Both 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XV: Summary of the comparison between “Orig- 
inal” and “Extended” data 
 
This table summarizes the differences in the the categorization of an industry as either treated or control      is 
each dataset from 1992 to 2005 as well as the differences in the mean and standard deviation of the average 
tariff . “Original” data is the data provided by Feenstra (1996); Feenstra et al. (2002); Schott (2010) until 
the year 2005 and “Extended” data is the data on tariff reductions which I construct using   the data on 
imports provided by Peter Schott until the year 2015.  An industry is categorized as treated if   the tariff 
reduction in an industry year is three times larger than the average (absolute) change in the      same industry 
across. Other filters are also applied following Valta (2012) and are explained in the section  on  data  and 
sample. 
 
      Original - Extended 
    # of Ind Mean  SD 
Control in Both   41 -0.012  0.083 
Treated in Both   38 0.003  0.153 
Treated in Original Data but not Extended Da  10 -0.474  1.102 
Treated in Extended Data but not Original Da  7 0.119  0.215 
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Table XVI: Number of events across years between 
“Original” and “Extended” data 
 
This table shows the number of events in each year from 1992 to 2005 in “Original” and “Extended” data. 
“Original” data is the data provided by Feenstra (1996); Feenstra et al. (2002); Schott (2010) until the year 
2005 and “Extended” data is the data on tariff reductions which I construct using the data on imports 
provided by Peter Schott until the year 2015. Tariff reduction event is defined following Valta (2012) where 
tariff reductions are considered as an event only when the tariff reduction in an industry year is three times 
larger than the average (absolute) change in the same industry across. Other filters are also applied 
following prior literature and are explained in the section on data and sample. 
 
year # of tariff reductions 
in “Original data” 
# of tariff reductions 
in “Extended data” 
1992 13 12 
1993 12 7 
1994 9 11 
1995 27 31 
1996 7 5 
1997 9 8 
1998 9 10 
1999 6 4 
2000 5 6 
2001 0 1 
2002 0 1 
2003 1 2 
2004 1 1 
2005 1 1 
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Using  individual  campaign  contribution  data,  I  measure  the  political  ideology  of 
U.S. CEOs over the period 1994 to 2014 and analyze the relation between CEO ideology 
and firm performance.  To  identify the causal effect of CEO ideology,  I use      a  
combination  of  time-varying  effects  and  novel  instruments  based  on  the  ideology of 
the pool of potential CEO hires. Across all specifications, I find that firms with Republican  
CEOs,  on  average,  6  percentage  point  higher  ROA  compared  to  firms with Democrat 
CEOs.  Several alternate explanations such as time varying differences    at  state-industry  
level,  political  connections  and  firm  fixed  effects  do  not  explain away  the results. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Why do some firms perform significantly better than others? Studies have found that these 
performance differences are persistent, enormous in magnitude1, and relevant for similar 
sized firms, even within narrowly defined industry sectors (Syverson, 2004; ?; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; ?). Researchers have highlighted the importance 
of managers in determining these differences (??). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) follow 
the top executives across multiple firms to empirically demonstrate the importance of 
individual managers in explaining a significant proportion of variation in the firm outcomes 
and Bennedsen et al. (2006) highlight the fundamental role of CEOs in determining firm 
performance by showing that CEO deaths, hospitalization events, and the death of family 
members have substantial effects on firm performance. However, these studies do not 
directly show the specific characteristics of the CEOs that matter. 
 
Several researchers have proposed that CEO’s beliefs, preferences, vision or “style” may 
matter for corporate outcomes (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1993, 2000). Some managerial 
traits highlighted in the literature include managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011), and managerial optimism (Otto, 2014; Huang-Meier 
et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2013). Other characteristics such as risk preferences (Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010; Sunder et al., 2017) and life experiences (Malmendier et al., 
2011; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Bernile et al., 2017), are shown to be associated 
with firm outcomes as well.  Kaplan et al. (2012) study the importance of a number    of 
CEO characteristics for performance of firms involved in buyout and venture capital 
transactions. 
 
While this prior work is informative, the inherent endogeneity of the CEO selection process 
limits our ability to draw a causal inference of the effect of managerial characteristics 
on corporate outcomes. Fee et al. (2013), highlight methodological concerns with prior 
work, and show that the CEO style has limited impact on firm policy when considering 
exogenous CEO departures. Hence, the question of whether CEOs play a causal role in 
determining firm performance remains contested. 
 
In this paper, I shed light on the debate about the role played by CEOs in determining 
firm performance. Specifically, I analyze the relation between a quantitatively measurable 
 
1For instance, Syverson (2004) reports that the plant at the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution makes 
twice as much output compared to the 10th percentile plant. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) report even higher difference in 
productivity of about 5 times between these percentiles in their study on Chinese and Indian firms and Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) document that best performing firm is nine times more profitable than an average S&P 500 firm. 
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proxy for CEOs preferences and beliefs, i.e. CEO political ideology, and firm performance. 
To circumvent the identification issues,2 I use a combination of state and industry specific 
time trends and novel instruments to provide a causal estimate for the effect of ideology 
on firm performance. 
 
I focus on CEO ideology because several studies in political science and psychology theorize 
and document differences in personality and preferences between liberals and conservatives 
(Wilson, 1973). Carney et al. (2008) provides a detailed review of all the theories identifying 
personality traits resonating with conservative and liberal ideology dating back to over half 
a century. Some of these characteristics identified by psychologists may affect corporate 
performance. For example, Republican ideology places great importance on an economic 
system with free and efficient markets while Democrat ideology believes that government 
may need to regulate to ensure the protection of rights and interest of all (Sattler, 2013; 
Hutton et al., 2015). These ideological differences may reflect in the management style of 
the firm which, in turn, may affect firm performance. Moreover, stark differences in the 
stance of both ideological groups with respect to equality may have an impact on firm’s 
compensation and employment policies. Furthermore, a firm’s attitude towards its various 
stakeholders such as consumers, society or its labor force may be determined by CEO 
ideology. For instance, the stance on environmental protection, or affirmative action may 
affect various firm policies such as the level of investment in CSR projects and effort and 
investment towards improving employees’ working conditions. 
 
Therefore, political ideology may affect several firm level policies simultaneously. In this 
paper, I address the broader question: Does the political ideology of the CEO have a net 
effect on firm performance? If so, is a specific ideology more beneficial for the firm than 
the other? 
 
In a U.S. political setting, I take individual political contributions by firms’ top executives 
and CEOs over the period 1994 to 2014 from Federal Election Commission (FEC) to con- 
struct a measure of political ideology. I categorize the CEOs into Democrats, Republicans 
and equal-givers based on their contribution history. Using this categorization, I analyze 
the relation between firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA), and CEO 
ideology. 
 
2Researchers have highlighted how management changes are endogenous events (Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al., 1988; 
Parrino, 1997) with a highly selected sample (Fee and Hadlock, 2003; Hayes and Schaefer, 1999). Fee et al. (2013) highlights 
multiple methodological concerns with prior work using turnover events including high serial auto-correlation and unknown 
properties for F-tests. 
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I find that, unconditionally, firms with Republican CEOs are associated with 3.3% higher 
ROA compared to firms with Democrat CEOs and the difference is 3.6% once I control 
for observed CEO characteristics. These differences are economically sizable, since they 
amount to about one third of the standard deviation of ROA or a quarter of the mean of 
ROA. 
 
The positive association between ROA and CEO ideology may stem from a causal effect 
of ideology on performance or from selection if Republican CEOs are being systematically 
selected by firms in profitable states or industries. Indeed, I find that firms with Republican 
CEOs tend to be concentrated in profitable states and industries compared to firms with 
Democrat CEOs. However, the Republican-CEO premium is still a substantial 2.9% once 
I control for state, industry and year fixed effects as well as for differential trends by state 
and industry by including two and three-way fixed effects between state, industry and 
year. 
 
Given the rich set of single, two and three-way fixed effects employed, the estimated 
coefficient is plausibly causal, since it is reasonable to argue that within a state and 
industry in a given year, the available candidates for CEO position may be limited, and 
thus, firm-CEO matches may not be driven by ideology. 
 
In any case, the results suggest that CEO ideology matters for firms, since it either has 
a causal impact on firm performance or it is selected by firms for reasons correlated 
with performance. To isolate the causal effect of CEO ideology on firm performance, I 
propose two related instruments. The instruments build on the fact that a firm hires 
CEOs from a pool of available candidates, which is composed mostly of executives from 
inside the firm, or from intra-industry (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003) or local Yonker 
(2016) labor markets. Therefore, I construct a pool composed of the CEOs and other 
named executives in the same state and industry as the firm (excluding its CEO). The 
first version of the instrument consists of the ideology of the pool of named executives 
in the same state-industry-year as the firm. In addition, I control for all two-way fixed 
effects at state, industry and year level. Therefore, I exploit only the within state-industry 
variation in the pool of executives to estimate the impact of CEO ideology on the firm 
performance. Consistent with the OLS results, I find that firms with Republican CEOs 
outperform firms with Democrat CEOs by 0.7 standard deviations of ROA. 
 
The second variant of the instrument is the ideology of the pool of potential CEO candidates 
in the industry-state at the time the CEO was hired.  Because of specific   investments, 
6
 
 
entrenchment, and frictions in the turnover process, CEO replacements are relatively 
rare and may be triggered by specific events such as CEO quits or retirement, control 
changes or very poor performance. Therefore, the pool at the time at which the CEO was 
hired may be more relevant than the contemporaneous pool in determining the ideology 
of the CEO. This instrument also guards against the potential presence of time-varying 
omitted variables that might be correlated both with the ideology of candidates and firm 
performance, as any such variable at the time the CEO was hired is not likely to be 
related to firm performance today. Moreover, this instrument also allows the inclusion 
of three-way state-industry-year fixed effects in the estimation, controlling for potential 
time-varying state-industry factors that could bias the results. The results obtained using 
this instrument are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained using the previous instrument. 
With selection on ideology accounted for, these observed differences in firm performance 
can be attributed to the causal effect of ideology on firm performance. 
 
The results are robust to several alternative measures of ideology. In the main analysis, 
I use a binary measure of CEO ideology which distinguishes between Republican and 
Democrat CEO. The results are robust to different definitions of this binary variable as well 
as to the use of a continuous variable that measures the fraction of a CEO’s contributions 
allocated to Republican candidates. I also construct a more nuanced measure of CEO 
ideology by using the voting records of the legislators to whom CEOs donate as a measure 
of the candidates’ ideology.  In particular, I construct a measure of CEO ideology as  the 
weighted average of the DW-Nominate score of the legislators3 to whom the CEO 
contributes over her lifetime. Using this measure, I find that a one standard deviation 
increase in CEO conservatism increases firm performance by 0.15 standard deviations. 
Moreover, based on their DW-Nominate score, I categorize CEOs into four groups: Liberal 
Democrats, Moderate Democrats, Moderate Republicans, and Conservative Republicans.   I 
find that all the groups do significantly better than the Liberal Democrats, while the 
Moderate Republicans have the best firm performance. 
 
An important concern about my results is that they may reflect the impact of political 
connections on performance (identified, among others, by (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Mian and Khwaja, 2004; Boubakri et al., 2012; Goldman et al., 2009; Correia, 2014)) 
instead of the effect of CEO ideology. The use of individual donations (as opposed to firm 
donations) in my measure of ideology mitigates this concern because individual donations 
are legally restricted to be small and prior work has shown that they are  ideologically 
 
3Introduced by Poole and Rosenthal (1985), DW-Nominate uses roll-call voting data of legislators in the Congress and 
the Senate to assign each politician on a continuous scale of liberal (-1) to conservative   (1). 
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motivated (Burris, 2001; Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Gimpel et al., 2008; Barber, 2016). 
Moreover, if Republicans and Democrats have similar connections, then the difference 
estimates net out the effect of possible connections. Nonetheless, I explicitly control for 
political connections to isolate the effect of ideology from that of connections. The results 
remain robust to the inclusion of these controls. 
 
Furthermore, I add firm level factors shown to be associated with CEO ideology in the 
literature. The difference in firm performance between Republican and Democrat CEOs 
remains significant even after inclusion of firm size, leverage, investment in tangible capital, 
investment in research and development and cash holding, suggesting that the effect of 
ideology of the CEO on firm performance cannot be reduced to one or two policy measures. 
Last, I examine whether the increased profitability of Republican CEOs is driven from 
higher risk taking. Using three different proxies for risk (standard deviation of ROA, 
volatility of stock returns and firm beta), I find no evidence that higher profitability of 
firms with Republican CEOs is a result of higher risk taking. The results remain robust 
to alternative measures of performance, the inclusion of firm fixed effects and addition of 
firm characteristics at the time of CEO change interacted with time trend. 
 
This paper is related to the research that analyzes the role of top management in de- 
termining corporate outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) empirically document that 
manager fixed effects explain a significant proportion of variation in the firm outcomes. 
Bennedsen et al. (2006) highlight the importance of CEOs by showing that CEO deaths, 
hospitalization events, and the death of a family member have significant effects on firm 
performance. However, they do not directly show that CEO characteristics or management 
style matter. Moreover, Fee et al. (2013) do not find significant evidence that idiosyncratic 
managerial style matters for corporate outcomes once they use exogenous CEO departures. 
Therefore, the question of whether CEO characteristics and, in particular, “soft” char- 
acteristics, such as CEOs’ preferences and beliefs, matter for firm performance remains 
open. This paper contributes to this debate by documenting that CEOs’ political ideology 
influences corporate performance. 
 
Moreover, I contribute to the rapidly growing empirical literature on the relation between 
political ideology and corporate outcomes. Political ideology has been shown to be 
associated with investment in CSR (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 
2014), tax avoidance (Christensen et al., 2015), corporate litigation (Hutton et al., 2015), 
mergers and acquisitions (Elnahas and Kim, 2017), and remuneration policy (Chin and 
Semadeni, 2017; Gupta and Wowak, 2017). Kim et al. (2013) and Lee et al. (2014) show a 
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positive association between ideologically diverse boards and firm performance. Hutton 
et al. (2014) argue that Republican managers are more likely to have conservative personal 
ideology which leads them to adopt financially conservative policies such as lower debt, 
capital and R&D.4 My work differs from these studies in multiple ways. First, I focus on 
the effect of CEO ideology on overall firm performance instead of specific firm policies. 
Second, I make an empirical contribution by proposing novel instruments to estimate the 
causal relation between CEO ideology and firm performance. Third, I introduce a new 
measure of CEO ideology using the DW-Nominate score of the legislators to which the 
executives contribute to, which allows us to exploit the variation within an ideological 
group. Finally, I also control for the potentially confounding effect of political connections. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data along 
with the construction of the political measure used for the analysis. Section 3 highlights 
the empirical strategies used in the paper and section 4 presents the results obtained. 
Section 5 and 6 contains the robustness checks and the analysis on competing mechanisms, 
respectively. Lastly, section 7 presents the discussion and conclusion of the paper. 
 
 
2 Data Sources and Variable Construction 
 
I obtain data from three main data sources: the Federal Election Commission (FEC), 
Execucomp and Compustat. The sample consists of the universe of firms in Execucomp 
and covers the period 1992 to 2014. It contains a total of 3,405 unique firms and 42,267 
named executives, out of which 6,884 are flagged as CEOs over the entire period of analysis. 
I use the names of the managers from Execucomp to obtain their ideology from FEC data. 
 
I obtain the political contributions data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
website. Along with the date and amount of transaction, campaigns are required to report 
the information (name, address, occupation) of the donors contributing $200 or more. I 
use these FEC individual campaign contribution files for the election cycles 1994 to 2014.5 
Since contributors’ name in the FEC records is not reported consistently, I implement an 
 
4To my knowledge, this is the only other paper that refers to the association between ideology and firm performance, however, 
their focus is on explaining the relation between managerial ideology and investment policies.  They use September    11 attacks 
and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural  experiments  to  draw  causal  inferences. This  paper  differs  from theirs’ in its 
focus as well as methodological approach. I focus on the effect of political ideology on overall firm performance, while remaining 
agnostic regarding the specific channels.  With respect to firm performance,  they establish association while      I utilize time 
varying state-industry fixed effects and instrumental variable approach to establish a causal relation.  Moreover,   the two papers 
differ in measurement of political ideology, as well as categorization of the ideological groups. 
5 Hence, the universe of campaign contributions is made by individuals from 1993 to 2014 for the Presidential, House 
and, Senate election cycles. 
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algorithm (explained in detail in Appendix A) to ensure consistent naming and a better 
match with Execucomp. Next, I characterize the affiliation of the committee to which 
the individual contributes.6 This information is combined with the committee master file 
reported by the FEC which contains the address, designation, party affiliation, and, in case 
of a candidate committee, the unique candidate id. This gives us the political affiliation of 
the committee to which the individual donates the money. Finally, I match the individual 
contributions from the FEC data to the individuals we have in the Execucomp based on 
their full name. 
 
Across the 1994 to 2014 FEC election cycles, there are more than 22 million individual 
contributions. An election cycle is considered to be 2 years as per FEC definition. Hence, 
we have 11 election cycles. Based on full name, I match 438,940 individual contributions 
to the executives in the Execucomp. These matched contributions correspond to 4,818 
CEOs who made at least one contribution over the sample period, i.e. 70% of the CEOs 
available in the sample from Execucomp. 
 
Lastly, I use data from Compustat to construct the financial variables. The dependent 
variable, Return on Assets (ROA), is computed as the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to the book value of firm’s total assets. Other financial variables employed 
include return on equity, leverage, R&D, book-to-market ratio, firm size, return on sales 
and earnings per share. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. All variables are described in detail in Appendix B. 
 
 
2.1 Individual Contributions as a Proxy for Ideology 
 
The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) establishes a set of rules regarding the 
sources of contributions, the amount that can be donated, and disclosure principles. The 
FECA categorizes two sources of funding: individuals and interest groups. Interest 
groups include firms, labor organizations, membership organizations, trade associations, 
and other cooperatives. A firm (an interest group), as an entity is not allowed to contribute 
directly towards candidates’ campaign. It can, however, set up a PAC, which is a political 
committee organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat 
candidates. A firm is not allowed to use its treasury to fund the PAC. Therefore, company 
 
6When signing up for candidacy, each candidate must designate a political committee as his/her principal campaign 
committee or authorize a committee to receive and expend resources on his/her behalf. The name of these principal and 
authorized committees would necessarily contain the name of the candidate. There may also be committees not formally 
authorized by the candidate who make expenditures to support the candidate. These may be interest groups. Hence, I only 
focus on the contributions made by individuals to principal and authorized    committees. 
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executives contribute to the PAC. An individual, however, can contribute in two ways; 
directly donate to a candidate or his/her party committee and/or via a political action 
committees (PAC). 
 
The literature on campaign contributions has shown that PACs are concerned with gaining 
access to legislators to tilt the legislation in their favor (Snyder Jr, 1990; Hall and Wayman, 
1990). Empirical studies support this “access-seeking” theory. PACs contribute more to 
incumbents who hold powerful positions (Grier and Munger, 1991; Romer and Snyder, 
1994). Politicians who are very old (suggesting a higher probability of retirement or death 
and hence, a higher probability that the relation will end) or who announce retirement 
receive much lower PAC contributions (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Romer and Snyder, 
1994). Grier et al. (1994) find that PACs belonging to industries which stand to gain the 
most from government assistance contribute significantly more. 
 
Conversely, individual contributions are associated with the alignment of the political 
ideology of individuals and the candidate they support (Burris, 2001; Ansolabehere et al., 
2002; Gimpel et al., 2008). Ansolabehere et al. (2002) argue that individual donations are, 
for the most part, ideologically motivated. They find that while individuals are the biggest 
contributors in campaign finance, each individual contributes a rather small amount.7 
Analyzing the giving pattern of the top executives, the authors show that they contribute 
much less than their maximum limit, their contribution represents only about 0.05 percent 
of their annual income which happens to be even lower than they what they give to 
charities (another consumption good of similar nature). This meager average contribution 
size suggests that the private benefits that motivate PACs to contribute cannot be bought 
by these individuals. Using an original survey data on donors for the 2012 election cycle 
combined with PAC contributions, Barber (2016) shows that PACs consistently give to 
both parties, while individuals almost entirely contribute to candidates from one party. 
Moreover, using within-legislator analysis to isolate the effect of incumbency on 
donors,8 the author shows that PACs contribute significantly more to the incumbents9 
while individuals’ donations are unaffected by incumbency. Furthermore, Barber (2016) 
shows that PAC contributions to candidates that change party while in office remain 
unaffected, while the individuals align their contributions  accordingly. 
 
7This finding is substantiated by Cooper et al. (2010) as well. They find that largest group contributors are individuals, 
contributing about 80% and 60% of the total campaign contribution for Senate and House elections   respectively. 
8They consider the legislator who was a challenger in time t, won and now is an incumbent in time t + 1. They compare 
the donation portfolio for this legislator from time t to t+1 to get the incumbency effect on donations. 
9Consistent with the theoretical argument that incumbents are more valuable to access oriented groups/individuals. 
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Hutton et al. (2014) and Christensen et al. (2015) analyze the individual contributions of 
top executives, and compare their measures of ideology based on contributions with the 
self-reported ones using Marquis Who’s Who database. Christensen et al. (2015) found an 
86% match of the self reported ideology with the one they obtained using contributions, 
which increases to 96% when considering only “polar” individuals, i.e. executives who 
made political contributions to just one party. 
 
Given the findings in the literature on the motivation for political contributions, I use only 
direct donations by individuals to candidate committees to capture CEO ideology. 
 
 
2.2 Measurement of Political Ideology 
 
Individual political contributions are given to candidates (House, senate, presidential) or 
party committees. For each executive, I compute the total contribution given to Republican 
candidates and committees, and Democratic candidates and committees in each year. I 
compute the Political Ideology Index (PII) of the CEO similar to Hong and Kostovetsky 
(2012), Hutton et al. (2014), and Lee et al. (2014). 
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REPit and DEMit denote the total dollar amounts of political donations made by individual 
i in year t to the Republican and Democratic Parties over the sample period, respectively. 
The index P IIi is a measure between -1 and 1, where a higher number represents a more 
Republican political ideology. For instance, a CEO who gives only to Republican 
(Democrat) candidates and committees throughout his contribution history has an index 
of 1 (-1). By construction, those individuals that give equally to both parties will have an 
index value equal to zero. 
 
Similar to prior literature, the entire contribution history of the CEO is used to compute 
the index i.e. contributions before becoming a CEO as well as after. Hence, the index 
does not change over time for an individual. This not only minimizes the measurement 
error, but also aims to capture the ideological component of the contributions.10 
 
10For instance, a CEO can give more to Republicans relative to Democrats in a year in which Republicans are in power so 
that a one-year measure may reflect strategic rather than ideological giving. However, if we observe an individual consistently 
giving to one party throughout her contribution history, it is likely that such giving reflects her   ideology. 
In my sample, PII has a mean of 0 .38 which suggests that, on average, CEOs are more 
Republican than Democrat. Out of 4,818 CEOs who contribute at least once, there are 
1,613 (33.5%) CEOs who donate only to Republican candidates or party over the entire 
sample period (with PII =1), while 504 (10.5%) CEOs contribute solely to Democrat 
candidates (with PII= -1). For 282 (5.9%) CEOs, the total amount given to Republicans 
and Democrats over the sample period is exactly equal (PII=o ). Similarly, out of 42,267 
executives in Execucomp, 22,152 (52,4%) executives contribute at least once during the 
sample period. Of these, 7,547 (34.1%) executives contribute only to Republican candidate 
or party over the entire sample period (with PII =1) while 3,436 (15.5%) executives 
contribute solely to Democrat candidates (with PII= -1). 
In the literature, the index has been assigned a value of zero not only when the managers 
contribute exactly equally to both parties but also when they do not contribute at all 
(Lee et al., 2014; Hutton et al., 2014). However, it is important to distinguish between 
these two groups because CEOs who contribute are more likely to be politicallycom1ected 
compared to CEOs who do not contribute. Therefore, I consider equal contributors and 
non-contributors as two separate categories. Moreover, to disentangle the effect of ideology 
from that of political connections, in my baseline regressions, I restrict the sample to 
contributors only. This would net out any potential effect of political connections. 
Prior literature has assumed a linear relation between CEO ideology and outcome variables. 
However, this may not necessarily be the case.11 Moreover, PII does not allow a direct 
comparison between the two ideological groups, as having a lower index value may imply 
being less Republican but doesn't necessarily imply being a Democrat. To guard from these 
concerns, I consider a categorical measure of ideology which characterizes an executive 
as Republican, Democrat or Equal-giver based on certain cut-off for the index12• In the 
baseline case, I define the executives' ideologies as follows: 
Ideo; = 
D 
~ REP if PII; = 1 
DEM 
~EQUAL 
iif PII = 1 
if - o 5 5 PII; 5 0.5 
(2) 
11Tbat is, the effect of being 1 standard deviation more republican (e.g. from 0.3 to 0.7) may be different from the effect 
of being less democrat (e.g. from -0.7 to -0.3) or a change in ideology altogether (e.g. from -0.2 to 0.2 ). 
1 twbile the cut-off to define the CEO as EQual-giver is arbitrary in ldeo, I take different values for the cut-off to 
demonstrate that the results are robust to these alternate cut-offs. 
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Panels A and B in Figure 1 show histograms of the Political Ideology Index (PII) with 
CEOs and executives who contribute in more than one cycle, respectively. We see that the 
distribution is bi-modal, with the modes being -1 and 1, respectively. The distribution is 
also continuous in the interval -1 and 1 with no obvious cut-offs to characterize the CEOs 
and executives as Republican or Democrat. 
 
According to Ideo, I categorize 1043 CEOs as Republican, 264 as Democrats and 912 as 
Equal-givers. Table I shows the number of CEOs in each category according to the old 
and new measures. Moreover, it also shows the mean giving by CEOs of each category 
to their respective parties. As seen in the table, the mean giving ($ amount as well as 
number of times) by Republicans to Republican party and candidates is comparable to 
the mean giving by Democrats to Democratic party and candidates. 
 
Table II reports descriptive statistics of the key variables and their correlations with the 
different measures of ideology. Panel A contains the political measures. The table shows 
that 47% of the firm-year observations correspond to firms managed by Republican CEO, 
while 11% of the firm-year observations correspond to firms managed by Democrat CEO. 
The remaining 42% correspond to firms managed by CEOs categorized as Equal-givers. 
 
Panel B contains the CEO characteristics. An average CEO is a 55 years old male, with an 
average tenure of 8 years in the firm as a CEO. Age and male are positively correlated with 
being Republican and negatively correlated with being a Democrat CEO. However, the 
correlations are small in magnitude. Similarly, other CEO characteristics; tenure, ability 
and education are also not highly correlated with measures of ideology. Panel C reports 
the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics constructed using Compustat data. The 
main dependent variable is ROA. The average firm performance in the sample is 0.13 with 
a standard deviation of 0.10. None of the firm characteristics are very highly correlated 
with the measures of ideology either. 
 
 
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Univariate  Analysis 
 
Apriori, it is difficult to predict the direction or the magnitude of the effect. Therefore, 
first, I analyze the unconditional relation between CEO Ideology and firm performance 
as measured by return on asset (ROA). Using a continuous measure of ideology (PII), I 
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obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.017 with a standard error of 
0.0035. Using the categorical variable, Ideo, I find that firms with Republican CEOs are 
associated with 0.026 higher ROA compared to firms managed by equal-givers and with 
0.033 higher ROA compared to Democrat CEOs. 
 
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot between ROA and CEO ideology.13 We see a clear positive 
association between firm performance and having a Republican CEO. Hence, uncondi- 
tionally, firms with Republican CEOs have better performance as compared to firms with 
Democrat CEOs. 
 
 
3.2 The Relation between CEO Ideology and Firm Performance 
 
There are numerous scenarios in which ideology may result in observable differences in 
firm performance. It is important to distinguish between them and identify to which 
scenario the results can be attributed to. On one hand, these uni-variate results could 
reflect the causal effect of ideology, where, as long as the firms are not selecting CEOs 
based on ideology, differences in ideology would result in observed performance differences. 
However, this positive association between performance and Republican ideology could 
also arise if CEOs with different ideologies are matched to firms with different performance 
levels, or CEO ideology is correlated with some other CEO characteristics that either 
has a causal effect on performance or influences firm-CEO matches. To shed light on the 
possible explanations behind the uni-variate results, I consider several factors that could 
drive the correlation between CEO ideology and firm performance. 
 
CEO characteristics such as the level of knowledge and experience of the CEO are 
important for firm performance. If these characteristics are correlated with CEO ideology, 
not controlling them would bias the results. For instance, if more experienced CEOs are 
better for firm performance, and Republican CEOs tend to be more experienced, then I 
would obtain a positive association between firm performance and Republican CEO. Thus, 
I control for CEO characteristics such as age and gender. I add CEO tenure, measured as 
the number of years as a CEO in the firm, as a proxy for CEO ability, to the estimation. 
Moreover, to proxy for experience, I construct a variation of ‘tenure’ where I measure the 
number of years the individual has been present in any firm in the Execucomp in any 
managerial position. I also control for CEO education based on the degree of qualification14 
 
13To construct the scatterplot, PII is used by dividing it in100 bins, so that the figure shows the average ROA within 
each bin. 
14I obtain data on education for the CEOs using Boardex and construct a categorical variable, where the categories are: 
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I further explore potential selection problems that could give rise to the uni-variate results. 
Firstly, there could be time varying factors common to all firms such as economic recessions 
and booms. If firms hire more Republican CEOs during booms while more Democrat 
CEOs during recessions, the estimated coefficient on REP and DEM may partially capture 
this effect. Figure 3 shows the variation in Republican and Democrat CEOs and firm 
performance over time. We see a very stable pattern in all three variables. The average 
proportion of firms with Republican CEOs remains stable between 0.25 and 0.30 from 1992 
to 2013. Similarly, the average proportion of firms with Democrat CEOs stays between 
0.05 and 0.10 during the sample period. The average ROA seems to be pretty stable over 
time as well. Overall, the figure suggests that there is no stark time trend in any of the 
three variables. 
 
Secondly, there might be systematic differences among industries with respect to CEO 
ideology and ROA. That is, there may be more “Republican” industries and more “Demo- 
cratic” industries and they may exhibit different performance levels. For example, the 
firearm industry has much better ROA than IT industry. Moreover, firearms industry 
predominantly has Republican CEOs while IT industry is dominated by Democrat CEOs. 
Figure 4 shows a clear positive correlation between average industry CEO ideology and 
average industry firm performance. For instance, tobacco firms (SIC − 21) have a high 
average ROA and are predominantly run by Republican CEOs. On the other hand, social 
services firms (SIC − 83) are predominantly run by Democrat CEOs and have low 
profitability. Figure 4 highlights the importance of CEO ideology at industry level. 
 
Thirdly, there could be systematic state level differences in ROA and CEO ideology. If firms 
in ‘Red’ states such as Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming are more likely to be managed by 
Republican CEOs and are also more profitable than firms in ‘Blue’ states such as, Hawaii 
and Vermont which are more prone to be managed by Democrat CEOs, the estimated 
coefficient on REP and DEM may partially reflect this effect. Figure 5 shows the relation 
between state’s average CEO ideology and its average firm performance. Again, we see a 
clear positive correlation between state’s average ideology and average firm performance. 
For instance, firms in Hawaii are mostly managed by Democrat CEOs and have low average 
ROA. On the other hand, firms in South Dakota are mostly managed by Republican CEOs 
and have high average ROA. This suggests that state is an important correlate of both 
ROA and CEO ideology and should be controlled in the estimation. 
 
less than college degree, college degree, graduate degree, doctorate degree and specialization in accounting, finance and 
business. 
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These state and industry trends highlight the importance of CEO ideology as they 
suggest that Republican CEOs tend to be concentrated in firms in profitable industries 
and profitable states. This systematic correlation between the CEO ideology and firm 
performance at industry and state level suggests that either Republican CEOs are better at 
increasing firm performance and hence we see this correlation, or there might be selection 
at play where high performing states and industries select Republican CEOs. While it is 
interesting to analyze the factors giving rise to this possible selection, the focus of this 
paper is to estimate the causal effect of ideology on firm performance. Therefore, I add 
time, industry and state fixed effects to the estimation to get an effect of CEO ideology, 
net of these industry and state specific factors. 
 
While these fixed effects control for the time invariant differences among states and 
industries, and the shocks common to all the industries, there might still be threats to 
identification. For instance, there might be time varying shocks to a particular industry 
or particular state which may be correlated with the firm performance as well as CEO 
ideology. 
 
First, certain industries may receive a shock in some year that may affect their performance 
(ROA), and at the same time affect CEO ideology. For instance, some industries may 
experience stronger regulatory laws which may directly impact their performance. If the 
firms in this industry believe that under these circumstances it may be beneficial to hire 
CEOs of a specific ideology, then the identification assumption may not hold. Second, 
certain states may receive positive or negative shock in some year which may affect the 
performance of the firms in that state and may also affect CEO ideology. For instance, 
some states may receive a Republican governor, or a majority of Republicans in the state 
congress, which may reduce the overall regulation and oversight of all the firms in that 
state, thus increasing the profitability. If the firms in these states choose to hire Republican 
CEOs during this time period due to the role of potential connections, the estimated 
coefficient on REP and DEM may partially capture this effect. Third, there might by 
differences among firms belonging to the same industry, but different states. For instance, 
the firms belonging to financial industry may have different profitability in New York 
compared to New Mexico due to firm agglomeration, difference in productivity among 
states, and other differences. These differences could overlap with the differences in the 
CEO ideology. Thus, I control for industry-year, state-year and state-industry fixed effects 
to eliminate all these concerns. 
 
After controlling for all the single and two-way fixed effects, most of the unobserved factors 
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affecting ROA and CEO ideology are accounted for. However, one may argue that time 
varying shocks specific to a certain industry and state may be driving the results. For 
instance, changes in regulation of industries among states. That is, some states introduced 
more regulations, or relaxed some regulations on certain industries than the others. If 
these changes are associated with CEO ideology, the estimated coefficient on REP and 
DEM may be biased. Therefore, I add state-industry-year fixed effects to the estimation 
to obtain unbiased estimates. 
 
The equation below captures the estimation. 
 
ROAjist = β0 + β1REPjist + β2DEMjist + Xjtistγ + αs + αi + αt + αit + αst + αis + αist + ωjist, 
(3) 
where j represents the firm, belonging to industry i, located in the state s, at year t. 
REPjist  and DEMjist  are binary variables equal to one if the CEO ideology for firm, j,   in 
year t, is Republican and Democrat respectively. The reference group is Equal-givers. 
Xjtist is vector of CEO-level controls and α capture various fixed effects. 
The identification assumption to obtain unbiased estimates of β1  and β2  is E(ωjist|αs  + 
αi + αt + αit + αst + αis + αist) = 0. That is, conditional on CEO characteristics and all the 
fixed effects, the unobserved factors impacting firm performance, ωjist, are uncorrelated 
with the CEO ideology. 
 
 
3.3   Instrumental Variables 
 
Even after controlling for CEO characteristics as well as firm characteristics that CEO 
cannot easily alter, the possibility of selection may still pose threat to identifying a causal 
effect of ideology. The identification assumption could be violated in the presence of 
selection at a state-industry level. For instance, if high (low) performing firms systematically 
choose Republican (Democrat) CEO. However, it is reasonable to argue that within a state 
and industry in a given year, the available candidates for CEO position may be limited. 
The criteria on which to choose a CEO maybe composed of a bunch of characteristics of 
first order importance, such as, qualification, experience, expertise and reputation, and 
thus, firm-CEO matches may not be driven by ideology. Hence, after controlling for all 
the fixed effects, we can assume ideology of the CEO to be plausibly exogenous to the 
selection of the CEO. Nonetheless, to explicitly address the potential endogeneity problem, 
we need to come up with a setting in which we can achieve exogenous variation in the 
CEO ideology i.e. the choice of the firm when hiring a CEO is restricted with respect to 
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ideology. Hence, I construct an instrumental variable for the ideology of the CEO that a 
firm selects. 
 
A firm hires from the pool of available candidates. Usually, firms hire CEOs from inside 
the firm as not only does this hiring strategy serve as an incentive mechanism for the 
firm’s executives and ensure stability, but also allows the firm to benefit from the insider’s 
knowledge of the firm (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). Moreover, the chances of a mismatch 
between the firm and the CEO are lower as the firms have greater information about the 
skill sets of the insider relative to an outsider (Harris and Helfat, 1997). However, firms 
may sometimes choose a CEO from outside the firm (Howard, 2001; Guthrie and Dutta, 
1997). The primary source then becomes the intra-industry labor market, because an 
executive from within industry embodies industry specific skills useful for the firm 
operating in that industry which an executive from outside of industry may not possess 
(Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). Cremers and Grinstein (2013), using a universe of firms 
from Execucomp during 1993-2005, demonstrate that 81% of the new CEOs are appointed 
from within the same industry. Moreover, Yonker (2016) highlight the role of geography 
in the market for CEO, by documenting that firms are five times more likely to hire 
locally. Therefore, I construct a pool which is composed of the CEOs and other named 
executives in the same state and same 1 digit SIC code of the firm.15 This pool would be 
representative of the pool of potential candidates from which a firm can hire a CEO. The 
variable used to instrument the CEO ideology is the ideology of the pool of these potential 
candidates for the CEO constructed at the state and industry level. 
 
I consider two versions of the instrument. The first one is constructed at the state and 
industry level for a given year. Hence, the variation in the pool from which a CEO can be 
hired arises from entry and exit of executives in the pool each year. While each firm can 
choose its own executives, no one firm has control over the choice of executives of other 
firms in the pool. Hence, we have a variation in the ideology of the pool which does not 
depend on a specific firm’s decisions. Not only is there a substantial variation between 
pools, but within pools as well. 
 
Figure 6 shows the variation for two industries (manufacturing and services) for three 
different states (California, New York and Texas) to illustrate the variation. In the 
manufacturing industry in California, 44% of the executives were Republican, while 17% 
 
15Even though it is a coarse measure of industry grouping, 1 digit SIC code is used in the main analysis because it yields 
a bigger pool for the firms to choose from, which is less restrictive and hence closer to reality. When pools are constructed 
using 2 digit SIC, the number of pools increase and the number of firms per pool are much less.  Nonetheless, I carry out the 
estimation using 2 digit SIC as well and the results remain   robust. 
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were Democrat. The number of executives who are Republican steadily decreased to 
31% and Democrats increased to 18% over the 20 years. New York and Texas, on the 
other hand, experienced higher variation in the Republican and Democrat executives over 
the sample period. In 1992, in the manufacturing industry in New York, 44% of the 
executives were Republican and 30% were Democrat. In 2000, the proportion of Republican 
executives decreased to 26%, while the number of Democrat executives increased to 32%. 
The proportion of Republicans decreased further and proportion of Democrats increased 
further in the next years, with 17% of the executives being Republicans and 43% being 
Democrats by 2012. Similarly, Texas saw an increase in the Democrat executives over the 
sample period, while the Republican executives remained the same. 
 
The variation in this instrument is the within state and industry variation in the pool of 
executives. For example, I do not compare the executive ideology in the same industry 
in different states (e.g. manufacturing industry in New York to manufacturing industry 
in Texas) or two different industries in same state (e.g. manufacturing industry in New 
York to services industry in New York) to predict the probability of hiring a Republican 
or Democrat CEO. Instead, I compare the executive ideology in an industry in a state (e.g. 
manufacturing industry in New York) with itself over the different years in the sample 
period. 
 
The second instrument is constructed as the pool of CEOs and executives at the time 
the CEO was hired. In this case, the variation in the pool is coming from the presence 
of different executives in the year in which the CEO was hired. For instance, suppose a 
firm hires a CEO in 1998 and then again in 2005. For years 1998 to 2004, the IV is going 
to be the ideology of the executives in the pool in the year 1998. In 2005, the IV would 
change to the value of the ideology of executives in the pool in the year 2005. If there are 
no subsequent changes in CEO, the value of the IV would remain unchanged for years 
2005 onwards. 
 
This second instrument, similar to the earlier one, constrains the firm’s choice of CEO 
based on ideology. While it has less variation than the first instrument, it has some 
advantages. Firstly, if one were to assume that there is little turnover of CEOs, the pool 
at the time at which the CEO was hired may be more relevant than the contemporaneous 
pool. Secondly, as this instrument does not vary over all the years, potential presence 
of any omitted variable that may affect the pool as well as firm performance will not 
bias the results. This is because any such omitted variable at the time the CEO was 
hired should not be related to firm performance today. Lastly, it allows the inclusion of 
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three-way state-industry-year fixed effects which is not possible in the first instrument. 
Panel D of Table II reports descriptive statistics of all the instrumental variables and their 
correlations with the different measures of  ideology. 
 
In the first stage, the probability that the firm will hire a Republican CEO is estimated 
as a function of the ideology of the pool controlling for the CEO characteristics. In the 
second stage, the predicted values of probability of hiring a Republican CEO are used. 
The equations below illustrate the empirical methodology. The first stage is given by: 
 
REPjist  = β0  + β1P ool REPist  + β2P ool DEMist  + EREP , 
DEMjist  = β0  + β1P ool DEMist  + β2P ool REPist  + EDEM , (4) 
The second stage of the instrumental variable estimation is given by the following equation: 
ROAjist  = β0  + β1R EPjist  + β2D EMjist  + Ejist (5) 
where j represents the firm, belonging to industry i, located in the state s, at year t. 
P ool REPist and P ool DEMist is the ratio of Republican and Democrat executives in the 
same industry-state pair as the firm j, in the year t and REPjist and DEMjist are binary 
variables equal to one if the CEO ideology for firm, j, in year t, is Republican and 
Democrat respectively.  The reference group is  Equal-givers. 
 
Here, the identification assumption is that the ideology of the pool of executives in the 
state-industry pair is exogenous with respect to the unobserved firm level characteristics, 
and that this pool only influences the firm performance through the ideology of the CEO. 
In other words, E(Ejist|REP  P OOList, DEM  P OOList) = 0. 
 
As before, the differences in firm performance could be correlated with differences in 
the pool of potential CEOs due to several reasons. Hence, I control for year, state and 
industry fixed effects to account for any macroeconomic shocks common to all firms and 
time invariant state level and industry level factors. I further control for industry-year 
and state-year fixed effects to account for time varying factors that may affect certain 
industries or states in some years which may affect their performance (ROA), and, at the 
same time, affect the pool of executives. Finally, state-industry fixed effects account for 
differences among firms belonging to the same industry, but different states. 
 
The error term in the equation 6 can be expressed in terms of the new error as:  Ejist  = 
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αs + αi + αt + αst + αit + αis + vjist. The identification assumption for the instrument to be 
valid can now be expressed as:  E(vjist|P ool REPist, P ool DEMist) = 0.  In other words, 
the firm unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the the firm performance are 
uncorrelated with the ideology of the pool of executives. Hence, I estimate the following 
in the second stage. 
 
ROAjist  = β0  + β1R EPjist  + β2D EMjist  + αs  + αi  + αt  + αit  + αst  + αis  + vjist, (6) 
 
 
After controlling for all the single and two-way fixed effects, the identification assumption 
for the consistent estimation of the coefficients β1 and β2 is much more reasonable. However, 
time varying shocks specific to a certain industry and state may be driving the results. 
By definition, these shocks would be perfectly correlated with the instrument, as the 
instrument is constructed at the industry, state and year level. An example, of such a 
shock could be the changes in regulation of industries among states. That is, some states 
introduced more regulations, or relaxed some regulations on certain industries than the 
others. This is not going to affect the consistency of the coefficients β1 and β2 as long as 
these changes do not accompany changes in the pool of executives as well. Hence, my 
instrument will be inconsistent only if the firm performance of firms in industry-state 
pairs over years systematically varied with the ideology of the pool of the executives in 
the industry-state pair over time. 
 
Even though I can not include the three way fixed effects in the estimation because the first 
instrument varies at the state-industry-year level, I address this issue by including a proxy, 
interaction of state GDP and industry GDP, for the profitability of the state-industry pair 
over the different years. This proxy captures the common time-varying shocks to the firms 
which belong to the same industry-state pair. This would address the potential issue of 
state-industry time-varying shocks driving the  results. 
 
Moreover, using the second instrument, constructed at the level of state-industry and 
the year the CEO was hired, alleviates these concerns as it allows inclusion of the three 
way state-industry-year fixed effects.  The identification assumption after inclusion of 
the three way fixed effects is:  E(wjist|P ool REP alt , P ool DEMalt ) = 0.  In other words, 
the firm unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the the firm performance 
are uncorrelated with the ideology of the pool of executives after controlling for the 
state-industry-year fixed effects. This assumption is reasonable because with the inclusion 
of the three way fixed effects, I am essentially comparing the performance of the firms 
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within the same industry and state in the same year. 
 
 
 
4 Results 
4.1 OLS Results 
 
Table III shows the results of the estimation. Column 1 contains estimates for the uni- 
variate analysis where ROA is regressed over the two ideologies; Republican and Democrat, 
with Equal-givers being the reference group. The standard errors are clustered at a firm 
level to allow for correlation among the observations from a firm across time16. The 
relation between ideology and firm performance suggest that firms with Republican CEOs 
tend to have better firm performance by 0.026 as compared to firms with CEOs who are 
non-ideological (Equal-givers). On the other hand, firms with Democrat CEOs do not 
seem to significantly differ from firms with non-ideological CEOs. Furthermore, firms with 
Republican CEOs tend to have higher return on assets (ROA) by 0.033 compared to firms 
with Democrat CEOs. This result is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The 
economic significance of these coefficients can be gauged by comparing them with the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable in the sample. The mean ROA of the firms 
in the sample is 0.128 with standard deviation 0.102. A coefficient of 0.033 suggests that 
the difference between the performance of firms with Republican CEOs and Democrat 
CEOs is about one third of the standard deviation of ROA. 
 
In column 2, I control for CEO characteristics such as gender, age, tenure, experience and 
education.17 If we compare the coefficients obtained in column 2 to the uni-variate results 
obtained in column 1, we can gauge the impact of omitted CEO characteristics. While 
the R2 of the model has increased from 0.018 to 0.023, the coefficients on REP, DEM 
and the difference between the two remain almost unchanged. This suggests that CEO 
characteristics are not strong correlates of ideology. 
 
I add year, state and industry fixed effects to the estimations in column 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively and column 6 shows the results after controlling for all three fixed effects 
simultaneously. As suggested by Figure 3 adding year fixed effects does not change the 
earlier results by much, however, adding state fixed effects reduces the coefficient on REP 
 
16Results are robust to clustering at industry and state level as well. 
17For the sake of brevity, I only report coefficients on variables of interest in the tables. I do not obtain statistically 
significant coefficients on any of the CEO characteristics except tenure, for which I obtain a positive and significant coefficient 
of 0.002. 
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slightly, suggesting that the firms with Republican CEOs, relative to Democrat, tend to be 
concentrated in high-profitability states. The difference is still statistically significant at 
1% significance level and corresponds to 0.26 standard deviation of ROA. Adding industry 
fixed effects also results in a reduced difference between performance by the firms with 
Republican CEOs compared to Democrat CEOs and a slight reduction in the coefficient 
on REP, suggesting that the firms with Republican CEOs, relative to Democrat CEOs, 
tend to be concentrated in high-profitable  industries. 
 
In column 6, after controlling for all these effects simultaneously, we see that firms with 
Republican CEOs outperform firms with non-ideological CEOs by 0.011 (0.11 standard 
deviation of ROA) and firms with Democrat CEOs by 0.021 (0.21 standard deviation of 
ROA). 
 
Column 7, 8, and 9 of Table III shows results of the estimation after controlling for two-
way state-year, industry-year and state-industry fixed effects respectively. Increasing the 
number of fixed effects results in higher standard errors. In column 10, all fixed effects 
are controlled for simultaneously. The difference between the performance of firms with 
Republican CEOs compared to Democrat CEOs remains positive and statistically 
significant at 5% significance level. This effect of ideology (0.024) is equivalent to 0.24 
standard deviation of ROA. The number of observations reduce significantly once three way 
fixed effects are accounted for in column 11. Even after controlling for time varying factors 
at a state-industry level, firms with Republican CEOs outperform firms with Democrat 
CEOs by 0.029. 
 
The results obtained in the previous subsection suggest that ideology matters. A consis- 
tently positive coefficient on REP and a positive difference of firm performance between 
Republican and Democrat highlight not only that ideology matters but also that a specific 
ideology may be more beneficial for firm performance than the other. Firms managed by 
Republican CEOs outperform firms with Democrat and non-ideological CEOs even after 
controlling for all single, two-way and three-way fixed effects. 
 
 
4.2 Instrumental  Variable Results 
 
As long as the identification assumption holds, the results in the previous section can be 
interpreted as causal. However, as highlighted earlier, the identification assumption could 
be violated in the presence of selection at a state-industry level.  For instance, if   high 
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(low) performing firms systematically choose Republican (Democrat) CEO. Therefore, to 
address potential identification concerns, I use instrumental variables for the ideology of 
the CEO to constrain the choice of the firm when hiring a CEO with respect to ideology. 
 
The results of IV estimations are presented in Table IV and Table V. As shown in Table IV, 
Panel A, the results in the first stage show a positive and highly significant coefficient on 
P ool REP for REP and P ool DEM for DEM. Moreover, the instruments yield a high 
F-statistic, showing the strength of the instruments. 
 
In the second stage, presented in Table IV Panel B, consistent with the earlier results, we 
obtain positive and statistically significant coefficient on REP through all the specifications, 
whereas the coefficient on DEM remains statistically insignificant. Column 1 reports the 
unconditional relation i.e. without controlling for any fixed effects. The coefficient on 
REP is larger than the one obtained earlier. 
 
Firms with Republican CEOs perform better by 0.06 as compared to firms with non- 
ideological CEOs as well as Democrat CEOs. This result is statistically significant at  1% 
significance level with an economic significance equivalent to 0.6 standard deviation of 
ROA. I add all year, state and industry fixed effects to the estimations in column 2. The 
coefficient on difference between the performance of firms managed by Republican and 
Democrat CEO decreases to 0.43. However, once I include all the single as well as two-
way fixed effects simultaneously, the coefficient increases in magnitude closer to the one 
obtained in the unconditional estimates in the first column. Firms with Republican 
CEOs outperform firms with non-ideological CEOs by 0.042 (0.42 standard deviation of 
ROA) and firms with Democrat CEOs by 0.07 (0.7 standard deviation of ROA). 
 
I can not include three-way fixed effects as the instrument is constructed at the state- 
industry-year level. However, I use the state and industry GDP from 1997 to 2013 from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as a proxy for the profitability of the state-industry 
pair over the different years.18 Results are presented in Table IV. As shown in panel B, 
column (4), even after including an interaction of state GDP and industry GDP to control 
for common time-varying shocks to the firms which belong to the same industry-state pair, 
firms with Republican CEOs outperform firms with non-ideological CEOs by 0.045 and 
firms with Democrat CEOs by 0.059 (0.59 standard deviation of ROA). 
 
18BEA reports the 3-digit NAICS industry GDP data. As I am using 1 digit SIC industry classification, I match the 
industry title provided by BEA with the 1 digit classification SIC to get the corresponding GDP. 
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Table V present the first and the second stage result of IV estimation using second set of 
instrumental variables constructed at the level of state, industry and the year the CEO 
was hired. Panel A shows the first stage results. As before, we have a positive and highly 
significant coefficient on P ool REP for REP and P ool DEM for DEM. Moreover, the 
strength of the instruments is also evident by high F-statistics obtained in the first stages. 
 
Table V Panel B shows the results from the second stage. Column (2-3) shows results 
with the inclusion of the single and two-way fixed effects. We get qualitatively similar 
findings to the one obtained before. Firms with Republican CEOs outperform firms with 
non-ideological as well as Democrat CEOs. 
 
In column 4, I include the three way fixed effects. The inclusion of three way fixed effect 
does not come without a cost. While, the inclusion of three way fixed effects strengthens 
the argument for the validity of the instrument, it reduces the power to detect an existing 
effect for two main reasons. First, with the inclusion of three way fixed effects, there are 
more than 2500 fixed effects in the estimation. The total number of observations are less 
than 10,000. This implies, on average, 4 observations per industry-state-year pair. Such 
small number of observations in the industry-state-year bin reduces the power significantly. 
Second, the inclusion of three way fixed effects partials out around 80 percent of the 
variation in the instrument. This significantly reduces the amount of variation in the 
instrument. 
 
The inclusion of three way fixed effects increases the coefficients of Democrat and Re- 
publican CEO. The coefficient on the difference between the Republican and Democrat 
CEO is 0.025. The coefficient implies that the firms run by Republican CEO have 0.025 
higher ROA compared to the firms run by Democrat CEO in the same industry and state 
and in the same year. The magnitude of the coefficient in the last column is statistically 
indistinguishable from the one in column 3. The standard errors, however, are larger due 
to inclusion of the three way fixed effects. 
 
The results are consistent across various different specifications and estimations. First, 
the OLS estimates yield a significant relation between CEO political ideology and the 
firm performance. IV estimation further suggests that the results are causal. That is, the 
difference in political ideology causes differences in firm performance. The finding remains 
consistent throughout i.e. firms with Republican CEOs outperform firms with Democrat 
as well as non-ideological CEOs. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect of ideology on 
firm performance is economically significant. 
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4.3 Ideology vs. Connections 
 
There is vast literature on political connections which highlights the importance of political 
connectedness of firms on various firm level outcomes.19 Thus, there may be a concern 
that an individual may be giving donations to the candidates in expectation of favors in 
the future when their candidate gets elected and is in position of power. If this is the 
case, the results may reflect the effect of ideology and connections. Specially, if firms with 
Republican CEOs have stronger connections, it would reflect in the estimates documented. 
However, this concern is countered by the use of individual contributions only, as the 
research on motivations behind donations clearly suggests that these individual donations 
reflect donor’s ideology. Hence, the measure being used partially controls for this “quid 
pro quo” aspect of connections. 
 
An additional concern could be that the managers may still be able to reap benefits from 
the fact that they contributed to the winning candidate, even if the motivation behind the 
donation was ideological and not opportunistic. They may still be in a position to request 
favors that the candidate may feel obliged to fulfill. This argument essentially rests on 
the assumption that just by the fact that the individual contributed, he has earned some 
network of connections. However, when comparing Republicans, Democrats and Equal 
givers, this concern is mitigated to a greater extent as all these groups are contributing. 
 
However, a potential problem may arise if Republicans contribute greater amounts or more 
frequently, which may earn them stronger connections. Table I shows that the average 
contribution amounts of Republicans and Democrats are comparable.20 The average 
number of times these groups contribute is also comparable. 
 
Nonetheless, given that I seek to estimate the effect of political ideology, I explicitly control 
for political connections as well to ensure that the results are not driven by political 
connections. This is mainly to account for the concern that connections play an important 
role when the party that the CEO supported is in power. Controlling for the ruling party 
ensures that the effect of connections coming from the network established is accounted for. 
I control for the ruling party at a presidential level. Rep rule pres is a dummy taking the 
 
19Political connectedness is associated with higher stock prices (Fisman, 2001; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Ferguson and 
Voth, 2008; Jayachandran, 2006; Knight, 2006), ease of access to finance (Mian and Khwaja, 2004; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014), and other perks such as 
procurement of productive government contracts, tax redemption or regulatory benefits (Goldman et al., 2009; Correia, 2014) 
20Republican CEOs contribute on average $34,087 to Republican candidates and party over all the years. Similarly, 
Democrat CEOs contribute on average $44,680 to Democrat candidates and party over all the years 
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value of one for the years in which there was a Republican president and zero otherwise. 
 
However, it can be argued that the connections to the party in power may not matter at 
such a broad scale but rather at a state level as the benefits that firms expect may be taken 
at smaller level. Therefore, I control for the party affiliations of the senators as well as the 
governors at the state level. Senate is responsible for passing laws which include laws that 
directly affect the firms. Moreover, the senators oversee the federal bodies responsible for 
keeping check on institutions including firms. United States Senate has 100 senators, with 
two representatives per state. Therefore, which party represents the state in the Senate 
can be assessed by looking at the party affiliations of these two senators from that state. I 
hand collect the party affiliations of each of the individual in the U.S. Senate for the 50 
states for years1992 to 2014. For each year and state, Rep rule senate is assigned a value 
of 1 if both the representatives of the state in the U.S. Senate were Republicans, 0.5 if one 
was Republican and the other a Democrat and 0 if both the senators were Democrats. I 
collect party affiliations of each of the governors as well. Similar to before, Rep rule gov 
for state s at year t indicates whether the governor of the state is Republican. 
 
Table VI shows the results after controlling for connections at various levels. The proxy for 
connection at presidential level is completely absorbed once year fixed effects are added. 
Similarly, proxies for connections at state (senate and governor level) are subsumed in 
the state-year fixed effects. However, to further control for the potential difference in the 
value or strength of connections between the two ideological groups, I interact the proxies 
for connections with the dummy variable for CEO ideology and add as an instrument to 
the estimation. 
 
In column 1, connections at a presidential level are controlled for. Once we add the 
interaction term, we get a number of possible combinations depending on the ideology 
of the ruling party in a given year. For instance, if the president in power belongs to  the 
Democrat party then the dummy Rep rule pres will be zero and the coefficient on “REP-
DEM” indicates the difference between the performance of firms with different 
ideological CEOs under Democrat rule. Similarly, “REP-DEM” in REP rule indicates the 
difference between firm performance based on CEO ideology when the president in power 
is Republican. I further present the coefficients for the difference in firm performances 
when firms are managed by REP CEOs when Republicans are in power and DEM CEOs 
when Democrats are in rule to highlight that the difference in the value of connections 
between Republicans and Democrats is not driving the results. 
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Columns 2 and 3 present similar analysis but controlling for connections at the governor 
and senate level respectively and column 4 presents results when controlling for potential 
connections at all three levels  simultaneously.21 
 
The results remain robust to the inclusion of these interaction terms. As before, we find a 
positive and significant coefficient on REP i.e. firms with Republican CEOs have higher 
ROA of 0.04 compared to equal-givers. Moreover, the difference in firm performance 
between the Republican and the Democrat CEOs remains positive and mostly significant 
regardless of which specific political party is in power. Note that the coefficients on 
REP-DEM in DEM rule are consistently positive and significant through all columns i.e. 
firms with Republicans CEOs perform better even when the party in rule is of opposite 
ideology (and hence, arguably not favorable in terms of connections). The results highlight 
the importance of ideology for firm performance even after controlling for possible value of 
connections at presidential as well as state level. 
 
 
4.4 Measuring Ideology using DW-Nominate 
 
Ideo is a categorical measure of CEO ideology, which may not capture the ideological 
variation within a similar ideological group. One may argue that two CEOs who donate all 
their money to Republicans, but one donates mostly to extreme conservative politicians, 
while other to moderate Republicans may be ideologically different from each other. 
 
To understand within differences among Republican and Democrat CEOs, we need to 
capture the variation within the Republican and Democrat political party itself. One 
such measure is the ideal point estimation of each legislator known as the DW-Nominate, 
which was introduced by Poole and Rosenthal (1985).22 The DW-Nominate is widely 
used in political science as a measure of the ideology of the legislators. The only study in 
finance utilizing similar methodology is Bolton et al. (2018), who argue that firms’ policies 
are not entirely motivated by economic forces and inevitably have a political facet, by 
documenting that the ideological leanings of the institutional investors are depicted in 
their voting patterns. 
 
21Note that when adding all three proxies for connections as interaction terms, we essentially have too many instruments 
in the equation i.e. we are predicting 8 instruments using variation coming from two variables only i.e. Pool REP and 
Pool DEM . This would understandably lead to weak instrument problem and thus the F-value when all three proxies for 
connections are added as interaction terms drops below 10. 
22DW-Nominate uses roll-call voting data of legislators in the Congress and the Senate to assign each politician on a 
continuous scale of liberal (-1) to conservative (1). The measure relies on two key assumptions. First, it assumes that the 
“Yea” and “Nay” can represent each legislation on a Euclidean space. Second, each legislator votes non-strategically to 
maximize his static utility function from each  vote. 
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Following Mian et al. (2010) and Mian et al. (2014); Autor et al. (2016) I rely on the 
primary DW-Nominate dimension to measure the CEO ideology. 23 Specifically, I analyze 
the political contributions given by each CEO to different legislators and construct the 
measure as the weighted average of the DW-Nominate score of the legislators to whom 
the CEO contributes over her life-time. The following expression represents the measure 
for CEO i who contributes to legislators j = 1, · · · , J: 
 
DW -Nominate 
 
J 
= j=1 
DW -Nominatej  ∗ Amountj 
i J 
j=1 Amountj 
 
To illustrate, suppose a CEO gives $1,000 to a candidate with DW-Nominate of 0.90 
and $2,000 to a candidate with DW-Nominate of 0.60, the CEO’s DW-Nominate will be 
0.70. The measure highlights the differences within Republican and Democrat CEOs. For 
instance, CEO Carol L. Williams (execid 43364) who gave $1,450 to Ron Paul (one of the 
most conservative politician with a DW-Nominate of 0.97) has a DW-Nominate score of 
0.97 and is thus much more conservative compared to CEO Thomas M. Bolger (execid 
16306) who gave $1,825 to John McCain (moderate Republican with a DW-Nominate of 
0.38) and thus, has a DW-Nominate score of 0.38. 
 
Figure 7 plots the distribution of CEO ideology using the DW-Nominate score. The 
Republican CEOs (P II = 1) appear in red, while Democrat CEOs (P II = −1)   are 
represented in blue. We see that there is almost no overlap in ideology between the 
Republican and Democrat CEOs. An average CEO has a DW-Nominate score of 0.056 
and the dispersion of DW-Nominate is 0.165. The middle 50% of the CEOs have a DW-
Nominate score between -0.021 and 0.135. The Republican CEOs have an average DW-
Nominate score of 0.168, with middle 50% lying between 0.043 and 0.260. On the other 
hand, the Democrat CEOs have an average DW-Nominate score of -0.018,   with 
middle 50% lying between -0.069 and -0.276.24 
 
Table VII shows the impact of CEO ideology on the firm performance using DW-Nominate 
as a measure of ideology. Columns 1 to 3 are estimated using OLS. Column 1 shows the 
estimates without controlling for any fixed effects, while Columns 2 and 3 include all 
single and two-way state, industry and year fixed effects. We see that the CEO ideology is 
 
23The DW-Nominate of the legislators traditionally is estimated on two dimensions, where the primary dimension captures 
the liberal-conservative ideology scale, while the second dimension captures the post Civil Rights realignment between the 
Southern and Northern Democrats. For this reason, most of the work in economics which uses DW-Nominate, utilizes only 
the primary dimension. 
24The distribution of the DW-Nominate of the CEOs matches well with the DW-Nominate scores of the legislators. There 
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are very few extreme conservative and liberal CEOs as most of the legislators have a score between -0.318 (25th percentile) 
and 0.335 (75th percentile), with a mean score of 0.018 and a standard deviation of   0.37. 
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positively correlated with the firm performance. A more conservative CEO is associated 
with higher firm performance. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the CEO 
conservatism increases firm performance by 0.043 (0.158*0.027/0.0998) standard deviation. In 
other words, CEO with conservatism at the 75th percentile, relative to CEO at the 25th 
percentile, have a 0.038 (0.027*(0.123+0.017)/0.0998) standard deviation higher ROA. 
An average Republican CEO outperforms an average Democrat CEO by 0.05 standard 
deviation of ROA. 
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Columns 4 to 6 of Table VII are estimated using IV. Analogous to previous analysis,     I 
instrument the CEO DW-Nominate score by the DW-Nominate score of the pool of 
executives available in that industry-state in a particular year. Column 4 shows the 
unconditional estimates, while Columns 5 and 6 include all single and two-way state, 
industry and year fixed effects. We see similar results using IV approach. A one standard 
deviation increase in the CEO conservatism increases the firm performance by 0.15 
(0.158*0.095/0.0998) standard deviation. Similarly, CEO with conservatism at the 75th 
percentile outperform the CEOs at the 25th percentile by 0.13 (0.095*(0.123+0.017)/0.0998) 
standard deviation. An average Republican CEO outperforms an average Democrat CEO 
by 0.13 standard deviation of ROA. 
 
Next, I allow for the effect of CEO conservatism on firm performance to vary depending on 
the level of conservatism. Based on their DW-Nominate score, I define the following four 
groups: Liberal Democrats, Moderate Democrats, Moderate Republicans, and Conservative 
Republicans.25 I estimate a flexible relation by allowing for the impact of each of the 
categories to be different on the firm performance. The reference group is the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, all the other groups perform significantly better than the Liberal 
Democrats. The Moderate Republicans have the best firm performance: the Moderate 
Republicans outperform Liberal Democrats by 0.22 standard deviation of ROA. In addition, 
the Moderate Republican also outperform Moderate Democrats by 0.14 standard deviation 
(significant at 5% significance level) of ROA. The difference in firm performance between 
Moderate Republicans and Conservative Republicans is both economically and statistically 
insignificant (less than 0.09 standard deviation and insignificant at 10% significance 
level). We also see that the differences between Conservative Republicans and Moderate 
Democrats are insignificant as well (less than 0.06 standard deviation and insignificant at 
10% significance level). Hence, the evidence suggests that Moderate Republicans are best 
for firm performance. 
25CEOs with DW-Nominate below (above) median value among Democrat CEOs are categorized as Liberal (Moderate) 
Democrats and CEOs with DW-Nominate below (above) median value among Republican CEOs are categorized as Moderate 
(Conservative) Republicans. 
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5 Robustness Tests 
 
I estimate the effect of ideology on firm performance using various alternate measures of 
ideology, alternate measures of performance, controlling for firm fixed effects and adding 
lagged controls interacted with time trend to check the robustness of the results. 
 
 
5.1 Alternative Measures of Ideology 
 
I check the robustness of the results using various alternate measures of ideology. First, I 
increase (decrease) the threshold to impose stricter (lenient) condition on being equal-giver. 
Hence, I categorize the CEO as equal-giver for index value between -0.25 and 0.25 (-0.75 
and 0.75). Furthermore, I employ another specification where I define equal givers as those 
who give exactly equal amount to both the parties, to avoid any arbitrariness altogether 
i.e.  Ideo = 0.26   Lastly, similar to earlier studies, I also bunch together both equal   and 
non-givers as equal-givers. 
 
Table VIII, columns 1-4 show the results using varying measures of ideology. The measure 
of ideology used is indicated at the top of the column. The dependent variable is ROA. As 
before, CEO characteristics along with all single and two-way fixed effects are controlled for 
in all the estimations and robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Regardless 
of the measure used, the difference between the performance of firms with Republican 
CEOs as compared to firms with Democrat CEOs remains positive and statistically 
significant. The stricter the cutoffs i.e. 0.25 and exact 0, the higher the difference in the 
firm performance between the two ideological groups i.e. 0.075 (i.e. 75% of the standard 
deviation) and 0.09 (i.e. 90% of the standard deviation) respectively. 
 
I use a continuous measure as well to check if the effect obtained earlier exists with the 
continuous measure as well. Table IX reports the first stage as well as second stage results 
with a continuous measure of ideology. The results in the first stage show a positive and 
highly significant coefficient on P ool Ideo. Moreover, the instruments are strong as 
suggested by high F-statistics. Second stage results show that more Republican the CEO, 
higher the firm ROA. 1 unit increase in PII increases firm ROA by around 0.04 (i.e. 40% of 
the standard deviation). A movement from a Republican (PII=1) to a Democrat (PII=-1) 
reflects a 2 unit change in PII. Therefore, the results indicate that a strict Republican 
CEO causes 0.08 units increase in the ROA compared to a strict Democrat CEO. 
26I do not limit the sample to those who only give in more than one election cycle here as the number of individuals who 
give exactly equal to both and have given in more than one election cycle is very  low 
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5.2 Alternative  Measures  of Performance 
I use three alternate measures of accounting firm performance: return on equity (ROE), 
return on sales (ROS) and earnings per share (EPS).27 Table X reports the results. 
Consistent with the earlier results, I obtain positive and statistically significant difference 
between performance of firms with Republican CEOs as compared to firms with Democrat 
CEOs for all three alternate measures. Thus the coefficients on REP-DEM correspond to 
about 53% of the standard deviation of ROE, 60% of the standard deviation of ROS and 
56% of the standard deviation of EPS. These results are quantitatively similar to those 
obtained earlier and are economically  sizable. 
 
 
5.3 Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects 
I do not include firm fixed effects in my main analysis because, if I employ fixed effects, I 
would only be using within firm variation, which would essentially mean that my estimate 
of effect of ideology on firm performance only uses the firms in which there is an ideology 
change. The number of firms in which the CEO changes during the sample period and the 
new CEO is of a different ideology than the old one i.e. ideology changes at the CEO level 
is very small.28 Most of my sample does not have within firm variation in political ideology. 
The small number of firms with ideology changes substantially reduces the power of the 
estimations to detect an effect of political ideology on the firm value. However, the results 
are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects as well. Table XI presents the results. 
 
 
5.4 Controlling Lagged Firm Characteristics 
 
I do not control for firm characteristics in my main analysis as CEO ideology may affect 
firm performance via various firms characteristics and adding controls may undermine the 
total effect of ideology on firm performance. In this section, I control for firm characteristics 
at the time the CEO was hired (lagged controls). The reasoning being that the CEO 
inherits those firm characteristics, and therefore, including them at the time CEO was 
hired would not capture the effect of that CEO’s ideology. However, firm characteristics 
do not stay stagnant from one year to another either. Therefore, simply including, for 
instance, leverage computed at the time the CEO was hired may not be ideal. To account 
for this, similar to Frydman and Hilt (2017), I interact these characteristics at the time the 
 
27 Following Cooper et al. (2010), I define ROE as the ratio of income before extraordinary items scaled by total common 
equity. ROS is calculated as net income over total sale and EPS is taken as reported in Compustat. 
28I only have 45 firms in which CEOs change from REP to DEM or vice versa 
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CEO was hired with a linear time trend. This addresses the potential problem that the 
firms with different CEO ideologies are systematically different from each other. Results 
are presented in Table XII. Firms managed by Republicans CEOs continue to outperform 
firms managed by Democrat CEOs by 0.056 even after including the time trends for all 
the lagged firm characteristics simultaneously  (column7). 
 
 
6 Competing Mechanisms 
 
The focus of this paper has been to consistently estimate the total effect of CEO ideology 
on firm performance. Using instrumental variables, I show that firm with Republican CEOs 
outperform firms managed by Democrats, and that the results are robust across various 
alternate specifications and alternate measures of ideology. As discussed earlier, some of 
the systematic differences in the policy choices of the Democrat and Republican managers 
have already been identified in the literature. In this section, I carry out further analysis to 
rule out some of the possible mechanisms to show that the effect of CEO ideology on firm 
performance goes beyond the firm policies already examined in the literature. Moreover, I 
explore potential competing mechanism for the results  obtained. 
 
 
6.1 Risk-Return 
It is possible that the results obtained are indicative of the tradeoff between risk and 
return. That is, Republicans tend to take higher risk, consequently increasing the return 
on assets of a firm.29 I explore this possibility by constructing three different proxies for 
firm risk. Standard deviation of the ROA at the firm-CEO level, volatility of stock returns 
for each firm in each year and yearly betas using single factor model. Results are reported 
in Table XIV. Column 1 shows the effect of CEO ideology on firm risk, measured as the 
standard deviation of ROA.30 I find no statistically significant difference in the risk level of 
the firm based on CEO ideologies. Columns 2 and 3 show there is no significant difference 
between the levels of volatility of returns of firms managed by CEOs of different ideologies. 
Lastly, we do not see any association between the ideology of the CEO and systematic 
risk of the firm either, as shown by the results in columns 4 and 5. 
 
29Even though this hypothesis seems implausible as the literature has documented the opposite association i.e. Repub- 
licans managers tend to be more risk averse and are associated with less risky investments (Hutton et al., 2014) 
30As this measure is at firm-CEO level, I cannot control for year fixed effects or any two- or three-way fixed effects 
containing year fixed effects.  I do control for state, industry, and state-industry fixed effects  though. 
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The results seem consistent with the previous finding that Republicans tend to take less 
risky decisions which reflect in lower (though statistically insignificant) volatility of ROA 
and stock returns. The conclusion remains consistent even after controlling for three-way 
state-industry-year fixed effects as well as different proxies of risk. These results suggest 
that the risk-return argument cannot explain the observed abnormal positive performance 
under the Republican CEOs compared to under Democrat CEOs. 
 
 
6.2 Specific  Firm Policies 
 
Some of the specific policies shown to be associated with CEO ideology include corporate 
debt (leverage), investment in tangible capital and investment in research and development. 
I include these variables as controls to see how much of the total effect of ideology is 
explained by these specific policy choices.Variable definitions are given in the Appendix. 
Table XIII presents the results. The difference between performances of firms managed by 
Republicans and Democrats remains significantly positive as before even after including all 
controls simultaneously as shown in column 7. This highlights that the effect of ideology 
of the CEO on firm performance can certainly not be reduced to few policy measures. 
 
 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results obtained show not only that ideology matters but also that a specific ideology 
is more beneficial for firm performance than the other. I get a consistently positive 
difference in performance between firms managed by Republican CEOs compared to the 
ones managed by Democrat CEOs even after accounting for time-invariant state level, 
industry level, and time-varying state, industry and state-industry factors. Using IV 
estimations give similar results and suggest that these results are causal. Firms managed 
by Republican CEOs, on average, have 0.06 (0.6 standard deviation) higher ROA compared 
to firms under Democrat CEOs. The results are robust to various alternate measures of 
ideology and performance. 
 
Do Republicans really increase shareholder wealth? If Republicans are clearly more 
beneficial for shareholders than Democrats, why do firms hire Democrats at all? One 
would expect that these differences shouldn’t persist because once the firms realize the 
importance of ideology and the benefits of hiring a Republican CEO for the overall firm 
performance, they would discount this fact and, eventually, the effect of ideology would 
fade away. 
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The results highlight that, on average, Republican CEOs are better for firms. However, 
while on average, firms with Republican CEOs perform better than firms with Democrat 
CEOs, it is possible that depending on specific firm characteristics, for a certain subset of 
firms, it may be that Democrat CEOs are more beneficial than Republican CEOs or are 
preferred in a specific point in time. One possible scenario could be if a firm is facing (or 
has recently faced) litigation pertaining to environmental damage and needs to build its 
reputation as a socially responsible firm now, it may be beneficial for this specific firm to 
hire a Democrat CEO to assuage the concerns of the shareholders. 
 
Moreover, one possible explanation for the persistence of the results obtained could be 
that the firms have not yet realized the crucial role that ideology plays and hence they 
are not selecting CEOs based on ideology. The criteria on which to choose a CEO may 
be composed of a bunch of characteristics e.g. qualifications, credentials, reputation, 
experience to name a few. Is political ideology one of these criterion on which firms base 
their decisions to hire a CEO? Furthermore, is it important enough in this list of criteria 
that a firm would ignore an otherwise suitable candidate over his political ideology? 
 
There is also a possibility of the presence of market frictions in CEO hiring not well explored 
in the literature yet. For example, the board of directors may have certain preferences of 
ideology which dictate their CEO hiring decisions. If directors exhibit “homophily” i.e. 
the tendency of individuals to associate with people similar to oneself (McPherson et al., 
2001; Kossinets and Watts, 2009), we may expect Democrats directors to prefer Democrat 
CEOs and vice versa which may explain the persistence of the obtained results. In a recent 
study, Marks et al. (2018) carry out an experiment to show how people sought and then 
followed the advice of those who shared their political opinions on issues that had nothing 
to do with politics, even when they had all the information they needed to understand that 
this was a bad strategy. Not only the directors, but the shareholders themselves may have 
ideological leanings that may reflect in their preference for CEOs with a specific ideology. 
Bolton et al. (2018), in a recent study, provide evidence that institutional investors have 
ideological preferences which are reflected in their voting patterns. Hence, firms’ policies 
are not entirely motivated by economic forces and inevitably have a political facet. 
 
There is not enough research on this topic to be able to claim with certainty whether 
firms are or aren’t incorporating individual ideology as a selection criterion. However, 
by highlighting the significance of CEO ideology for firm performance, this study opens 
up room for further discussion on the possible scenarios resulting in the persistence of 
these results. Each of these scenarios warrants a separate study of its own, thus providing 
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possible avenues for future research. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of CEO Ideology 
 
Figure1: This figure shows the distribution of the variable political ideology index (PII) for the CEOs and 
the top executives, who contributed in more than one election cycle. 
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Figure 2: Unconditional correlation between CEO ideology and ROA 
 
Figure2: This figure shows the scatterplot of firm performance (ROA) against CEO ideology. A continuous 
measure of CEO ideology i.e. PII is used to construct the scatterplot, which is divided in 100 equal-sized bins 
so that the figure shows the average ROA within each bin, along with the linear fit using OLS. 
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Figure 3: Variation in CEO Ideology and ROA over time 
 
Figure3: This figure shows the time-series of the variables REP, DEM and ROA. The figure plots the 
average proportion of Republican CEOs (REP), average proportion of Democrat CEOs (DEM), and 
average firm performance (ROA) for years 1992 to 2013. 
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Figure 4: Average CEO Ideology and ROA by Industry 
 
Figure4: This figure shows the binned scatterplot (equal-sized bins of 0.05) of average firm performance 
against average CEO ideology, as measured by  proportion of Republicans (REP) in each 2-digit SIC,    along 
with the linear fit using   OLS. 
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Figure 5: Average CEO Ideology and ROA by  State 
 
Figure5: This figure shows the the binned scatterplot (equal-sized bins of 0.05) of average firm performance 
in each state against average ideology of CEOs, as measured by proportion of Republicans (REP), along 
with the linear fit using OLS. 
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Figure 6: Variation in the Instrument 
 
Figure6: This figure illustrates the source of variation in the instrument using example of two 2-digit SIC 
industries (manufacturing and services) and three states (California, New York and Texas). Each figure 
plots the time-series of the proportion of executives who are Republican (Pool REP) and Democrat (Pool 
DEM) for each state-industry pair. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of CEO Ideology using DW-Nominate 
 
Figure7: The figure shows the distribution of political ideology of CEOs constructed as the weighted 
average of the DW-Nominate score of the legislators to whom the CEOs contribute over their life-time 
The red bars represent the distribution of ideology of Republican CEOs and blue bars represent the 
distribution of ideology of Democrat CEOs. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of CEO Ideology using DW-Nominate 
 
Figure8: This figure plots the effect of CEO ideology on firm performance for the four groups categorized 
based on the level of conservatism. The four groups are: Liberal Democrats (DW-Nominate below median 
value among Democrat CEOs), Moderate Democrats (DW-Nominate above median value among 
Democrat CEOs), Moderate Republicans (DW-Nominate below median value among Republican CEOs), 
and Conservative Republicans (DW-Nominate above median value among Republican CEOs). The dots 
represents the estimated effect and the vertical red bars represent the 90% confidence interval. 
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Table I: Political Contributions- Summary Statistics 
 
This table shows the numbers of CEOs falling in each category according to the different measures as well as the mean giving by CEOs of each category to   their 
respective parties. “Mean $ amount given to” is the average dollar contribution by respective CEOs over their lifetime to different party candidates or committee. 
“Mean # of time given to” is the average number of times respective CEOs contribute to different party candidates or committee over their lifetime. PII is the 
measure used in the literature, which uses all observations for CEOs who have contributed at least once, and which assigns a value of zero both to non-givers and 
equal-givers. Ideo is the categorical measure used for the analysis in this paper, which uses only the observation for CEOs who have contributed in more than 
one election cycle.  It characterizes CEOs as Republican (REP) if they contribute only to Republican candidates or party over            the entire sample, Democrat 
(DEM) if they contribute only to Democratic candidates or party over the entire sample, and Equal-givers (EQUAL) if they contribute to both parties in equal 
amounts over the sample period.  The Index value is indicated in the first column for further clarification. 
 
Index Value # of CEOs Mean $ amount given to Mean # of time given to 
 
 
 
PII 
 
 
 
Ideo 
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 Republican Democrat Republican Democrat 
REP (0,1] 3245 45,998 4,369 17.34 3.46 
DEM [-1,0) 1291 6,773 46,883 5.40 18.74 
Equal/No-giver 0 2346 22 22 0.04 0.03 
REP 1 1042 34,087 - 13.48 - 
DEM -1 264 - 44,680 - 12.34 
EQUAL (-0.5,0.5) 912 21,816 19,236 13.63 12.79 
 
106  
Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used. Number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, the minimum, median and maximum value of the variables are provided. Moreover, the 
correlations of the variables with the different measures of ideology are also presented. Panel A contains 
the descriptive statistics of all the political measures. Panels B and C report the summary statistics for 
CEO and firm characteristics respectively. Panel D reports descriptive statistics of the main instrumental 
variables used. Lastly, Panel E reports the statistics on different variables used for robustness checks  and 
the measures of political connections. Definition of all the variables are provided in the appendix. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 
Descriptive Statistics Correlations 
Variable N Mean SD. Min. Median Max. PII REP DEM EQUAL 
 
Panel A: Political Measures 
 
PII 29091 0.29 0.63 -1 0.26 1 1 0.86*** -0.73*** -0.40*** 
REP 12166 0.47 0.50 0 0 1  1 -0.37*** -0.78*** 
DEM 12166 0.11 0.32 0 0 1   1 -0.29*** 
EQUAL 12166 0.42 0.49 0 0 1    1 
DW Nominate 12166 0.06 0.17 -0.68 0.04 0.93 0.67*** 0.56*** -0.51*** -0.24*** 
 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
 
CEO age 11623 55.83 7.31 31 56 88 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.02 
Male 12166 0.98 0.13 0 1 1 0.13*** 0.05 -0.19*** 0.07*** 
Tenure 12166 8.82 5.23 0 8 22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 
Experience 12166 3.80 3.65 0 3 21 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Education 12166 2.46 1.08 1 2 5 -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.01 0.08*** 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
 
ROA 12166 0.13 0.10 -0.42 0.13 0.43 0.10*** 0.12*** -0.04*** -0.10*** 
ROE 12164 0.10 0.36 -2.16 0.12 1.81 0.06*** 0.04 -0.06*** 0.00 
ROS 11294 0.04 0.16 -1.09 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.01 
EPS 11294 1.36 2.23 -7.90 1.31 8.52 0.05** 0.03 -0.05 0.01 
TFP 4891 1.02 0.34 0.02 1.00 15.48 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 
Sales 5863 3090 4957 40 1399 32084 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 
Firm Size 12166 7.63 1.72 0.05 7.52 12.06 -0.02*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 0.15*** 
Leverage 12118 0.24 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.94 -0.07*** -0.10*** 0.03 0.11*** 
R&D 12166 0.02 0.05 0.05 0 0.28 -0.02 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.07*** 
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Descriptive Statistics Correlations 
Variable N Mean SD. Min. Median Max. PII REP DEM EQUAL 
 
Panel D: Instrumental Variables 
 
Pool REP 12010 0.44 0.22 0.05 0.43 1 0.44*** 0.47*** -0.22*** -0.34*** 
Pool DEM 12010 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.13 1 -0.39*** -0.28*** 0.38*** 0.03 
Pool EQUAL 12010 0.42 0.18 0.05 0.42 1 -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.02 0.40*** 
Alt Pool REP 12010 0.45 0.21 0.05 0.44 1 0.43*** 0.46*** -0.23*** -0.32*** 
Alt Pool DEM 12010 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.12 1 -0.39*** -0.29*** 0.37*** 0.05 
Alt Pool EQUAL 12010 0.41 0.17 0.05 0.41 1 -0.26*** -0.37*** 0.01*** 0.37 
Pool PII 12010 0.14 0.13 -0.52 0.13 0.72 0.37*** 0.32*** -0.26*** -0.15*** 
Pool DW Nominate 12165 0.05 0.08 -0.29 0.05 0.54 0.35*** 0.30*** -0.22*** -0.16*** 
 
Panel E: Other Variables 
 
REP Rule Pres 12166 0.40 0.49 0.05 0 1 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.03 
Rep Rule Sentate 11971 0.42 0.42 0.05 0.5 1 0.19*** 0.14*** -0.16*** -0.03*** 
REP Rule Gov 11924 0.60 0.49 0.05 1 1 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.04 -0.02*** 
State GDP 9735 0.64 0.52 0.02 0.42 2.05 -0.08*** -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.01 
Industry GDP 9892 1.27 0.64 0.09 1.01 3.38 -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 
  
 
Table III: Does Ideology Matter - OLS Estimation 
 
This table reports the estimated relation between the firm performance and CEO ideology using OLS estimation. The sample covers the period 1994-2013. 
Dependent variable is ROA and the main independent variables are dummies for Republican and Democrat CEO. CEO characteristics (gender, age, tenure 
in the firm, experience and education) are controlled for in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are reported in the parenthesis. 
Coefficients marked with *,** and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.014* 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) 
 
REP 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.024*** 
 
0.024*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.013*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
0.011** 
 
0.012** 
 
0.011** 
 
0.011 
 
0.021** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
 
REP-DEM 
 
0.033*** 
 
0.036*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.024*** 
 
0.017** 
 
0.024** 
 
0.029* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
 
Observations 
 
12166 
 
11,623 
 
11,623 
 
11,470 
 
11,623 
 
11,470 
 
11,305 
 
9,174 
 
11,379 
 
8,831 
 
2,744 
R-squared 0.018 0.023 0.033 0.062 0.355 0.380 0.411 0.542 0.576 0.743 0.639 
CEO Characteristics NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES - - YES - - 
State FE NO NO NO YES NO YES - YES - - - 
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES - - - - 
StatexYear NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES - 
IndustryxYear NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES - 
IndustryxState NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES - 
StatexIndustryxYear NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
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Table IV: Does Ideology Matter - Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
This table reports instrumental variable regression estimation results.  The endogenous variables are REP and DEM. The instrumental variables are     Pool 
REP for REP and Pool DEM for DEM constructed at state-industry level. The first-stage regression results are reported in Panel A and second-stage 
regression results are reported in Panel B. The sample covers the period 1994 to 2013. CEO characteristics (gender, age, tenure in the firm, experience and 
education) are controlled for in all specifications. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are 
reported in the parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Panel A: First Stage Results  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
 
DEM REP 
 
Pool DEM 
 
0.860*** 0.045 0.776*** 0.085** 0.566*** 0.059 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.046) (0.060) 
 
0.497*** 0.090 
(0.052) (0.066) 
Pool REP 0.014 1.055*** 0.058*** 0.960*** 0.031 0.687*** 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) 
0.043 0.628*** 
(0.029) (0.047) 
 
Year FE 
 
NO YES - 
 
- 
State FE NO YES - - 
Industry FE NO YES - - 
StatexYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxState NO NO YES YES 
IndGDPxStateGDP NO NO NO YES 
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 Table IV: Continued 
 
 
Panel B: Second Stage Results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
DEM 
 
0.002 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.029) 
REP 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.060*** 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.070*** 
 
0.059* 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.024) (0.033) 
 
Observations 
 
11,470 
 
11,470 
 
11,300 
 
9,263 
Year FE NO YES - - 
State FE NO YES - - 
Industry FE NO YES - - 
StatexYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxState NO NO YES YES 
IndGDPxStateGDP NO NO NO YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
646.8 
 
335.1 
 
77.07 
 
46.16 
Craig-Donald F-value 633.4 396.1 74.66 41.5 
Underidentification 554.2 370.9 159.2 99.07 
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Table V: Alternate Instrumental Variable 
 
This table reports IV estimation results using alternate IV. The endogenous variables are REP and DEM. The instruments are constructed at level of industry 
and state and at the the year in which the CEO was hired. The first-stage regression results are reported in Panel A for all the different empirical specification 
used. The second-stage regression results are reported in Panel B. The sample covers the period 1994 to 2013. CEO characteristics (gender, age, tenure in 
the firm, experience and education) are controlled for in all specifications. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: First Stage Results 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
 
 
Pool DEM alt 0.943***  0.017 0.871***  0.013 0.791***  0.022 0.788*** -0.288** 
(0.031) (0.037)  (0.033) (0.043)  (0.056) (0.074)  (0.084)  (0.113) 
 
Pool REP alt  0.012 1.059*** 0.069*** 0.960***  0.023 0.785***  0.058 0.456*** 
(0.012)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.023) (0.030)  (0.046) (0.050)  (0.077) 
 
 
Year FE NO YES - - 
State FE NO YES - - 
Industry FE NO YES   -  - 
StatexYear NO  NO YES  - 
IndustryxYear NO  NO YES  - 
IndustryxState NO  NO YES  - 
StatexIndustryxYear NO  NO  NO YES 
 
continued 
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Table V: Continued 
 
 
Panel B: Second Stage Results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
DEM 
 
0.007 
 
0.001 
 
0.011 
 
0.080** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.035) 
REP 0.064*** 0.034*** 0.063*** 0.102*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.031) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.057*** 
 
0.034*** 
 
0.052** 
 
0.025 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.02) (0.031) 
 
Observations 
 
11,470 
 
11,470 
 
11,300 
 
9,691 
Year FE NO YES - - 
State FE NO YES - - 
Industry FE NO YES - - 
StatexYear NO NO YES - 
IndustryxYear NO NO YES - 
IndustryxState NO NO YES - 
StatexIndustryxYear NO NO NO YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
615.1 
 
336.9 
 
110.8 
 
23.94 
Craig-Donald F-value 591.3 393.7 121.1 20.08 
Underidentification 587.2 417.2 206.6 57.44 
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Table VI: Controlling for Connections 
 
This table reports the second-stage regression results of IV estimation after controlling for possible political 
connections at presidential, governor and senate level. Each proxy for connection is interacted with the 
dummy variable for CEO ideology and added as an instrument to the estimation to capture the potential 
difference in the value of connections. CEO characteristics are controlled for in all estimations. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.064** 
 
-0.087** 
 
REP 
(0.023) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
(0.033) 
0.043*** 
(0.013) 
(0.026) 
0.048*** 
(0.017) 
(0.041) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
REP - DEM in DEM rule 0.077*** 
(0.025) 
0.072** 
(0.034) 
0.112*** 
(0.028) 
0.135*** 
(0.025) 
 
REP-DEM in REP rule 
 
0.063* 
 
0.073** 
 
-0.025 
 
0.102** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.047) (0.042) 
REP in REP rule-DEM in DEM rule 0.087*** 0.117 0.101*** 0.144*** 
 (0.027) (0.389) (0.029) (0.047) 
REP in DEM rule-DEM in REP rule 0.054* 0.029 -0.014 0.093** 
 (0.033) (0.351) (0.049) (0.041) 
 
Observations 
 
11,300 
 
11,222 
 
11,266 
 
11,222 
StatexYear YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES YES 
Connection PRES GOV SENATE ALL 3 
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Table VII: DW-Nominate and Firm Performance 
 
The table reports the estimated relation between ROA and CEO ideology measured using DW-Nominate. 
OLS estimation results are reported in column 1, 2 and 3 and the second stage results of the instrumental 
variable estimation in column 4, 5 and 6. CEO characteristics are controlled for in all specifications. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 
  OLS    IV  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
DW Nominate 
 
0.057*** 
 
0.025** 
 
0.027* 
  
0.131*** 
 
0.093*** 
 
0.095*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.016)  (0.013) (0.020) (0.035) 
 
Observations 
 
11,623 
 
11,470 
 
8,931 
  
11,623 
 
11,470 
 
11,300 
R-squared 0.013 0.378 0.632  -0.003 0.162 0.312 
Year FE NO YES -  NO YES - 
State FE NO YES -  NO YES - 
Industry FE NO YES -  NO YES - 
StatexYear NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
IndustryxYear NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
IndustryxState NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
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Table VIII: Alternate Measures of Ideology 
 
This table reports the second-stage results of IV estimation with alternate measures of ideology. The 
measure of ideology used is indicated at the top of the column. The dependent variable is ROA. All single 
and two-way fixed effects are controlled for along with CEO characteristics and robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 1, -1, 0.25 1, -1, 0.75 1, -1, 0 1, -1, 0 (inc NG) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.017 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.050) (0.028) 
REP 0.074*** 0.043*** 0.058 0.047*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.058) (0.014) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.075*** 
 
0.061** 
 
0.093*** 
 
0.065** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) 
 
Observations 
 
8,634 
 
14,637 
 
11,076 
 
19,848 
StatexYear YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
70.03 
 
68.68 
 
16.69 
 
72.51 
Craig-Donald F-value 54.20 74.81 15.50 73.13 
Underidentification 135.9 154.4 35.95 154.0 
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Table IX: Continuous Measure 
 
This table reports the results from IV estimation when using continuous political ideology index. The 
instrumental variable is continuous measure of ideology of the pool. The first-stage regression results are 
reported in Panel A and the second-stage second-stage regression results are reported in Panel B. The 
sample covers the period 1994 to 2013. CEO characteristics are controlled for in all specifications. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Panel A: First Stage Results 
Continuous Ideology Index (PII) 
 
Pool Ideo 
 
0.998*** 0.783*** 0.563*** 0.485*** 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.045) (0.052) 
 
Panel B: Second Stage Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
PII 0.037*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
 
Observations 
 
11,470 
 
11,470 
 
11,300 
 
9,263 
StatexYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxYear NO NO YES YES 
IndustryxState NO NO YES YES 
IndGDPxStateGDP    YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
3558 
 
1048 
 
155.4 
 
86.18 
Craig-Donald F-value 2744 820.8 128.1 69.15 
Underidentification 1671 682.7 164.0 91.83 
117  
 
 
 
 
 
Table X: Alternate Measures of Performance 
 
This table provides the second stage results of the instrumental variable estimation using alternate 
measures of firm performance as dependent variables. Dependent variable in column1 is return on equity 
(ROE) measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items scaled by total common equity as in 
Cooper et al. (2010). Dependent variable in column 2 is return on sales (ROS) calculated as net income 
over total sale and dependent variable in column 3 is earnings per share (EPS) as reported in Compustat. 
As before, CEO characteristics (gender, age and tenure in the firm) is controlled for in all specifications. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
ROE 
 
ROS 
 
EPS 
 
DEM 
 
-0.147* 
 
-0.085** 
 
-1.019* 
 (0.084) (0.038) (0.563) 
REP 0.012 0.034 0.317 
 (0.042) (0.021) (0.339) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.159* 
 
0.119** 
 
1.336** 
 (0.090) (0.042) (0.627) 
 
Observations 
 
11,605 
 
10,614 
 
10,549 
StatexYear YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
74.91 
 
62.82 
 
70.37 
Craig-Donald F-value 71.66 60.12 67.96 
Underidentification 156.1 132.3 147.4 
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Table XI: Controlling Firm Fixed Effects 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results in column 1 and 2 and the second stage results of the 
instrumental variable estimation in column 3 and 4. Firm fixed effects are included in the estimations 
along with single and two-way state, industry and year fixed effects. CEO characteristics are controlled 
for in all specifications. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
OLS IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.010 
  
-0.050 
 
-0.127** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.039) (0.064) 
REP 0.001 0.001  0.042** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.018) (0.025) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.010* 
 
0.011* 
  
0.093*** 
 
0.128*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.035) (0.051) 
 
Observations 
 
10,578 
 
10,287 
  
10,448 
 
10,287 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
StatexYear NO YES  NO YES 
IndustryxYear NO YES  NO YES 
IndustryxState NO YES  NO YES 
 
F-value-rk 
    
32.67 
 
21.32 
Craig-Donald F-value    78.03 31.84 
Underidentification    67.19 52.16 
  
Table XII: Controlling Lagged Firm Characteristics (Linear Trend) 
 
This table reports second stage instrumental variable regression estimation results. The dependent variable is ROA. Through columns 1-6, I add different firm 
characteristics to the baseline specification. Column 7 reports the results once all firm characteristics are controlled for simultaneously. Firm characteristics 
are computed at the time the CEO was hired (lagged controls) and interacted with a linear time trend. CEO characteristics are controlled for in all 
specifications. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.043* 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.052** 
 
-0.056** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
REP 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm size -0.000***      0.000 
 (0.000)      (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.008***     -0.009*** 
  (0.001)     (0.002) 
R & D   -0.066***    -0.063*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007) 
Dividends    0.140***   0.166*** 
    (0.013)   (0.014) 
Cash     -0.037***  -0.059*** 
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Investment      0.088*** 0.108*** 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.0698*** 
 
0.0636*** 
 
0.0701*** 
 
0.0882*** 
 
0.0713*** 
 
0.0917*** 
 
0.0980*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0245) (0.0278) (0.0269) 
 
Observations 
 
11,300 
 
11,297 
 
11,300 
 
11,294 
 
11,298 
 
10,329 
 
10,321 
R-squared 0.308 0.316 0.332 0.308 0.308 0.264 0.316 
StatexYear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
78.64 
 
78.83 
 
76.74 
 
78.85 
 
76.74 
 
57.37 
 
59.21 
Craig-Donald F-value 75.76 75.85 74.10 77.09 74.22 57.80 60.42 
Underidentification 162.6 163.1 159.1 162 158.9 120.7 123.6 
119 
  
Table XIII: Controlling Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports second stage instrumental variable regression estimation results. The dependent variable is ROA. Through columns 1-6, different firm 
characteristics are addeed to the baseline specification to see how much of the total effect of ideology is explained by these specific policy choices. Column 7 
reports the results once all firm characteristics are controlled for simultaneously. CEO characteristics are controlled for in all specifications. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the    10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DEM 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.052** 
 
-0.016 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
REP 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm size 0.004***      0.004*** 
 (0.001)      (0.001) 
Leverage  -0.049***     -0.055*** 
  (0.008)     (0.009) 
R & D   -0.528***    -0.528*** 
   (0.038)    (0.039) 
Dividends    0.425***   0.411*** 
    (0.094)   (0.082) 
Cash     -0.042***  -0.029** 
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Investment      0.081*** 0.109*** 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
 
REP - DEM 
 
0.0693*** 
 
0.0677*** 
 
0.0542** 
 
0.0728*** 
 
0.0712*** 
 
0.0914*** 
 
0.0568** 
 (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0278) (0.0266) 
 
Observations 
 
11,300 
 
11,256 
 
11,300 
 
11,288 
 
11,298 
 
10,329 
 
10,280 
R-squared 0.309 0.315 0.374 0.322 0.309 0.263 0.389 
StatexYear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
F-value-rk 
 
74.91 
 
76.98 
 
75.27 
 
76.74 
 
76.79 
 
57.36 
 
54.44 
Craig-Donald F-value 72.76 74.22 73.10 74.05 74.23 57.78 55.33 
Underidentification 155 159.7 156 159.2 159 120.6 114.5 
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Table XIV: Effect of CEO Ideology on Firm  Risk 
 
The table reports the estimated relation between the firm risk and CEO ideology using OLS estimation. 
Dependent variable (Risk) is proxied using three variables. Standard deviation of ROA at firm-CEO level 
(sd(ROA)), volatility of stock returns in each year (sd(ret)) and beta constructed using single factor model. 
The main independent variables are dummies for Republican and Democrat CEO. Standard errors, 
clustered as firm level, are reported in the parenthesis. Coefficients marked with *,** and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
sd(ROA) 
 
sd(ret) 
 
sd(ret) 
 
Beta 
 
Beta 
 
REP 
 
0.00283 
 
-0.00001 
 
0.00003 
 
-0.00238 
 
-0.00171 
 (0.00285) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00211) (0.00237) 
DEM 0.00492 0.00009 0.00014 -0.00241 -0.00177 
 (0.00374) (0.00020) (0.00021) (0.00259) (0.00276) 
 
REP-DEM 
 
-0.00209 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.00012 
 
0.00003 
 
0.00006 
 (0.00365) (0.00019) (0.00021) (0.00251) (0.00270) 
 
Observations 
 
1,307 
 
12,465 
 
10,675 
 
12,465 
 
10,675 
R-squared 0.252 0.387 0.439 0.168 0.246 
Year FE NO - - - - 
State FE YES - - - - 
Industry FE YES - - - - 
StatexYear NO YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxYear NO YES YES YES YES 
IndustryxState YES YES YES YES YES 
StatexIndustryxYear NO NO YES NO YES 
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8 Appendix 
 
8.1 Appendix A: Name Matching Process 
 
I obtain the political contributions data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
website which reports the name, address and occupation of the donors contributing $200 
or more along with the details of the transaction. Since, the names are self-reported by 
the contributors, it sometimes includes the title and qualification of the individual or 
his/her nick name. The name in the FEC data is mostly recorded as last name, first name 
although there are many exceptions. The names are cleaned in several ways. First, I 
search for all the possible different exhaustive combinations of the titles accompanying the 
name. I clean the name by removing all these titles.31 Second, the names of individuals 
with suffix is not consistently coded across the FEC files. For instance, the names are 
sometimes coded as Smith, John Sr, or Smith, Jr John. All these names are cleaned and 
formatted in a consistent way i.e. Smith, John Jr.. Similarly, the names with suffix such 
as: II, III, IV are standardized in the same way. Third, the names with punctuations are 
reported in a non-standard way which may potentially make matching less efficient. For 
instance, the names are sometimes recorded as: Smith, M. John Jr or Smith, M John Jr,. 
All these names are standardize in a way to include full-stop after the middle name and 
the suffix i.e. Smith, M. John Jr.. Finally, the names are then ordered in the standardized 
way reported by the Execucomp: firstname middlename lastname, Jr/Sr. 
 
Next, I characterize the affiliation of the committee to which the individual contributes. 
For each contribution, we have the unique committee id to which the donation is given. 
This information is combined with the committee master file reported by the FEC. The 
committee master file reports relevant information about the particular committee. It 
records the address, designation, party affiliation, and, in case of candidate committee, 
the unique candidate id. The committee reported party affiliation is used as the political 
affiliation of that particular committee. However, in practice, there are more than half 
committees with no political affiliation. This happens because the committee is an 
interest group and does not solely give to one political party, hence, having no unique 
political affiliation per se. But, this also happens for many candidate committees, which 
by definition, should have a political affiliation. In order to correct for this problem, I 
utilize the data on the contributions from the committees to the candidates.  This  file 
 
31For example, consider the FEC entry Smith, John Mr.. I change it to Smith, John. Similarly, Smith, Lit. USAF John 
is cleaned to Smith, John. 
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records the universe of contributions made by the committees to the candidates. The 
file includes the unique candidate id to which the contribution is given to. Using these 
records, the information is collapsed on committee candidate level to have one observation 
per committee donor and candidate receiver. This information is then matched with 
the candidate master file, which has the information on the political affiliation of the 
candidate. The candidate committee files almost uniquely give money to the candidate 
they are committee of. Thus, the self-reported political affiliation by the committee is 
augmented by this matched political affiliation from their contribution to the candidates. 
Moreover, this matched political affiliation measure also serves as a verification or check 
whether the self-reported political affiliation is consistent with the contributions made by 
these committees, which it is. This gives us the political affiliation of the committee to 
which the individual donates the money to. 
 
Finally I match the individual contributions from the FEC data to the individuals we 
have in the Execucomp based on their full name (First + middle + last name). Since, 
names in FEC sometimes do not report the middle name, this will lead to under-reporting 
the contributions made by the individuals. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
 
Panel A: Political Measures 
 
 
PII Total dollar amount given to the Republican party by an individual minus 
the total dollar amount given to a Democrat Party by an individual as a 
ratio of the total donations given to both parties by an individual. The index 
is a measure between -1 and 1, where the higher number represents more 
Republican political ideology. 
Federal Elec- 
tion Commis- 
sion and Exe- 
cucomp 
 
Ideo  It is a categorical variable constructed using PII but only    including indi- 
viduals who have contributed in more than one cycle. It equals REP when 
PII=1, DEM when PII=-1 and EQUAL when PII is in between -0.5 and 0.5. 
 
REP Dummy variable taking the value of one if PII=1 and zero otherwise. This 
represents the CEOs who gave only the Republican candidate or  party. 
 
DEM  Dummy variable taking the value of one if PII = -1 and zero otherwise. 
This represents the CEOs who gave only to Democrat candidate or party. 
 
EQUAL Dummy variable taking the value of one if PII lies between -0.5 and 0.5 and 
zero otherwise. This represents the CEOs who gave almost equal to both 
the parties. 
 
DW Nominate CEO ideology measured as the weighted average of the DW Nominate of the 
legislators they contribute to.  DW nominate of the legislators is a measure  of 
their ideology using their roll-call voting data in the Congress. 
 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
 
 
Return on Assets(ROA) Ratio  of  operating  income  before  depreciation  (OIBDP)  to  the  book  value 
of a firm’s total assets  (AT) 
Compustat 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total common equity 
Return on Sales (ROS) Ratio of net income to total sale 
Earnings per Share (EPS) Earnings per share basic excluding extra ordinary items 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm(AT) 
BTM Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
 
Leverage Total debt (DLTT+DLC) over the firm’s total assets(AT) 
 
R&D Ratio of research and Development expense (XRD) to firm’s total assets(AT) 
 
continued 
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Appendix-(Continued) 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
 
 
Asset-turnover Ratio of sales to total assets 
 
Inst Proportion of total shares outstanding held by the  institutional investors 13-F 
Inst conc. The concentration index (HHI) of institutional ownership (between 0 and 1) 
sd(ROA) Standard Deviation of yearly ROA. The variable is at the firm-CEO level 
sd(Returns) Standard Deviation of monthly stock returns. The variable is at the firm-year 
level 
CRSP 
 
Beta Beta obtained from single factor model.  The variable is at   the firm-year 
level 
 
 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
 
 
CEO age Age of the CEO Execucomp 
 
Male Dummy variable equal to one if the gender of the CEO is male 
Tenure The number of years the CEO has been with the firm 
Experience  The number of years the CEO has been present in any firm in the Execucomp 
(not necessarily as a  CEO) 
 
Education Categorical education obtained by the CEO, where the categories are: less 
than college degree, college degree, graduate degree, doctorate degree and 
specialization in accounting, finance and business. 
Boardex 
 
Top-league Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO studied from a top 50 university 
according to the US News  Rankings 
 
continued 
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Appendix-(Continued) 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
 
 
Panel D: Instrumental Variables 
 
Pool REP Ratio of Republican executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
in the year t 
Federal Elec- 
tion Commi- 
sion and Ex- 
ecucomp 
 
Pool DEM Ratio of Democrat executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
in the year t 
 
Pool EQUAL Ratio of Equal giver executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
in the year t 
 
Alt Pool REP Ratio of Republican executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
at the time of CEO hire. 
 
Alt Pool DEM Ratio of Democrat executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
at the time of CEO hire. 
 
Alt Pool EQ Ratio of Equal giver executives in the same industry-state pair as the firm j, 
at the time of CEO hire. 
 
Pool PII Average ideology of executives, as measured by PII, in the same industry- 
state pair as the firm j, in the year  t. 
 
Pool DW Nominate Average ideology of executives, as measured by DW Nominate, in the same 
industry-state pair as the firm j, in the year  t. 
 
Panel E: Other Variables Used 
 
REP Rule Pres Dummy variable taking the value of one for the years in which there was a 
Republican president and zero otherwise 
 
United States Senate 
 
Rep Rule Senate  Categorical variable assigned a value of 1 if both the representatives of the State 
in the US Senate were Republicans, 0.5 if one was republican and the other 
a Democrat and 0 if both the senators were  Democrats. 
 
Rep Rule Gov Categorical variable assigned a value of 1 if the governor of the    State is 
Republicans and 0 otherwise. 
 
State GDP The gross domestic product of each state in a given year. 
 
Industry GDP The gross domestic product of each industry at a single digit level in a given year.   Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
(BEA) 
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Abstract 
 
 
We test whether focal firms whose CEOs sit on multiple boards can suffer decreases in 
performance due to transient attention-grabbing events in firms where CEOs sit as 
independent directors. We exploit extreme returns (positive and negative), extreme 
earnings and extreme volatility in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors    and 
find that such distraction leads to an average decrease of approximately 1%        of focal 
firms’ ROA, Q, market returns and ROE. This effect is stronger for focal firms that 
are geographically more distant to firms where CEOs sit as independent directors, which 
suggests that distraction is costlier in such situations. Additionally,  we  show that 
distraction is greater for CEOs that sit on the audit committee or     chair a major sub-
committee.  Finally, we show that these distraction events also    lead to lower CEO 
compensation and a higher probability of forced turnover. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“Don’t go overboard!” In their recent policy papers, two of the largest U.S. proxy advisors 
strongly recommend against the directors who sit on too many boards. Glass Lewis, for 
instance, terming it as “overboarding”, said they would only recommend directors who 
serve on no more than five boards, instead of six. The limit is much more stringent for 
CEOs serving on boards which just got updated from three to two seats. BlackRock, the 
world’s largest asset manager, cast 168 votes against directors last year owing to 
overboarding concerns (Sarah Krouse and Joann S. Lublin, 2017). These policy updates 
by proxy advisors are reflective of the rising concern that the directors may be stretching 
themselves too thin due to directorships becoming more time consuming. In the U.S., the 
number of hours devoted to the duties pertaining to directorship has increased by 18% 
over the previous decade. 
 
Indeed, recent research had highlighted the negative consequences of directors being too 
busy or distracted (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field et al., 2013; Masulis 
and Zhang, 2018). Attention is a limited resource. Distracting events demand additional 
attention and, given limited attention, this implies shifting attention away from another 
task. Using this intuition, numerous studies have highlighted the consequences of limited 
attention on corporate finance (Falato et al., 2014; Kempf et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2016; 
Stein and Zhao, 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Masulis and Zhang, 2018). However, most of this 
research has exclusively focused on the distraction of directors and its consequences for 
the firms on whose board they sit.1 In contrast to the prior literature, in this paper we 
focus on the distraction of CEOs sitting as directors on boards of other firms and its 
consequences on the profitability of the focal employing firm. If a CEO is distracted due 
to his responsibilities as a director in other firms, the employing firms could be affected 
significantly. 
 
We follow intuition from Kempf et al. (2016) to measure CEO distraction. For each CEO, 
we first measure a shock as a variable which takes on a non-zero value if one of the firms in 
CEO’s portfolio as independent director (not including the focal firm) receives an extreme 
positive or negative returns. We then weight this variable with the weight of each of these 
firm in the CEO’s independent director portfolio (including the CEO’s focal firm) and with 
how unimportant the CEO’s focal firm is to them. We give more weight to instances where 
the shocked directorship is of relatively larger market value or focal firm is of relatively 
1Exceptions include (Kempf et al., 2016) and (Liu et al., 2017)who analyze the effect of distraction of institutional 
investors rather than directors on various corporate outcomes 
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smaller market value in the portfolio of directorships. 
 
We then estimate the impact of CEO distraction on firm profitability. In all our specification, 
we include the firm and year fixed effects to rely on the within firm variation to estimate 
the impact of CEO distraction. Additionally, we control for whether the CEO sits on in 
another board and the market value of the firms in which CEO sits as an independent 
director. This implies that we are comparing changes in firm performance among firms 
that have a more distracted CEO with changes among firms with a less distracted CEO 
while both CEOs sit in another board as an independent director. 
 
We find that the CEO’s focal firm is significantly negatively affected when the CEOs are 
more distracted. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the CEO distraction 
results in a 0.023 lower return-on-asset for the focal firm compared to firms with a non- 
distracted CEO. The effect is economically sizable as the effect is comparable to the effect 
generated by having a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of busy directors 
sitting on the board. These results suggest that the attention-grabbing events at the other 
firms in which CEO sits as an independent director have an impact on the performance of 
the CEO’s focal firm. The effect is transient in nature and lasts for upto two years after 
the year in which CEO became distracted. 
 
Next, we present a number of heterogeneity tests to highlight scenarios when CEOs are 
more distracted. We find that the impact is stronger if the CEO serves as a chair of the 
audit, compensation, and nominating committees in the other firm, with being chair of 
the audit committee resulting in the strongest negative impact on the CEO’s focal firm. 
Finally, we find that the CEOs focal firm suffers more if the extreme returns occur at the 
firm which is geographically further away from the CEO’s focal firm. In addition, we 
distinguish between extreme positive and negative returns to analyze which shocks lead to 
a greater impact on the CEO’s focal firm. We find that both the extreme positive and 
negative returns have a significant negative impact on the CEO’s focal firm. 
 
The results are robust to different ways of measuring distraction, and firm performance. 
In the baseline specification, we define shock as a dummy variable taking value of one if 
the firm on which CEO sits as an independent director receives an extreme return defined 
as top or bottom 15% of the returns.  We  show that the results are similar if instead   we  
define shock equal to one for top or bottom 10%, 5%, and 1% of the returns.  In   the 
baseline specification, we concentrate on the firm’s return-on-asset to measure firm 
performance. We show that the focal firm of the CEO under-performs other firms if we 
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measure performance using annual market returns, Tobin’s Q, and  return-on-equity. 
 
Finally, we shed light on how CEO distraction impacts the CEO’s outcomes. We find 
that the CEO distraction does not impact the salary and bonus received by the CEO. 
However, it impacts the total compensation received by the CEO. In addition, a higher 
CEO distraction results in a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
 
This paper makes multiple contributions to the literature. First, this paper contributes 
to the literature on limited attention in behavioral finance. While previous research has 
used transient attention grabbing events to highlight the consequences of limited attention 
of directors and institutional investors on corporate outcomes, this is the first paper to 
analyze the consequences of such events on CEO distraction. 
 
Moreover, this paper contributes to the vast body of literature on the importance of the 
CEOs. Seminal paper using exogenous distraction events to highlight the consequences of 
CEOs being distracted was by Bennedsen et al. (2006) who document that CEO deaths, 
hospitalization events, and the death of family members have substantial effects on firm 
performance. This paper, however, solely focuses on CEOs’ distraction arising due to their 
professional commitments. While personal distractions such as death or hospitalization 
of family members, marriage, divorce or birth of a child are out of the realm of policy 
and hence, cannot be regularized, the consequences arising from professional distractions 
allows to bring about useful changes in the policy by investors and regulators. Hence, this 
paper is useful in shedding light on the current discussions among the investors and proxy 
advisors on the issue of “overboarding” by documenting a previously unexplored outcome 
of sitting on multiple boards. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and along 
with the construction of the measure of distraction used for the analysis. Section 3 the 
empirical methodology used in the paper and section 4 presents the main results obtained. 
Section 5 and 6 present the results from additional tests highlighting scenarios when CEOs 
are more distracted, the horizon of distraction and the effect of CEO distraction on various 
CEO outcomes. Section 7 presents robustness checks. Lastly, section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
131  
2 Data and Sample 
 
The focus of this paper is on CEOs that hold outside directorships at other boards. These 
individuals are presumably allocating most of their time and effort on the firm where 
they hold their CEO title. This is consistent with the strong monetary and reputation 
incentives CEOs possess. Nonetheless, attention is a limited resource. Even with CEOs 
prioritizing their CEO position over other jobs, we argue that transient attention-grabbing 
events that happen at other firms where CEOs participate as outside members generate 
enough distraction for the CEO that the performance of the focal firm worsens. 
 
Data on CEOs and directors is obtained from BoardEx, a database that gathers biographical 
information about board members around the globe. BoardEx analysts gathers individuals’ 
full history regarding employment, their education and other activities such as memberships, 
not-for-profit activities. BoardEx allows to track how individuals are connected across 
organizations, which is key in our study as we focus on CEOs that are connected with 
other boards through their role as independent board members. BoardEx starts tracking 
individuals from 1999, increasing the scope of their data through to nowadays. 
 
We also obtain market prices from CRSP, and financial accounting data and ZIP codes 
from Compustat. In additional analyses we make use of executive compensation data 
from Execucomp and use the United States Census Bureau 2018 Gazetteer Files for the 
translation of ZIP codes to geographical coordinates.2 
 
We proceed as follows to match the different databases: first, we obtain information about 
directors’ employment within BoardEx using their employment history to identify CEOs. 
Also, we identify in the same file whether CEOs hold the role of independent director in 
another firm simultaneously to that of CEO. Second, we merge the information on 
directors and board level controls obtained from BoardEx with the attention-grabbing 
shocks and controls from CRSP and Compustat. Throughout the paper we have data 
available for 4260 unique firms that we track over the period 1999-2016, although we do 
not have a balanced panel dataset.  
2We obtain data on the latitude and longitude for US Zip codes from the US Census Bureau from the following   URL: 
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer2018.html 
132  
\ 
2.1 Measuring CEO Distraction 
 
Our main variable of interest is a firm-level proxy for how much the CEO is distracted in 
a given year due to their role as independent director at another firm. We are inspired by 
studies such as Masulis and Mobbs (2014), which exploit independent directors’ preferences 
of effort allocation over their different directorships and Kempf et al. (2016), which study 
how institutional investors get temporarily distracted by attention grabbing shocks. We 
call this proxy “distraction” and it is defined such that higher values of this measure 
indicate when CEOs are more distracted in their focal firms. In terms of our distracted 
CEO hypothesis, a higher distraction implies temporarily less attention to the operations 
of the focal firm. 
 
The intuition behind CEO distraction and our measure is the following: a given CEO c 
in a focal firm i is more likely to be distracted if there is an attention-grabbing event in 
another firm where such CEO participates as an independent director, and that if that 
other firm is important for the CEO, i.e., the firm represents a large percentage of relative 
market value over the portfolio of different directorships in which the CEO participates 
in a given year (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). These attention grabbing events should at 
the same time create less distraction for CEOs if their focal firm (where they hold the 
CEO status) is of relative importance in the portfolio of different directorships in which 
the CEO participates in a given year, i.e., if the relative market value of the focal firm 
with respect to the whole portfolio is greater. We first compute the weighted distraction 
that every independent directorship d generates for a CEO in a given year t, and later we 
aggregate it at the focal firm level i as: 
 
 
D 
Distractionit = (1 − ωit) × Shockdt × ωdt, (1) 
d 
 
 
where Shockdt captures whether an attention-grabbing event occurs in a directorship other 
than the one where the CEOs hold their status as chief officer and ωdt represents  how 
much CEO c cares about the shocked directorship.  The weight (1 − ωit) captures  how 
important focal firm f is in CEO i ’s portfolio. 
 
More specifically, we start calculating ωdt, which indicates the market value weight a 
directorship d represents over the total portfolio of directorships (including the focal  firm 
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d 
d 
MV  +     D MVdt 
MV  +     D MVdt 
where CEOs hold their CEO status) in a given year t.3Secondly, we define Shockdt as   a 
firm-level measure that indicates whether there is an attention-grabbing event going 
on in firm d at time t. In most of our tests, Shockdt is an indicator variable that takes 
the value one whenever a directorship shows extreme neutral returns. We define extreme 
neutral returns for a given firm d at year t where CEOs sit as independent directors as 
the top or bottom 15%, 10%, 5% or 1% returns from the distribution of firm d. These 
two terms measure whether there is something happening that could attract the time 
and attention from CEO c and whether this event happens at a firm that is of  relative 
importance for such CEO. Finally, we define (1 − ωit) where ωit is the relative importance 
of the focal firm i in the portfolio of directorships for CEO c in year t. We give more 
weight to instances where the shocked directorship (focal firm) is relatively larger (smaller) 
and thus the attention-grabbing event will have a greater impact. We weight the measure 
twice as it could be that a CEO participates in three different directorships (including the 
focal firm), and including both weights provide a more complete view of the importance of 
the CEO distraction. Therefore, we define: 
 
 
  MVdt  ω = , (2) 
dt 
it 
 
 
and 
 
 
  MVit  ω  = , (3) 
it 
it 
 
 
where MVit and MVdt are the market value of the focal firm and a firm where the CEO 
participates as an independent  director. 
 
To sum up, our measure of CEO distraction (Equation 1) depends on whether there are 
attention-grabbing events at other firms in which CEOs participate, whether those 
firms are of relative importance for the CEO and whether the focal firm is of relative 
unimportance for the CEO. 
 
Table I shows the summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper. We see that 
mean of the CEO distraction according to the baseline measure is 0.02. We see that 26% 
3Market value is calculated as prcc f*csho from  Compustat. 
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of the CEOs sit as an independent director in another firm in a given year. On average, 
4% of the CEOs sit as an independent director in another firm within the same industry. 
Around 7% of the independent directors sit in more than three other boards. The average 
return-on-asset in our sample is -0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.22. 
 
 
3 Empirical  Methodology 
 
In this section we discuss the main empirical strategy. We are interested in evaluating the 
impact of CEO distraction due to extreme returns at the other firm in which the CEO 
sits as an independent director. We estimate the following equation: 
 
ROAi,t = α + βDistractioni,t + γtControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit, 
where ROAi,t is the return-on-asset for firm i in the year t. Distractioni,t is the measure 
of CEO distraction which takes on a non-zero value if the CEO is distracted. In the 
baseline specification, we measure the distraction variable using different definitions of 
neutral shocks at 15%, 10% and 5% i.e. bottom and top 15%, 10% and 5% performance 
in the firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. In the augmented 
specification, we explore whether the CEO’s are more distracted due to positive or negative 
shocks. Controlsi,t−1 are one-period lagged firm controls. We include board controls such 
as the proportion of independent directors, proportion of busy directors in the focal firm, 
board size and board tenure; firm controls such as the firm size, market-to-book value, 
leverage, cash and sales growth; and CEO controls such as the tenure of the CEO, age 
and gender of the CEO. 
 
Additionally, to account for differences in firm performance among firms in which the CEO 
sits in another board and those in which CEOs do not have any outside directorship, we 
control for whether the CEO holds a seat in another board as an independent director 
(Outside Seat) and the proportion of firms where CEOs sit as independent board members 
that are in the same industry (Pct Same Industry). To account for market size of the firms 
in which the CEO sits as an independent director, we control for the log of the average 
market value of firms where CEOs sit as independent directors (Mkv Other). 
 
πi denotes the firm fixed effects. This expression absorbs all the firm-specific time-invariant 
factors that may explain firm performance. Factors such as the location and the industry 
of the firm are absorbed by this term. τt accounts for the year effects which absorb shocks 
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which are common to all the firms in a given year. This term absorbs shocks such as the 
business cycle fluctuations. 
 
Our main parameter of interest is the β. β measures how the performance of the focal 
firm changes with respect to a unit increase in the distraction of the CEO. For β to reflect 
an impact of distracted CEO and not some CEO or firm-specific factors, the measure of 
distraction needs to be orthogonal to the CEO and focal firm. Given that we focus on the 
attention-grabbing events at other firms in which CEOs participate, it is likely that these 
events are uncorrelated with the characteristics of the focal firm. 
 
 
4 Main Results 
 
Table II shows the main results. In all specifications, we include firm and year fixed effects 
and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. We see that a higher CEO distraction 
results in a lower firm performance for the focal firm. We see that a unit increase in the 
CEO distraction results in a 0.042 lower return-on-asset. This implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in the distraction results in a 0.023 standard deviation lower 
return-on-asset for the focal firm. 
 
The effect is similar across the different definitions of CEO distraction. We measure 
CEO distraction using 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% neutral returns in Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. We see that the a unit increase in the CEO distraction as measured according 
to 10%, 5%, and 1% extreme events in the firm where the CEO is an independent director 
leads to a 0.038, 0.045, and 0.037 lower return-on-asset in the focal firm of the CEO. 
 
We also see that the proportion of CEOs sitting in the board of other firms in the same 
industry do not have an impact on the performance of the focal firm. We see that a higher 
proportion of busy directors is associated with a 0.046 lower return-on-asset. Since the 
magnitudes and standard deviations of CEO distraction and busy directors are similar, 
these estimates suggest that the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the CEO 
distraction on the focal firm is similar to the impact of a one standard deviation increase 
in the proportion of busy directors. 
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5 When are CEOs more distracted? 
5.1 Chair and subcommittee participation 
 
The CEO distraction stemming from CEOs sitting on board of other firms maybe more if 
these individuals have important role in the board. In this section, we test whether CEOs 
having an important role in the board leads to a greater loss in firm profitability in the 
focal firm. Specifically, we analyze CEO distraction due to role of CEO as a chairperson 
of one of the three committees: audit, compensation, and nomination. 
 
Table III shows the results. We see that a one unit increase in the CEO distraction 
stemming from firm in which CEO is chairperson of one of the three committees results in 
a 0.060 lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s focal firm. On the contrast, a similar shock 
leads to a 0.038 lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s focal firm if the CEO is not the 
chairperson of one of the three committees. 
 
The three key committees: audit, compensation, and nomination committees may require 
different level of attention as a result of a shock to the firm profitability. In Columns 2 to 5, 
we specifically test how the impact on the focal firm differs depending on whether the CEO 
is a chairperson of each of these three different committees. In Column 2, we see that a 
one unit increase in the CEO distraction when CEO is chairperson of the audit committee 
results in a 0.047 lower return-on-asset, while a similar increase in distraction results 
in a 0.039 lower return-on-asset if the CEO is not chairperson of the audit committee. 
In Column 3, we see that a one unit increase in the CEO distraction when CEO is 
chairperson of the audit committee results in a 0.048 lower return-on-asset, while a similar 
increase in distraction results in a 0.042 lower return-on-aseet if the CEO is not chairperson 
of the audit committee. These results suggest that being the chairperson of the audit 
and nomination committees require more CEO attention relative to the compensation 
committee. 
 
 
5.2 Geographic  Distance 
 
The CEO distraction maybe greater or lower depending on the geographic distance of the 
firm in which CEO sits as an independent director. For instance, after an onslaught of 
a negative shock to a firm, there may be board meetings to discuss how to address the 
concerns and devise new strategies. It would arguably be easier to attend such meetings 
without being away from one’s focal firm for greater amount of time if the firm in which 
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CEO sits as a director is closer to her focal firm. It may also be easier to monitor the 
firms which are close and hence may consume less time and attention of the CEO. In this 
section, we test whether CEOs are more distracted by firms which are geographically close 
to their focal firm. 
 
Table IV shows the results. We define far and near as dummy variables equal to one if the 
geogprahic distance between the firm in which CEO sits as an independent director and 
focal firm of the CEO is less than median and greater than the median, respectively. We 
see that the shock to firm in which CEO sits as an independent director results in a greater 
decrease in firm profitability if the firm is geographically far from the CEO’s focal firm. 
We see that a unit increase in the CEO distraction results in a 0.045 lower return-on-asset 
if the firm is geographically further away from the CEO’s focal firm, while it results in a 
0.028 lower return-on-asset if the firm is geographically close to the CEO’s focal firm. 
 
 
 
6 Additional  Results 
6.1 Horizon of impact 
 
In this section, we analyze the dynamic impact of CEO distraction on firm performance. 
Table V shows the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance in the subsequent 
years. We see that the impact of CEO distraction lasts for two years i.e. the year and  the 
year following the year in which CEO is distracted. We see that a unit increase in the 
CEO distraction leads to a 0.016 lower return-on-asset in the year following the year in 
which CEO was distracted due to extreme events at the firm in which CEO sits as an 
independent director. The impact in the subsequent year is around 40% of the impact of 
CEO distraction in the year in which CEO is distracted. 
 
We see a similar dynamic pattern across different definitions of firm performance. We see 
that the a larger CEO distraction also impacts the annual market returns last for two 
years. A unit increase in the CEO distraction results in a 1 percentage point lower annual 
market return in the CEO’s focal firm in the year following the year in which CEO became 
distracted. These estimates are three times larger than the impact of CEO distraction on 
the annual market return in the year in which CEO became distracted. This suggests that 
it takes some time for the impact of CEO distraction to reflect into the market returns. 
 
In Panel C, we measure the impact of CEO distraction on the long-term firm performance 
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as measured by Tobin’s Q. We see that the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance 
lasts for three years following the CEO distraction. A one standard deviation increase in 
the CEO distraction results in a 0.012 and 0.007 standard deviation lower Tobin’s Q in 
the year t + 1 and year t + 2, respectively. Finally, in Panel D, we see that the impact of 
CEO distraction on return-on-equity does not extend to the subsequent years. Together, 
these results show that the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance lasts for one 
year after the distraction. 
 
 
6.2 CEO outcomes 
 
Does CEO distraction result in any change in CEO outcomes? In this section, we explore 
whether CEO distraction impacts the CEO outcomes. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether the distraction impacts the CEO compensation and CEO turnover. Table VI 
shows the impact of distraction on CEO outcomes. We see that a higher CEO distraction 
does not impact the salary (Column 1) and bonus (Column 2) of the CEO. On the other 
hand, we see that a higher CEO distraction results in a lower total compensation. We see 
that a one unit increase in the CEO distraction results in a 0.013 standard deviation lower 
total compensation (Column 3). 
 
In Columns 4 to 6, we study whether the CEO turnover is affected by the CEO distraction. 
We see that CEO distraction does not change the probability of unconditional CEO 
turnover (Column 4). However, once we condition the CEO turnover on the market 
return or return-on-asset, we see that CEO distraction leads to a higher CEO turnover. 
Specifically, we see a one unit increase in the CEO distraction leads to a 2.3 and 2.2 
percentage points higher CEO turnover conditioning for market returns and return-on-asset 
increases, respectively. These results suggest a 10% increase in the probability of CEO 
turnover for an average firm. 
 
 
7 Robustness Tests 
7.1 Alternative Shocks to CEO Distraction 
 
In this section, we show that the results are robust to alternative definition of shocks used 
to capture CEO distraction. First, instead of using a continuous measure of distraction as 
we did in our baseline specification, we define distraction as a dummy variable taking value 
one whenever CEO is distracted and zero otherwise. Hence, we do not do any weighting 
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as before and use the dummy “shock” to capture CEO distraction. In Panel A, Table VII 
we see that the return-on-asset in the firms with distracted CEOs is 0.007 or 0.03 
standard deviation lower compared to firms with a non-distracted CEO. These results are 
much smaller in magnitude to the previous results suggesting that the level of distraction 
matters for the performance of focal firm. 
 
Second, we analyze whether CEOs are more reactive to positive shocks or the negative 
shocks. Panel B reports the effect of the negative shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as 
director on CEO’s focal firm. We see that a one standard deviation higher CEO distraction 
due to negative shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director leads to a 0.013 standard 
deviations lower return-on-asset. In Panel C, we see how positive shocks impact CEO’s 
focal firm. We see that a one standard deviation increase in the CEO distraction due to 
positive shocks at the other firm in which CEO sits as a director leads to a 0.018 standard 
deviation lower return-on-asset. The impact of a positive shock is 40% larger in magnitude 
compared to the negative shock. 
 
In Panel D, we test whether volatility shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director 
impact the firm performance at the focal firm. We see that the volatility shocks also result 
in lower firm performance at the CEO’s focal firm. A one standard deviation increase 
in CEO distraction due to higher volatility of return-on-asset in the firm in which CEO 
serves as an independent director leads to a 0.009 standard deviation lower return-on-asset 
in the CEO’s focal firm. These results paint a consistent picture that the CEO distraction 
due to positive, negative, and volatility shocks at the firm in which CEO sits as a director 
lead to a lower firm performance in the CEO’s focal firm. 
 
 
7.2 Alternate  Measures  of Performance 
 
In this section, we show that the results are robust to alternate ways of measuring firm 
performance. Table VIII shows the results. In Panel A, we measure the performance 
using annual market return. We see that a unit increase in the CEO distraction results 
in a 0.3 to 1.6 percentage points lower annual market return depending on the definition 
of distraction in the CEO’s focal firm. In Panel B, we see measure the impact of CEO 
distraction on firm’s long term performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. We see that firms 
with a unit higher distracted CEO have a 0.45 to 0.28 lower Tobin’s Q according to 
different definitions of distraction. Finally, in Panel C, we measure the impact of CEO 
distraction on firm performance using return-on-equity as a measure for firm performance. 
We see that a unit higher distracted CEO results in 0.069 to 0.094 lower return-on-equity 
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according to different measures of distraction. These results together show that the impact 
of CEO distraction on firm performance is robust not only to different cut-offs of defining 
CEO distraction, but also to various different measures of firm performance. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of CEO distraction on firm performance. We measure 
CEO distraction as the transient extreme positive or negative returns in the firms in which 
CEO sits as an independent director. We find that the CEO’s focal firm suffers as a result 
of these attention-grabbing events in the firms among CEO’s directorship portfolio. A one 
standard deviation increase in the CEO distraction results in a 0.023 standard deviation 
lower return-on-asset in the CEO’s focal firm. The effect is stronger if the CEO serves 
as a chair in one of the committees in the other firm and if the firm is geographically 
distant from the CEO’s focal firm. We also show that these distraction events also lead to 
lower CEO compensation and higher forced turnover. These results suggest that CEO 
distraction can be costly for the focal firm. 
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 Table I: Sample Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Observations Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75 
 
ROA 25708 -0.02 0.22 -0.02 0.04 0.08 
Return 25468 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.03 
Tobin Q 25708 1.92 1.61 0.97 1.42 2.23 
ROE 25705 -0.01 0.65 -0.03 0.08 0.16 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral 25708 0.02 0.12 0 0 0 
Distraction 10/90 Neutral 29223 0.02 0.09 0 0 0 
Distraction  5/95  Neutral 32437 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 
Distraction  1/99  Neutral 34163 0 0.05 0 0 0 
Distracted 15/85 Neutral 25708 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 
Distraction 15/85 Negative 29896 0.01 0.09 0 0 0 
Distraction 15/85 Positive 32163 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 
Distraction  15/85  Volatility 31755 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 
Salary 12821 776.51 344.72 519.62 737.31 996.44 
Bonus 12821 326.50 696.59 0 0 332.46 
Compensation 12769 5494.63 5477.78 1761.37 3796.37 7156.47 
Turnover 25708 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 
Forced  Turnover  (Return) 25708 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 
Forced Turnover (ROA) 25708 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 
Pct Same Industry 25708 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 
Pct Busy 25708 0.07 0.11 0 0 0.12 
Pct Ind 25708 0.71 0.17 0.6 0.75 0.86 
Outside Seat 25708 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
Mkv Other 25708 6.67 2.48 4.97 6.52 8.16 
CEO Tenure 25708 9.02 7.81 3 7 12 
CEO Age 25708 55.69 8.22 50 56 61 
Female CEO 25708 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 
Board Tenure 25708 6.99 3.45 4.5 6.44 8.86 
Board Size 25708 8.58 1.30 7.02 9.03 9.97 
Firm Size 25708 6.1 1.99 4.67 6.07 7.48 
MTB 25708 3.24 4.77 1.36 2.25 3.81 
Leverage 25708 0.2 0.2 0.01 0.15 0.31 
Cash 25708 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.32 
Sales Growth 25708 0.14 0.45 -0.02 0.07 0.2 
ROA is measured as the ratio between net income before special items (ib) over total assets (at). ROE is measured as the ratio between 
net income before special items (ib) over the book value of common equity (ceq). Tobin Q is measured as the ratio between the market value 
of equity (csho*prcc f), plus debt in short-term liabilities (dlc), plus long-term debt (dltt), plus the liquidating value of preferred shares (pstkl) 
and plus the accumulated tax deferrals (txdb), over the book value of total assets (at). Return is the yearly-average return at the fiscal year end. 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the CEO 
holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ return 
for Distraction 15/85 Neutral. Distraction 10/90 Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and negative 
returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 10% of the sample time series 
distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction 10/90 Neutral. Distraction 5/95 Neutral is the measure of CEO distraction generated by 
extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom 
or top 5% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction 5/95 Neutral. Distraction 1/99 Neutral  is the measure 
of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive and negative returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These 
shocks are defined as the bottom or top 1% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction 1/99 Neutral. Distracted 
15/85 Neutral is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 whenever there are extreme positive or negative returns in firms where the CEO holds 
an independent director position.  These shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the sample time series distribution     of a firms’ return 
for Distracted 15/85 Neutral. Distraction 15/85 Negative is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme negative returns in firms 
where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the bottom 15% of the sample time series distribution of a 
firms’ return for Distraction 15/85 Negative. Distraction 15/85 Positive is the measure of CEO distraction generated by extreme positive 
returns in firms where the CEO holds an independent director position. These shocks are defined as the top 15% of the sample time series 
distribution of a firms’ return for Distraction 15/85 Positive. Distraction 15/85 Volatility is the measure of CEO distraction generated by 
extreme volatility (volatility is calculated as the annual standard deviation of monthly returns) in firms where the CEO holds an independent 
director position. These shocks are defined as the top 15% of the sample time series distribution of a firms’ volatility for Distraction 15/85 
Volatility. Salary is the inflation-adjusted annual fixed salary (in thousands of USD) of a CEO. Bonus is the inflation- adjusted annual bonus 
(in thousands of USD) of a CEO. Compensation is the inflation-adjusted total annual compensation (in thousands of USD) of a CEO. Turnover 
is an indicator variable that takes the value one whenever CEOs are in the final year of their tenure. Forced Turnover (Return) is an indicator 
variable that takes the value one whenever CEOs are in the final year of their tenure and the firm’s market return in the previous year is at the 
bottom quartile of the industry-year distribution. Forced Turnover (ROA) is an indicator variable that takes the value one whenever CEOs are 
in the final year of their tenure and the firm’s ROA in the previous year is at the bottom quartile of the industry-year distribution. Pct Same 
Industry measures the percentage of firms where CEOs sit as independent board members and that are classified in the same 2-digit SIC code 
as the CEO focal firm. Pct Busy is the percentage of independent directors that hold at least three board seats in a given year. Pct Ind is the 
percentage of independent directors in a given year. Outside Seat is an indicator variable that takes the value one whenever the CEO holds a 
seat in another board as an independent director. Mkv Other is the natural logarithm of the average market value of firms where CEOs sit as 
independent directors. CEO Tenure is the number of years that a CEO has held their role as CEO. CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Female 
CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the CEO is of female gender. Board Tenure is the average number of years that 
Independent Directors have held their role in the firm. Board Size is the number of board members in a given firm and year. Firm Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets (ln(at)). MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the ratio between a firm’s market value of equity (prcc 
f*csho) and book value of equity (ceq). Leverage is the ratio between total debt (dlc + dltt) and total assets (at). Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio 
measured as cash (ch) divided by total assets (at). Sales Growth is the growth rate of sales ((salet-salet−1)/salet). 
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Table II: The Effect of CEO Distraction on Operating Perfor- 
mance. 
Dep. Var: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Neutral Shocks 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99 
Distraction -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.037* 
(-5.109) (-3.981) (-3.192) (-1.945) 
Pct Same Industry 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.012 
(0.746) (0.466) (1.063) (1.311) 
Pct Busy -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.052*** 
(-3.100) (-3.846) (-3.818) (-3.725) 
Pct Ind 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 
(3.648)  (3.621)  (3.808)  (3.654) 
Outside Seat -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
(-4.122) (-4.147) (-3.747) (-3.536) 
Mkv Other 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
(7.508)  (7.239) (6.564) (6.229) 
CEO Tenure -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* 
(-2.062) (-2.169) (-1.955) (-1.850) 
CEO Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.762) (1.046) (0.858) (0.724) 
Female CEO -0.018 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 
(-1.420) (-1.159) (-1.143) (-0.992) 
Board Tenure 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(3.643) (3.361) (3.291) (3.410) 
Board Size 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.013 
(0.096) (0.473) (0.824) (1.359) 
Firm Size -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
(-3.131) (-2.681) (-3.425) (-3.968) 
MTB 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(4.399)  (4.801)  (4.925)  (5.222) 
Leverage  -0.033* -0.040** -0.041** -0.046*** 
(-1.844) (-2.330) (-2.392)  (-2.698) 
Cash -0.000 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
(-0.008) (0.137) (-0.220) (-0.250) 
Sales Growth 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 
(0.646) (0.838) (0.533) (1.029) 
Constant  -0.071* -0.095*** -0.078** -0.065* 
(-1.902)  (-2.671) (-2.187) (-1.871) 
 
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163 
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0167 0.0153 0.0141 0.0141 
 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
ROAi,t = α + βDistractioni,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit 
For Column (1) the measure of CEO distraction is Distraction 15/85 Neutral, for Column (2) the  measure 
is Distraction 10/90 Neutral, for Column (3) is Distraction 5/95 Neutral and for Column 
(4) is Distraction 1/99 Neutral. Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% of the return 
distribution of a given firm. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table I. ***, **, and * represent 
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table III: The Impact of Chair and Subcommittee Participation. 
 
Dep. Var.: ROA (1) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Chair Yes -0.060*** 
(-2.842) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Chair No -0.038*** 
(-4.398) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Audit Comm Yes -0.047*** 
(-3.486) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Audit Comm No -0.039*** 
(-3.967) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Comp Comm Yes  -0.019 
(-1.416) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Comp Comm No -0.048*** 
(-5.188) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Nom Comm Yes  -0.044 
(-0.970) 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral*Nom Comm No -0.042*** 
(-5.087) 
 
Observations 25,708 25,708 25,708 25,708 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0168 0.0167 0.0169 0.0167 
 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
ROAi,t = α + β1Interaction1,,i,t + β2Interaction2,i,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit 
Table III shows the cross-sectional differences of CEO participation in sub-committees of firms where they 
hold an independent director position. CEO distraction is generated by neutral shocks defined as extreme 
positive and negative events at boards where the CEO participates as an independent director.  Neutral  shocks 
are defined in this Table as the bottom or top 15% returns from the return distribution of a given  firm. Chair 
Yes is a dummy variable that takes the value  1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a  board in which the 
CEO holds the title of Chairperson of a major subcommittee (audit, compensation or nominating committee). 
Chair No is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in 
which the CEO does not hold the title of Chairperson of a major subcommittee   (audit, compensation or 
nominating committee). Audit Comm Yes is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral 
shock stems from a board in which the CEO participates as a member of the audit committee. Audit Comm 
No is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral  shock stems from a board in which the 
CEO does not participate as a member of the audit committee.  Comp Comm Yes is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO participates as a 
member of the compensation committee.  Comp  Comm  No  is a dummy variable that takes the value  1 
whenever the neutral shock stems from a board in which          the CEO does not participate as a member of 
the compensation committee. Nom Comm Yes is a  dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the 
neutral shock stems from a board in which the CEO participates as a member of the nominating committee. 
Nom Comm No is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the neutral shock stems from a board 
in which the CEO does not participate as a member of the nominating committee.  All regressions include firm 
FE and year FE and Controls from   Table  II. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered at   the firm level. All variables are defined in Table I except for those defined 
above. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,  respectively. 
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Table IV: The Impact of Geographical  Distance. 
 
Dep. Var.: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Neutral Shocks 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99 
 
Distraction*Far 
 
-0.045*** 
(-4.822) 
 
-0.043*** 
(-3.832) 
 
-0.053*** 
(-3.168) 
 
-0.048** 
(-2.211) 
Distraction*Near -0.028** -0.021 -0.013 0.012 
 (-1.963) (-1.252) (-0.711) (0.352) 
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0168 0.0153 0.0141 0.0142 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
ROAi,t = α+β1Distraction∗Fari,t +β2Distraction∗Neari,t +γtControlsi,t−1 +πi +τt +εit 
Table IV shows the cross-sectional differences of CEO participation in sub-committees of 
firms where they hold an independent director position. CEO distraction is generated by 
neutral shocks defined as extreme positive and negative events at boards where the CEO 
participates as an independent director. Neutral shocks are defined in this Table as the 
bottom or top 15% returns from the return distribution of a given firm. Far is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 whenever the geographical distance from the focal firm to 
the shocked firm is above the median geographical distance between focal firms and the 
firms where CEOs (of the focal firm) participate as independent board members. Near is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the geographical distance from the focal 
firm to the shocked firm is above the median geographical distance between focal firms 
and the firms where CEOs (of the focal firm) participate as independent board members. 
All regressions include firm FE and year FE and Controls from Table II. Coefficients are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. All variables are defined in Table I except for those defined above. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table V: Horizon of the Impact of CEO Distraction on Perfor- 
mance. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 ROAt+4 
 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral -0.016** -0.003 0.006 0.006 
(-2.007) (-0.429) (0.795) (0.792) 
Observations 22,590 19,919 17,655 15,389 
Adj. R2 0.00822 0.00864 0.00858 0.0121 
Panel B Returnt+1 Returnt+2 Returnt+3 Returnt+4 
 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral 0.010*** 0.003 0.004 0.002 
(3.873) (1.045) (1.522) (0.663) 
 
Observations 22,408 19,785 17,551 15,323 
Adj. R2 0.0436 0.0139 0.00972 0.00335 
 
Panel C Tobin Qt+1 Tobin Qt+2 Tobin Qt+3 Tobin Qt+4 
 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral -0.161*** -0.096* -0.003 -0.056 
(-2.926) (-1.726) (-0.041) (-0.955) 
 
Observations 22,591 19,920 17,656 15,390 
Adj. R2 0.0553 0.0270 0.0219 0.0170 
Panel D ROEt+1 ROEt+2 ROEt+3 ROEt+4 
Distraction 15/85 Neutral -0.020 -0.014 0.026 0.025 
(-0.524) (-0.338) (0.834) (0.706) 
Observations 22,587 19,915 17,654 15,386 
Adj. R2 0.00630 0.00472 0.00393 0.00457 
 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equations: 
ROAi,(t+y) = α + βDistraction 15/85 Neutrali,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Returni,(t+y) = α + βDistraction 15/85 Neutrali,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit;  y = 1, 2, 3, 4. T 
obin Qi,(t+y) = α + βDistraction 15/85 Neutrali,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
ROEi,(t+y) = α + βDistraction 15/85 Neutrali,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit; y = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Table V shows the impact of CEO distraction generated by neutral shocks defined as extreme positive and 
negative events at boards where the CEO participates as an independent director. Neutral shocks  are 
defined in this Table as the bottom or top 15% returns from the return distribution of a given firm. All 
regressions include firm FE and year FE and Controls from Table II. Coefficients are reported with t-
statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in 
Table I. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table VI: The Impact of CEO Distraction on CEO Outcomes 
 
 (1) 
 
Salary 
(2) 
 
Bonus 
(3) 
 
Compensation 
(4) 
 
Turnover 
(5) 
Forced 
Turnover 
(Return) 
(6) 
Forced 
Turnover 
(ROA) 
 
Distraction Neutral 15/85 
 
2.791 
 
-32.443 
 
-593.263** 
 
0.020 
 
0.023** 
 
0.022* 
 (0.239) (-0.818) (-2.240) (0.860) (2.196) (1.694) 
Observations 12,821 12,821 12,769 25,709 25,709 25,709 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.0909 0.0132 0.0336 0.0263 0.0190 0.0105 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
CEO Outcomei,t = α + βDistraction Neutral 15/85i,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit 
For Column (1) the measure of CEO outcome is Salary, for Column (2) the measure is Bonus, for 
Column (3) is Compensation, for Column (4) is Turnover and for Columns (5) and (6) the measures are 
Forced Turnover (Return) and Forced Turnover (ROA). Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom 
or top 15% of the return distribution of a given firm. All regressions include firm FE and year FE and 
Controls from Table II. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table I. ***, **, and * represent significance 
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table  VII: Alternative Shocks to CEO Distraction. 
 
Dep.  Var: ROA 
Panel A 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Dummy Indicator (Neutral Shocks) 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99 
 
Distracted 
 
-0.007** 
 
-0.007* 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.002 
 (-2.140) (-1.939) (-1.105) (-0.291) 
Observations 25,708 29,223 32,437 34,163 
Adj. R2 0.0158 0.0148 0.0137 0.0140 
 
Panel B 
Negative Shocks 
 
 
15 
 
 
10 
 
 
5 
 
 
1 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.032*** 
(-3.433) 
 
-0.029*** 
(-2.731) 
 
-0.035** 
(-2.030) 
 
-0.037* 
(-1.945) 
Observations 29,896 31,707 33,422 34,163 
Adj. R2 0.0150 0.0146 0.0140 0.0141 
 
Panel C 
Positive Shocks 
 
 
85 
 
 
90 
 
 
95 
 
 
1 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.049*** 
(-4.041) 
 
-0.039*** 
(-2.758) 
 
-0.051** 
(-2.216) 
 
- 
Observations 32,163 33,860 35,356 36,341 
Adj. R2 0.0153 0.0140 0.0134 0.0133 
 
Panel D 
Volatility Shocks 
 
 
85 
 
 
90 
 
 
95 
 
 
1 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.036* 
 
- 
 (-1.454) (-2.581) (-1.655)  
Observations 31,755 33,497 35,140 36,341 
Adj. R2 0.0128 0.0120 0.0133 0.0133 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
ROAi,t = α + βDistractioni,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit 
Panel A uses a dummy indicator that takes the value one whenever a CEO that participates as an independent director in 
another board that is affected by a neutral shock. Neutral shocks are defined as the bottom or top 15% (Column (1) panel A), 
10% (Column (2) panel A), 5% (Column (3) panel A) and 1% (Column (4) panel A) of the return distribution of a given firm. 
Panel B uses as shocks to CEO distraction negative events defined as the bottom 15% (Column (1) panel B), 10% (Column 
(2) panel B), 5% (Column (3) panel B) and 1% (Column (4) panel B) of the return distribution of a given firm. Panel C uses 
as shocks to CEO distraction positive events defined as the top 15% (Column (1) panel C), 10% (Column (2) panel C), 5% 
(Column (3) panel C) and 1% (Column (4) panel C) of the return distribution of a given firm. Panel D uses as shocks to CEO 
distraction extreme volatility events defined as the top 15% (Column (1) panel D), 10% (Column (2) panel D), 5% (Column (3) 
panel D) and 1% (Column (4) panel D) of the volatility distribution of a given firm’s returns. All regressions include firm FE 
and year FE and Controls from Table II. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table I. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table VIII: Alternative Measures of Performance. 
 
Neutral Shocks (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Market Return 15/85 10/90 5/95 1/99 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.071) 
 
-0.004** 
(-2.149) 
 
-0.008*** 
(-2.862) 
 
-0.016*** 
(-3.538) 
Observations 25,465 28,980 32,195 33,921 
Adj. R2 0.0306 0.0429 0.0577 0.0737 
 
Panel B: Tobin’s  Q 
 
15/85 
 
10/90 
 
5/95 
 
1/99 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.448*** 
(-8.089) 
 
-0.411*** 
(-6.221) 
 
-0.280*** 
(-3.760) 
 
-0.301*** 
(-3.447) 
Observations 25,709 29,224 32,438 34,164 
Adj. R2 0.128 0.121 0.116 0.115 
 
Panel C: ROE 
 
15/85 
 
10/90 
 
5/95 
 
1/99 
 
Distraction 
 
-0.094*** 
 
-0.072** 
 
-0.071* 
 
-0.069 
 (-2.877) (-2.012) (-1.676) (-1.183) 
Observations 25,705 29,218 32,430 34,156 
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.0138 0.0147 0.0148 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects estimation of the following equation: 
P erformancei,t = α + βDistractioni,t + γIControlsi,t−1 + πi + τt + εit 
Panel A uses as dependent variable (performance measure) market returns, Panel B uses Tobin’s Q and 
Panel C uses return on equity.   For  Column (1) the measure of CEO distraction is Distrac-    tion 
15/85 Neutral, for Column (2) the measure is Distraction 10/90 Neutral, for Column (3) is 
Distraction 5/95 Neutral and for Column (4) is Distraction 1/99 Neutral. Neutral shocks are 
defined as the bottom or top 15% of the return distribution of a given firm. All regressions include firm 
FE and year FE and Controls from Table II. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Table I. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
